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ABSTRACT
SOCIAL INTERACTIONS IN EMPIRICAL MICROECONOMICS
Rossa O’Keeffe-O’Donovan
Camilo Garc´ıa-Jimeno
This dissertation studies the effects of social interactions in two different areas of
empirical microeconomics. The first chapter focuses on the effects of decentralized
provision of public goods by a variety of state and non-governmental agencies in
developing countries. In particular, I find evidence of strategic interactions between
neighboring communities in the provision of water in rural Tanzania: communities
simultaneously free ride on, and receive positive spillovers from, each other’s in-
vestments in public goods. In order to disentangle these two effects, I model the
maintenance of pumps as a network game between neighboring communities, and
estimate the model using geo-coded data. Decentralized provision of public goods
is costly in this setting, and I estimate that greater coordination between organiza-
tions installing water pumps would increase pump functionality rates, and result in
modest improvements in school attendance and child survival rates.
The second chapter, which is co-authored, is methodological, and analyzes the eval-
uation of programs and policies in the presence of strategic interactions.1 We show
1The second chapter is co-authored with Daron Acemoglu and Camilo Garc´ıa-Jimeno.
iv
that reduced form estimates of the direct effects and spillover effects of treatment
are biased in settings where there are strategic interactions between the individuals
affected by the program, even if researchers have valid instruments for individual
treatment and neighbors’ treatment. We develop a two-step procedure to test for
and correct this bias. The first step tests for strategic interactions, by estimating a
simple regression of individual treatment on neighbors’ treatment. The second step
uses a simple model to identify the structural parameters and estimate the true
effects of treatment.
Keywords : local public goods, spatial network, water, spillovers, free rider prob-
lem, Tanzania, strategic interactions, program evaluation, structural model.
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INTRODUCTION
My dissertation comprises two chapters and examines how social interactions affect
public goods provision in developing countries, and how they affect estimation of
treatment effects in program evaluation. The first chapter demonstrates that social
interactions have significant effects on the availability of public goods in a setting
where provision is highly decentralized. In particular, I find evidence that free rid-
ing and spillover effects between communities investing in water pump maintenance
in rural Tanzania affect water access and related human capital outcomes. The sec-
ond chapter of my dissertation is methodological: it proposes a procedure to make
unbiased estimates of the direct and indirect effects of a treatment in the presence
of social interactions between potential recipients of the treatment. We combine a
two-step experimental design with a simple structural model and demonstrate the
procedure using simulated data.
The first chapter analyzes the provision of water in sub-Saharan Africa, where
approximately 32 percent of people lack access to an improved source of drinking
water within 1km of their household. Globally, more than one billion people rely
1
on hand-powered pumps as their main source of water, but about one third of these
pumps are non-functional. Both the state and non-governmental organizations pro-
vide public goods in developing countries. In Tanzania, more than 500 organizations
have installed water pumps, potentially generating inefficiencies arising from lack
of coordination on the technology and location of pumps. I analyze whether this
fragmentation of water provision in Tanzania can help explain the low functionality
rate of pumps, by affecting communities’ costs of maintaining their pumps and their
incentives to do so.
I model the maintenance of pumps as a network game, in which communities de-
cide whether to maintain their pump given the existing network of installed water
sources and their neighbors’ maintenance decisions. The model incorporates free
riding between communities by allowing a community to use a neighbor’s water
source if their own pump is non-functional, with the cost of access depending on the
distance they must travel and the characteristics of the alternative water source.
There may also be maintenance cost-reduction spillovers: a community’s cost of
maintaining its pump depends on the maintenance decisions of its neighbors. The
cost of maintenance decreases for each neighbor that chooses to maintain its water
source, with the size of the discount depending on the distance between the water
sources and how similar they are. These maintenance spillovers may occur through
a number of mechanisms, including the creation of markets for spare parts, skill
2
development, or sharing of maintenance costs and information.
Distinguishing social interactions from correlated effects is a major challenge in
estimating network models (Manski (1993)). In this context, spatial correlations
in pump functionality may be driven by social interactions or spatial correlation of
unobserved variables. To overcome this identification challenge, I exploit the decen-
tralized nature of pump installation and use exogenous variation in the similarity
of water sources as a shifter in the strength of spillovers possible between them. I
assume that the strength of spillovers between neighboring communities depends
on whether they have the same technology of pump, but spatially correlated shocks
(e.g. weather) are independent of technology. Evidence from reduced form analysis
and from a survey of water sector experts in Tanzania and other developing coun-
tries supports this assumption. However, regression methods can only estimate the
net effect of spillovers and free riding, so I develop and estimate a model to disen-
tangle these two effects, estimate their magnitude and test the mechanisms through
which they work.
I estimate the model using new geo-coded administrative data on more than 8,500
rural communities in Tanzania with hand-powered water pumps. Estimation of a
network game with binary action space (maintain the pump or not) is difficult,
because community choices are not independent of each other and because multiple
3
equilibria are possible. To address these challenges, I use a clustering algorithm to
partition the water sources, and I assume that each cluster is playing an indepen-
dent game. In each cluster, I calculate the probability that each action profile is
an equilibrium and estimate the likelihood of the observed action profile by using
a probabilistic equilibrium selection rule. I estimate the model by maximum sim-
ulated likelihood, allowing for spatially correlated shocks to the cost of maintenance.
The results indicate that free riding and pump maintenance spillovers are impor-
tant factors in explaining variation in pump functionality. In particular, positive
spillovers are stronger between nearby communities with pumps of the same tech-
nology. I estimate that standardization of technologies installed in Tanzania would
increase the pump functionality rate by 6 percentage points. I also find strong evi-
dence that communities free ride on their neighbors’ water sources, but free riding
decreases when users have to pay to collect water. I estimate that the pump func-
tionality rate would increase by 11 percentage points if all communities charged
fees for water collection. To test the welfare consequences of pump functionality,
I estimate the impact of increased functionality on health and education outcomes
and find evidence of a modest positive effect on both. The increases in school at-
tendance are larger for girls, who are typically responsible for water collection and
would therefore have less distance to walk if pump functionality was increased.
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The second chapter of my dissertation (co-authored with Daron Acemoglu and
Camilo Garc´ıa-Jimeno) is methodological, and analyses the evaluation of programs
when there may be strategic interactions between individuals who may be affected
by the program. Recent improvements in program evaluation techniques have al-
lowed researchers to estimate the spillover effects of programs and policies, in ad-
dition to the direct effects. However, in some settings, there may be an interaction
between the direct effects and the spillover effects of a treatment, if the size of
spillovers depends on an individual’s own treatment status. These interactions are
strategic: an individual’s treatment status will depend on the treatment of their
neighbors.
We show that, in the presence of strategic interactions, reduced form estimates
of direct effects and spillover effects are biased, even when a two-step experimental
design is used. We propose a two-step procedure to test for and correct this bias.
The first step is a simple regression-based test for strategic interactions. Condi-
tional on finding evidence of strategic interactions, the second step uses a simple,
parsimonious model adapted from Acemoglu, Garc´ıa-Jimeno and Robinson (2015)
to estimate the underlying structural parameters and effects of treatment. When
the treatment variable is continuous, the second step involves joint estimation of
two linear equations. However, when treatment is binary, the approach requires a
Heckman-style selection bias correction because individuals can choose whether or
5
not to comply with their assignment to treatment. We demonstrate our procedure
using simulated data, and show that it correctly estimates the underlying structural
parameters and the treatment effects that they determine.
6
Chapter 1
Water, Spillovers and Free Riding:
Provision of Local Public Goods
in a Spatial Network
Abstract
Both state and non-governmental organizations provide public goods in develop-
ing countries, potentially generating inefficiencies where they lack coordination. In
rural Tanzania, more than 500 organizations have installed hand-powered water
pumps in a decentralized fashion. I estimate the costs of this fragmented provision
by studying how communities’ pump maintenance decisions are shaped by strategic
interactions between them. I model the maintenance of pumps as a network game
between neighboring communities, and estimate this model using geo-coded data on
the location, characteristics and functionality of water sources, and human capital
outcomes. Estimation combines maximum simulated likelihood with a clustering al-
gorithm that partitions the data into geographic clusters. Using exogenous variation
in the similarity of water sources to identify spillover and free riding effects between
communities, I find evidence of maintenance cost-reduction spillovers among pumps
of the same technology and strong water source free-riding incentives. As a result,
standardization of pump technologies would increase pump functionality rates by 6
percentage points. Moreover, water collection fees discourage free riding and would
increase pump functionality rates by 11 percentage points if adopted universally.
This increased availability of water would have a modest positive effect on child
survival and school attendance rates.
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1.1 Introduction
An estimated one billion people rely on hand-powered pumps as their main wa-
ter source (Carter, Harvey and Casey (2010)).2 However, approximately one third
of pumps in sub-Saharan Africa are broken, leaving 32 percent of people with-
out access to an improved source of drinking water within 1km of their household
(WHO/UNICEF (2015)).3 This lack of water access is costly: provision of water has
been estimated to decrease poverty (Sekhri (2014)), improve health (Kremer et al.
(2011), Jalan and Ravallion (2003), Galiani, Gertler and Schargrodsky (2005)), in-
crease welfare (Devoto et al. (2012)) and increase school attendance, particularly for
girls, who are often responsible for water collection in sub-Saharan Africa (UNDP
(2006)).
In developing countries with limited public resources, water sources and other pub-
lic goods are provided by both state and non-state actors (Collier (2009), Batley
and Mcloughlin (2010)). Despite significant investment by developing country gov-
ernments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and aid agencies, functionality
rates of hand-powered water pumps remain stubbornly low. I analyze whether de-
centralized provision of water can help explain this fact.
2Figures A.21 to A.24 in section A.2 of the Appendix show pictures and technical details of
the four most common technologies of hand-powered pumps in Tanzania.
3According to the classification used by WHO and UNICEF an ‘improved’ source of drinking
water includes piped water, a public tap or standpipe, a handpump, a protected spring or rain-
water. ‘Unimproved’ sources include an unprotected spring, an unprotected dug well and surface
water.
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Decentralized provision of public goods is strategic: one actor’s decision to pro-
vide a public good can affect another’s incentive to invest in a similar public good.
I develop a spatial network model to explain the water pump maintenance decisions
made by rural communities in Tanzania. By applying new tools from network eco-
nomics and industrial organization to this empirical context, I contribute towards
a better understanding of what determines pump functionality, and its impact on
health and education outcomes. This paper also includes methodological innova-
tions: first by using a novel empirical strategy to identify network effects, and second
by using a clustering algorithm to help overcome multiplicity in the estimation of
a network game with binary action space.
In the model, decentralized communities decide whether to maintain their pumps,
given the actions of their neighbors and the existing network of installed water
sources.4 The model incorporates free riding by allowing a community to use a
neighbor’s water source if their own pump is non-functional, with the cost of access
depending on the distance they must travel and the characteristics of the alternative
water source. A community’s cost of maintaining its pump depends on pump and
4There are two main stages of water provision in rural Tanzania. Installation is carried out by
water practitioners, including local and national government, domestic and international NGOs,
and international aid agencies. However, pump maintenance and repair is by ‘community based
management’ (CBM), and is therefore decentralized. This paper analyzes strategic interactions in
decentralized pump maintenance decisions, taking the installation decisions of water practitioners
as given.
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community characteristics, but also on the maintenance decisions of its neighbors.
The cost of maintenance decreases for each neighbor that chooses to maintain its
water source, with the size of the discount depending on the distance between the
water sources and how similar they are. These maintenance spillovers may occur
through a number of mechanisms, including the creation of markets for spare parts,
skill development, or sharing of maintenance costs and information.5 Health and
education outcomes depend on communities’ maintenance decisions, which allows
me to estimate the effects of pump functionality on child survival and school atten-
dance rates.
Distinguishing social interactions from correlated effects is a major challenge in
estimating network models (Manski (1993)). In this context, spatial correlations in
pump functionality may be driven by social interactions or spatial correlation of un-
observed variables. My identification strategy is motivated by two key facts: pumps
are more likely to be functional if there are more pumps of the same technology
nearby, but are less likely to be functional if there are more non-pump water sources
nearby. These findings are robust to a large number of specifications, and can be
explained in two main ways. First, spatially correlated technology-specific shocks
or unobservables may explain the opposite sign of these correlations. For example,
local physical conditions might affect both the technology of pump installed and the
probability that it is functional. However, I find little quantitative or qualitative
5I discuss the mechanisms for cost of maintenance spillovers in more detail in section 1.2.
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evidence to support this type of mechanism. Instead, the evidence points towards a
second explanation, that there are two counter-acting social interactions occurring:
free riding and positive spillovers in the maintenance of pumps. When there are
many pumps of the same technology nearby, the positive spillover effects dominate,
and pumps are more likely to work. However, when a pump is close to many non-
pump water sources, maintenance spillovers are smaller, and the free riding effect
dominates. While reduced form analysis only yields estimates of the net outcome of
these two effects, employing the model allows me to disentangle them and estimate
their magnitude.
To identify spillover effects in the cost of pump maintenance, I assume that the
strength of spillovers between neighboring communities depends on whether they
have the same technology of pump, but spatially correlated shocks (e.g. weather)
are independent of technology. Evidence from reduced form analysis and a survey
of water sector experts in Tanzania and other developing countries supports this
assumption. To identify free riding in the maintenance of pumps, I use variation in
the availability of community taps, which are typically managed by a centralized
authority rather than a rural community, because of their higher costs.6
6There are two main types of improved water source in Tanzania: hand-powered pumps and
taps (‘community standpipes’). Hand-powered pumps extract groundwater from a drilled well or
borehole, through repeated vertical motion of the handle. Taps typically use a gravity-fed supply
of water from an upland river or spring, transported to the community by pipes. Due to the
high capital costs of gravity schemes, taps are typically managed by a centralized authority. This
paper analyzes strategic interactions in decentralized pump maintenance decisions, but uses the
availability of a community tap as exogenous variation in the cost of accessing an alternative water
source to identify free riding effects.
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I estimate the model using new administrative data from Tanzania, focusing on
8,500 rural communities with hand-powered water pumps. I use census data to
control for community characteristics, hydrological data to control for physical con-
ditions, and collect survey evidence from 32 water sector experts to inform my
modeling decisions and help understand the mechanisms driving the results.7 Es-
timation of a network game with binary action space is challenging, because com-
munity choices are not independent of each other, and because multiple equilibria
are possible.8 To address these challenges, I use a clustering algorithm to partition
the water sources into geographic clusters, and assume that each cluster is playing
an independent game. In each cluster, I calculate the probability that each action
profile is an equilibrium, and estimate the likelihood of the observed action profile
by using a probabilistic equilibrium selection rule.9 I estimate the model by max-
imum simulated likelihood, allowing for spatially correlated shocks to the cost of
7The main source of data is water point mapping data collected between 2011 and 2013 by
GeoData Consultants Limited, a private contractor to the Government of Tanzania. This has
detailed information on all public rural water points in the country, including the type and tech-
nology of each water source, its functionality, management information and GPS coordinates. I
also use a number of secondary data sources: I obtain community characteristics from the 2007-
2008 National Panel Survey, and the 2002 and 2012 Population and Housing Census, and I use
three groundwater variables from the British Geological Survey (2012).
8Community choices are not independent of each other when there are social interactions, so
we cannot estimate the joint likelihood by simply taking a product of the individual likelihoods.
Multiple equilibria are common in games with discrete actions.
9The definition of geographic clusters imposes a restriction on the interactions that the model
allows. There is therefore an inherent tradeoff in the choice of the number and size of clusters
that are defined. The definition of larger clusters allows more interactions between neighboring
communities, but increases the computational burden required to solve the network game. In
a cluster of size n, we must consider 2n possible equilibrium outcomes. Further, each cluster
represents a single ‘observation’, an outcome of a network game. Defining larger clusters therefore
reduces the number of observations of the network game, and reduces the power of the estimation.
I set the maximum cluster size to 10, and define 3431 clusters in the data.
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maintenance.
The results indicate that free riding and pump maintenance spillovers are impor-
tant factors in explaining variation in pump functionality. In particular, positive
spillovers are stronger between nearby communities with pumps of the same technol-
ogy, and I estimate that standardization of technologies installed in Tanzania would
increase the pump functionality rate by 6 percentage points.10 I also find strong
evidence that communities free ride on neighboring communities’ water sources,
but free riding decreases when users have to pay to collect water. I estimate that
increasing the proportion of water sources that charge user fees from 37 percent to
100 percent would increase the pump functionality rate by 11 percentage points.
To test the welfare consequences of pump functionality, I estimate the effect of
increased functionality on health and education outcomes and find evidence of a
modest positive effect on child survival and school attendance. The increase in
school attendance is larger for girls than for boys.
This analysis has applications to provision of a broad class of public goods. Mod-
eling public goods provision in a game of strategic interactions may be particularly
important in developing countries where the provision of many public goods, in-
cluding health and education services, is carried out by a broad array of state and
10I define ‘standardization’ of technologies as the scenario in which all pumps in the data are of
the same technology. There are four main technologies in the data, which account for about 87
percent of handpumps.
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non-state actors. Spillovers and free riding may also affect local provision of pub-
lic goods in developed countries, such as law and order, transport infrastructure
(roads, railways, bridges), reduction of pollution, or investment in public schools.11
This paper draws on and contributes to a number of economic literatures. First
and foremost, it contributes to a new literature examining the provision of pub-
lic goods by multiple communities in a network. Most published research in this
area is theoretical and has characterized Pareto efficiency of equilibria (Elliott and
Golub (2015)), and uniqueness of equilibria (Bramoulle´, Kranton and D’Amours
(2014), Allouch (2015)).12 Acemoglu, Garc´ıa-Jimeno and Robinson (2015) apply
these uniqueness results in their analysis of the provision of state capacity in Colom-
bia, where state capacity refers to the provision of public goods and enforcement
of law and order. They find strong evidence that investments in state capacity
are strategic complements; municipalities invest more in state capacity when their
neighbors do likewise.
11Any public good that is provided locally may induce strategic interactions between neigh-
boring communities, especially when the public good is non-excludable to individuals outside of
a community, which may allow free riding between communities. In some cases it is possible to
exclude ‘outsiders’ from accessing a public good, but spillovers from provision may still occur. For
example, school districts typically give higher priority to students living in the district relative
to those living outside of it, but significant investment in schools may still result in (negative)
spillovers through ‘poaching’ of the best teachers or pupils. The application that has been most
studied in previous literature is spillovers in the provision of law and order (see, for example Dell
(2015)) though as far as I am aware, Acemoglu, Garc´ıa-Jimeno and Robinson (2015) is the only
paper to estimate a full network model.
12Bramoulle´, Kranton and D’Amours (2014) characterize existence and uniqueness of equilibria
with linear best responses, while Allouch (2015) extends this to the non-linear case.
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This paper contributes to the literature on public goods provision in a network in a
few key ways. Most importantly, I use new data to address the critical issue of water
access in developing countries. This requires a different modeling approach and es-
timation of different network effects, principally pump maintenance cost-reduction
spillovers. This empirical context also allows for a novel approach to identify these
spillovers. Acemoglu, Garc´ıa-Jimeno and Robinson (2015) identify network effects
by using historical instruments that give exogenous increases in state capacity of in-
dividual nodes of the network. In contrast, I use exogenous variation in the strength
of spillovers possible between nodes in the network. Furthermore, these previous
papers have only considered a continuous action space, while my action space is
binary, and therefore requires a fundamentally different estimation approach that
allows for multiple equilibria. I exploit the spatial structure of the data to partition
observations into clusters, and calculate the likelihood of the observed action profile
in each cluster.13
13This estimation approach is most similar to that used by Todd and Wolpin (forthcoming), and
incorporates a probabilistic equilibrium selection rule (see Bajari, Hong and Ryan (2010), de Paula
(2013) for an overview of the use of equilibrium selection mechanisms). The model is also similar
to entry games in the industrial organization literature, in which the econometrician observes a
cross section of markets playing a similar game (for example, Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), Berry
(1992), Ciliberto and Tamer (2009)). I model maintenance decisions in a game with complete
information, and consider Nash equilibria in pure strategies, as this more accurately reflects the
empirical context, in which nearby communities observe each others’ costs and actions. This
approach is common in the literature (Berry (1992), Mazzeo (2002), Tamer (2003), Andrews,
Berry and Jia (2004), Jia (2008), Ciliberto and Tamer (2009)), but an alternative approach would
be to model this as an incomplete information game and consider Bayes-Nash equilibria, which
would guarantee a pure strategy equilibrium. In equilibrium, each community must hold consistent
beliefs, and play a best response according to their beliefs over other players’ actions. To avoid
computationally intense solutions for players’ beliefs,they can be estimated using non-parametric
conditional choice probabilities (Hotz and Miller (1993)). This is a promising avenue for future
research. de Paula (2013) provides an excellent review of estimation of games with multiple
equilibria, with both complete and incomplete information. .
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I also draw on the literature examining the identification of social interactions
(Manski (1993), Brock and Durlauf (2001), Brock and Durlauf (2007), Bramoulle´,
Djebbari and Fortin (2009), De Giorgi, Pellizzari and Redaelli (2010)).14 Although
I try to use Manski’s original language of exogenous and correlated effects where
possible, in our context there is a distinction between actions and outcomes (in
Manski’s original paper these are interchangeable). Therefore, I distinguish be-
tween pure spillovers, the effect of neighbors’ actions on each others’ outcomes,
and strategic interactions, the effect of neighbors’ actions on each others’ actions
(Manski’s endogenous effects). Angelucci and Di Maro (2016) define four types of
spillovers: externalities; social interactions, including resource sharing, information
sharing and changing incentives; context equilibrium effects, on behavioral or social
norms; and general equilibrium effects. In our empirical context, strategic inter-
actions are likely to occur through social interactions, but may also occur through
other channels, as I explore in more detail in section 1.2.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 1.2 provides more
detail on the provision of water in rural Tanzania and how this relates to my em-
pirical approach, then section 1.3 describes the main sources of data. Section 1.4
establishes key facts about spatial correlations in the functionality of water pumps,
14See Blume et al. (2010) or de Paula (2016) for a recent review of this literature. I use partially
overlapping peer groups (or ‘neighbors of neighbors’) to help overcome the reflection problem
(Bramoulle´, Djebbari and Fortin (2009) and De Giorgi, Pellizzari and Redaelli (2010)).
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and how I use these to identify spillover effects in the network model. Section 1.5
describes the model, while section 1.6 gives an overview of the estimation procedure,
and how I identify each of the model parameters. Section 1.7 presents the model es-
timates, model fit, and evaluates potential policies to improve water provision, and
the effects this may have on health and education outcomes. Section 1.8 concludes.
1.2 Empirical context: rural water supply in Tanzania
Tanzania is one of the least developed countries in the world, ranked 151 out of 188
countries in the UN’s Human Development Index in 2015 (UNDP (2015)). In rural
areas, only 46 percent of people have access to an improved source of drinking water
within 1km of their home, an increase of only 1 percent since 1990 (JMP (2015)).
The two most common types of improved water source in rural Tanzania, hand-
pumps and taps, have functionality rates of 63 percent and 68 percent respectively.
Access to water has always been poor in rural Tanzania, despite significant nat-
ural renewable water resources (UN FAO (2005)). In the period after independence
in 1961, and with donor support, the national government embarked on a highly
centralized system of free water provision, installing diesel-powered pumps to ex-
tract water from boreholes (Mashauri and Katko (1993)). In response to high rates
of breakdown, there was a shift towards installing handpump technologies in the
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1980s, which are considered easier to maintain.15
Four handpump technologies are now common in Tanzania: Afridev, India Mark
II, SWN 80 and Nira.16 Each technology can be installed on either a hand dug or
machine drilled borehole, and uses a cylinder and plunger to lift groundwater to
the surface. However, each technology has a different design, with different internal
mechanisms which require different parts, a fact that is crucial to identification of
pump maintenance spillovers in the model. For pictures of the pumps, and more
technical details on the four technologies, see section A.2 of the Appendix.
Provision of handpumps has two main stages: installation and maintenance. In
Tanzania, as in most developing countries, handpumps are installed by ‘water prac-
titioners’ (local or national government, domestic or international non-governmental
organizations and aid agencies), but the local community is responsible for ongoing
costs of operation, maintenance and repairs. This is because the capital expenditure
required for installation is unaffordable for the vast majority of beneficiary commu-
nities, at $20 to $61 per person, whereas ongoing costs are estimated at $3 to $6
per person per year (IRC (2012)). There are a large number of organizations in-
15There was an increase in the installation of handpumps across many developing countries at
this time. Following the development of hand-powered pumps in India in the 1970s, there was
a global shift towards installing more ‘appropriate’ technology that was easier and cheaper to
maintain. During the International Decade for Drinking Water and Sanitation in the 1980s, the
UNDP and World Bank tested a series of new handpump technologies which were adopted in rural
Tanzania (MacArthur (2015)).
16The SWN 80 pump is also known as the Walimi pump and the Nira pump is also known as
the Tanira pump.
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stalling pumps in Tanzania, with more than 500 listed in the data, but there is very
little coordination between them.17 The technology installed is largely determined
by the preferences of the installing organization, with community characteristics or
preferences playing very little role in this decision.18
Maintenance of handpumps in rural Tanzania has been the responsibility of benefi-
ciary communities since the mid-1990s, a response to the perceived failure of central-
ized water provision, and a reflection of an international trend towards ‘community-
based management’ (CBM) of water pumps.19 The Tanzania National Water Policy
(2002) emphasized that communities are responsible for ‘full cost recovery for op-
eration and maintenance of services as opposed to the previous concept of cost
sharing’.20 This responsibility is taken on by ‘water point committees’, made up of
five to ten people, typically women, who are appointed by the community to main-
tain the pump.21 They are responsible for maintaining the pump, which mainly
comprises replacing pump components as they wear out, and carrying out repairs
17See survey evidence in Figure A.34 in section A.4, and Tanzania National Water Sector De-
velopment Strategy (2008).
18See survey evidence in Figure A.33 in section A.4.
19The term ‘village level operation and maintenance’ (VLOM) is also common in the water
sector, and is often used to refer to the design of pumps. I will use CBM in place of VLOM
throughout this paper.
20The policy of decentralization was started with the Tanzania National Water Policy of 1991,
and has continued with the Tanzania National Water Policy (2002) and the Tanzania National
Water Sector Development Strategy (2008).
21There are many names given to these committees, in Tanzania and other countries. Official
Tanzanian government policy refers to ‘Community Owned Water Supply Organizations’ (COW-
SOs), Water User Associations and Water Consumer Associations, while other names, including
‘water user groups’ and ‘village water committees’, are used in various places. For consistency, I
will use ‘water point committees’, which is commonly used in different countries.
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and pump deepening if the pump breaks down or dries up. Whether to charge user
fees or not is typically a joint decision between the water point committee and the
installing organization.22 About 35 percent of pumps require user fees (per bucket,
monthly or annually), while others require users to pay when a pump breaks down
or have no formal mechanism for raising funds.23
The causes of widespread low pump functionality rates are varied and complex.
Qualitative studies emphasize a number of causes, including social, institutional and
economic factors, as well as hydrological and engineering factors (Prokopy (2005),
Schweitzer and Mihelcic (2011), WaterAid (2011), Harvey and Reed (2004)). There
have been two thorough statistical analyses of pump functionality. Foster (2013)
uses logistic regressions to estimate predictors of pump functionality in Liberia,
Sierra Leone and Uganda, finding that system age, distance to the country’s capi-
tal and user fee collection are consistent predictors of pump functionality.24 Fisher
et al. (2015) uses a Bayesian network model to estimate the effect of different vari-
ables, and the synergy between them, in explaining pump functionality, and finds
strong effects of management and the institutional environment.
My research corroborates these general findings, and presents new evidence that
22See survey evidence in Figure A.39 in section A.4.
23Figures calculated using Tanzanian water point mapping data - see Section 1.3.1 for details.
24In all three countries, Foster (2013) finds evidence that pumps are more likely to be functional
if they are closer to the capital, are more recently installed or charge suer fees. Other pump and
community characteristics predicted pump functionality in one or two of the countries studied.
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maintenance of pumps is strategic, with strong interdependence between neighbor-
ing communities.25 In particular, I find evidence of free riding and cost-reduction
spillovers between pumps of the same technology, which may occur through a num-
ber of channels. Nearby communities may share some costs of maintenance, for
example the costs of obtaining spare parts, tools and skilled labor, and areas with
many pumps of the same technology are more likely to develop markets for these
inputs. Markets in these poor rural settings are often non-existent or thin, so can
be affected by the actions of individual communities. Communities may also share
information about pump maintenance (Pond and Pedley (2011)), and my survey
evidence suggests that standardization of technologies is also likely to increase co-
operation and cost sharing between communities, and the availability of spare parts
and pump mechanics.26
The potential benefits of standardizing pump technology are well known in the
water sector. Since 1982, fifteen countries in sub-Saharan Africa have attempted
formal standardization with the support of UNICEF (see MacArthur (2015) for a
25A number of my findings are consistent with these previous papers. First, descriptive analysis
of the data shows that 28 percent of breakdowns in Tanzania are due to hardware problems that
cost less than $10 to fix, and 15 percent of pumps have broken down primarily because they
are no longer used, suggesting that economic incentives to maintain a pump are an important
determinant of their sustainability (see Figure A.25 and Table A.2 in section A.2 of the Appendix
for more details on reasons given for breakdown in the data). Responses to my survey show that
water experts believe that a wide variety of factors are important in explaining pump functionality
(see Figure A.36 in section A.4). Results from the reduced form analysis are consistent with the
findings of Foster (2013) and Fisher et al. (2015) (section 1.4), as are the model estimates (section
1.7).
26See Figure A.37 in section A.4 of the Appendix.
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thorough overview).27 The Tanzania National Water Policy (2002) attempted to
initiate standardization to two technologies in Tanzania (Nira and SWN 80), but
there was no sustained effort to implement this policy, and the attempt appears to
have had little impact on the technologies that have been installed in the country
since. In fact, Figure A.1 in section A.1 shows that the proportion of Nira and
SWN 80 pumps installed in Tanzania has actually declined since 2002.
Access to water is often a key part of development strategies, and recent economic
research has shown effects on health, poverty and education.28,29 In Tanzania, where
girls are traditionally responsible for water collection, school attendance is 12 per-
cent higher for girls located within 15 minutes of a water source relative to those
who live more than an hour away, with a much smaller effect on boys’ school at-
tendance (UNDP (2006)). Consistent with this body of evidence, I find a small but
significant effect of improved water access on child mortality and school attendance,
with the effect on school attendance larger for girls than boys.
27Standardization efforts have attempted to decrease market fragmentation, and improve sup-
ply chains, quality of installations and communities’ ability to effectively manage their pump.
Potential costs of standardization include stifling of innovation, and decreased competition in
manufacture (MacArthur (2015)).
28Millennium Development Goal 7.C aimed to halve the proportion of the population without
sustainable access to safe drinking water and sanitation. This goal was reached globally, though
approximately 45 individual countries failed to meet it (WHO, UNICEF (2014)).
29Sekhri (2014) estimates that access to improved water sources reduces rural poverty in India
by 10-12 percent, Kremer et al. (2011) estimate a reduction of child diarrhea in Kenya by 25
percent, while Jalan and Ravallion (2003) find that health improvements in India are largest in
families with more educated mothers. Galiani, Gertler and Schargrodsky (2005) find a significant
effect of water access on child mortality in Argentina, with the effect largest for children in poorest
areas, and Devoto et al. (2012) find evidence of welfare increases in Morocco, though no effect on
health or income.
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1.3 Data
1.3.1 Primary data: water point mapping
The analysis focuses on administrative ‘water point mapping’ data collected by
GeoData Consultants Limited on behalf of the Tanzania Ministry of Water and
Irrigation.30 The data were collected between February 2011 and June 2013 to
provide a census of all mainland rural water services in the country, to determine
which sources were functional or not at the time of data collection, and to help set
investment priorities. This represented the first time the entire mainland’s rural
water points had been mapped, although 42 of 132 districts were mapped between
2005 and 2008 by three international NGOs.31,32
Enumerators used hand-held computers to collect information about each water
point and the community using it, including GPS coordinates and a photo (Water
Point Mapping Tanzania (2013)). The data also has information on the type of
water source (tap or pump), the technology of pumps, the type of hole the pump is
installed on, how the water source is managed, when the water source was installed,
30The data can be accessed at http://wpm.maji.go.tz/. Similar water point mapping exercises
have been carried out in many developing countries in the last decade, with more than 60 data
sets collected. Many of these are available as part of the Water Point Data Exchange (2016), at
https://www.waterpointdata.org/
31The administrative divisions in Tanzania are broken down as follows: 26 regions, containing
a total of 132 districts, with further sub-divisions into wards, villages and sub-villages.
32The first water point mapping exercise was carried out by WaterAid in partnership with
Engineers Without Borders and SNV, an international not-for-profit development organization
based in the Netherlands. Other pilot mapping exercises were carried out by Plan International,
Concern Worldwide, and AMREF, an African health charity.
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whether users pay to use it, and (when relevant) the date of last breakdown and
repair.
Table 1.1 presents summary statistics for key variables in the data. As noted in
section 1.2, there are four common handpump technologies in Tanzania, and they
account for 87 percent of pumps. 89 percent of handpumps are managed by a water
point committee (community based management), and about 35 percent of these
regularly collect user fees. The observations are plotted on a map of Tanzania in
Figure 1.1, with the colors of the markers corresponding to the functionality of water
sources. Figure A.2 in section A.1 shows the same maps but colors the markers by
water source type and technology. We can see that water sources are often installed
in clusters, with some clusters having a greater variety of type and technology than
others.
1.3.2 Additional data
I use a number of secondary data sources in the analysis, to control for community
characteristics and physical variables that are not observed in the water point map-
ping data, and to estimate the effect of pump functionality on health and education
outcomes. I merge the main data with ward-level information from the Tanzania
Population and Housing Census (2002) to control for additional community and
demographic characteristics that might help explain pump functionality in the re-
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Table 1.1: Summary statistics, water point mapping data. Key variables
in the sample used for reduced form analysis.
Observations Percent Functionality
of obs. rate
All water sources 43,441 100% 61.5%
Water source type
Tap/standpipe 27,776 63.9% 68.3%
Hand pump 10,667 24.6% 62.6%
Other 4,998 11.5% 21.8%
Hand pump technology
Afridev 1,176 11.0% 69.1%
India Mark II 2,138 20.0% 62.2%
SWN 80 2,722 25.5% 63.1%
Nira/Tanira 3,214 30.1% 67.1%
Other 1,417 13.3% 46.5%
Hand pump hole type
Machine drilled borehole 3,195 30.0% 60.8%
Hand drilled borehole 505 4.7% 63.8%
Hand dug shallow well 6,775 63.5% 63.6%
Other 192 1.8% 54.7%
Hand pump management
CBM 9,524 89.3% 62.4%
Parastatal 201 1.9% 74.6%
Private 493 4.6% 55.6%
Other 449 4.2% 47.0%
Other variables Observations Mean Std. dev.
Hand pumps
Age of pump (years) 10,667 12.69 9.50
Pay for use dummy 10,667 0.35 0.48
Non-pump water sources
Age of water source (years) 32,774 16.44 13.26
Pay for use dummy 32,774 0.49 0.5
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Figure 1.1: Location and functionality of water sources in Tanzania.
Water point mapping data, Tanzania (2013).
Notes: The top image shows the water sources in the main source of data and their functionality
status. The bottom image zooms in on a specific region, Morogoro. Regions with missing data
are excluded. Maps with type and technology of water source are shown in Figure A.2 in section
A.1.
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duced form analysis. To estimate the effect of pump functionality on health and
education outcomes, I use ward-level information on child mortality and school at-
tendance from the Tanzania Population and Housing Census (2012). The timing
of these censuses works well for the analysis: the 2002 census provides plausible
explanatory variables for patterns of pump functionality, while the 2012 census was
collected at a similar time to the water point mapping data and therefore provides
good measures of outcomes to use in the model. I also use detailed community
information from the Tanzania National Panel Survey (2008-09) to test whether
certain technologies of pump are more likely to be installed in communities with
different characteristics.33
It is important to control for physical variables that may affect pump function-
ality, in particular the local availability of groundwater. For this I use data from
the British Geological Survey (2012), which has three groundwater variables for the
whole of Africa at a 5km resolution. The dataset is constructed using information
on geology, geomorphology and rainfall.34 I control for its three variables in the
analysis: groundwater storage (measured in mm), groundwater productivity (mea-
sured in liters per second), and depth to water (measured in meters). MacDonald
et al. (2012) give a thorough overview of how they constructed the data.
33The Tanzania National Panel Survey (2008-09) is only available for a sample of communities,
so I do not use this information in the main specifications as it greatly reduces the sample size.
34The data is constructed using direct measures of borehole yields, existing hydrogeological
maps and a review of 283 aquifer summaries within 152 publications.
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I conduct a survey of water sector experts to supplement the quantitative anal-
ysis, and help understand the mechanisms driving the patterns of installation and
functionality in the data. I sent an online survey to a wide variety of stakeholders
with significant experience working in the provision of water in rural areas of low in-
come countries, and followed up with some of the respondents for additional input.
A detailed description of the survey methodology and a summary of the responses
can be found in section A.4 of the Appendix. I refer to these results throughout
the paper to help explain the quantitative analysis and justify some of my modeling
assumptions.
1.4 Reduced form analysis: spatial correlations in pump
functionality
The reduced form analysis establishes two empirical facts about water pump func-
tionality. First, pumps are more likely to be functional if there are more pumps
of the same technology nearby. Second, pumps are less likely to be functional if
there are more non-pump water sources nearby. I demonstrate these facts using the
main specifications in section 1.4.1, and then show that these spatial correlations
are robust to a large number of different specifications in section 1.4.2. There are
multiple explanations for these correlations, and I test these in section 1.4.3. In
section 1.4.4, I discuss how I use these facts to overcome the identification challenge
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to estimate spillover and free riding effects in a model of strategic interactions.
1.4.1 Main specifications
I estimate a probit model with pump functionality as the dependent variable, and
the number of water sources of various types within 1.2km as the key explanatory
variables of interest.35 In particular, I am testing the correlation between pump
functionality and the number of non-pump water sources, pumps of a different
technology, and pumps of the same technology within 1.2km. These variables can
be interpreted as a measure of degree centrality of a pump in a spatial network,
where pumps are connected if they are within 1.2km of each other. Summary statis-
tics for these variables can be found in Table A.1, and their histograms are given in
Figure A.3 in section A.1 of the Appendix. I include various pump and community
characteristics as explanatory variables, and present the results in Table 1.2.
These results show a clear negative correlation between a pump’s functionality sta-
tus and the number of non-pump water sources within 1.2km. The marginal effect
reported in my preferred specification (column 5), indicates that a pump is 0.3
percentage points less likely to be functional for every additional non-pump water
35Pump functionality is equal to one if the pump produced any water at data collection, and zero
otherwise. I chose 1.2km as the cutoff distance for two reasons. First, it provides good variance
in the number of water sources of various types, so allows me to estimate the effect of neighboring
pumps. Summary statistics for the number of water sources within 1.2km can be found in Table
A.1, and the histograms are given in Figure A.3. Second, I estimated that approximately 50
percent of households in the Tanzania National Panel Survey (2008-09) reported that they would
have to walk 1.2km or less to collect water. I run the same regressions with cutoffs of 0.7km and
1.7km as robustness tests, and discuss these in section 1.4.2.
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Table 1.2: Main specifications. Probit regressions of pump functionality on
the number of water sources within 1.2km, pump and community characteristics.
Marginal effects reported, in percentage points.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Number of non-pump sources within 1.2km -0.190* -0.245** -0.291*** -0.346*** -0.331***
(0.114) (0.106) (0.107) (0.104) (0.112)
Number of pumps, diff tech within 1.2km -0.437* 0.0822 0.0957 0.0222 -0.156
(0.232) (0.185) (0.194) (0.191) (0.243)
Number of pumps, same tech within 1.2km 1.74*** 1.12*** 1.06*** 1.13*** 1.17***
(0.293) (0.224) (0.215) (0.202) (0.221)
Age at record -0.585*** -0.587*** -0.556*** -0.568***
(0.0835) (0.0839) (0.0916) (0.0901)
Pay for use dummy (per bucket/month/year) 18.8*** 19.8*** 20.4*** 19.6***
(1.55) (1.55) (1.47) (1.46)
Installed on hand-drilled borehole -11.7 -11.7 -14.9**
(7.48) (7.46) (7.46)
Installed on machine-drilled borehole -11.0* -10.5* -13.8**
(6.30) (6.39) (6.35)
Installed on shallow well -7.03 -5.61 -7.63
(5.65) (5.75) (5.72)
Water quality dummy (community perception) 2.57 3.50* 3.05*
(1.85) (1.80) (1.81)
Managed by a parastatal organization 11.2* 12.3** 9.02
(5.96) (5.80) (6.09)
Managed by water point committee -6.58 -5.94 -7.87
(5.39) (5.43) (5.00)
User population in highest quintile 20.1***
(2.33)
Observations 10,667 10,667 10,667 10,667 10,667
Technology dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Groundwater variables No Yes Yes Yes Yes
District fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month of data collection dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Management type dummies No No Yes Yes Yes
Installer fixed effects No No No Yes Yes
Funder fixed effects No No No Yes Yes
Population quintile dummies No No No No Yes
Distance to major cities No No No No Yes
Ward census variables No No No No Yes
Psuedo R2 0.0118 0.108 0.113 0.128 0.143
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the ward level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1. Missing category for type of hole pump installed on is ‘other’; there are 7 categories of
payment type; 5 types of management, commercial management is omitted; dummies included
for installers with >1% of pumps, (16 largest representing 60% of pumps); dummies included for
funders with >1% of pumps (18 largest representing 50% of pumps); distance to the 11 largest
cities; Ward census variables include gender ratio, population density, dependency ratio, total
population, geographic area, population per water source, number of water sources/pumps in
ward and ward nationality fractionalization.
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source within 1.2km. An increase in the number of non-pump water sources within
1.2km of one standard deviation (6.8 water sources) predicts that a pump is 2.3
percentage points less likely to be functional, a significant but modest effect. The
marginal effect is reasonably stable across specifications, including when I control
for various pump characteristics, groundwater variables, district fixed effects, in-
staller fixed effects, and geographic variables.
There is a clear positive correlation between a pump’s functionality status and the
number of pumps of the same technology within 1.2km. The estimated marginal ef-
fect is larger: a pump is 1.2 percentage points more likely to be functional for every
additional pump of the same technology within 1.2km. An increase of one standard
deviation in the number of pumps of the same technology predicts a pump is 4.5
percentage points more likely to be functional. With a base rate of functionality of
62.6 percent, this represents a fairly large effect. However, the number of pumps
of a different technology within 1.2km is not a significant predictor of whether a
pump is functional or not.
A number of other results from the main specifications are worthy of note and
relevant to my research question.36 Older pumps are less likely to be functional,
as we would expect. However, the rate of breakdown is close to constant in the
36Note that I include the same covariates in the robustness specifications. In all cases, the
results are qualitatively the same, so I do not include their estimates in later tables, and will only
discuss them here.
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first 20 years of a pump’s life, as shown in Figure A.4 in section A.1. Pumps that
charge user fees are about 20 percentage points more likely to be functional, a very
large effect. In other specifications (not reported), this effect does not vary with the
frequency of payment (per bucket, per month or per year), or the amount charged,
both of which are available in the data. There is weak evidence that pumps installed
on boreholes are less likely to be functional, perhaps because it is harder for com-
munities to make repairs on pumps installed on deeper holes. There is also weak
evidence that pumps with a higher perceived water quality, and those managed by
a parastatal organization, are more likely to work. Finally, there is strong evidence
that pumps with more users are more likely to be functional, perhaps because these
communities have more collective resources for repairs and maintenance.
1.4.2 Robustness tests
To check the robustness of these results, I estimate a number of other specifications
and report the results in section A.3. In each case I use the same control variables
for specifications (1) to (5) as those reported in Table 1.2. The estimated marginal
effects for the control variables are qualitatively similar to those in Table 1.2, so I
only report the key marginal effects of interest.
Table A.3 shows probit regressions with pump functionality as the dependent vari-
able and various other measures of the number of water sources within 1.2km as
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explanatory variables. The overall number of water sources within 1.2km is not a
statistically significant predictor of pump functionality, suggesting that the positive
correlation with pumps of the same technology cancels out the negative correlation
with non-pumps. The number of pumps (of any technology) within 1.2km is pos-
itively correlated with pump functionality, and the estimated marginal effects for
the number of non-pumps and pumps of the same technology are very similar to
those in the main specifications.
I estimate the same specifications with different ‘cutoff’ distances of 0.7km and
1.7km, instead of 1.2km, and present the key results in Tables A.4 and A.5. The
estimated marginal effects all have the same sign and significance as the main spec-
ifications, and have a very similar magnitude. I also restrict the number of water
sources within 1.2km to just the number of working water sources within 1.2km, and
present the results in Table A.6. Again, the key results are very similar to the main
specifications in Table 1.2. The only significant difference is that the marginal ef-
fect of the number of working pumps of the same technology within 1.2km is about
three times larger than in the main specifications, suggesting that these positive
correlations are largely driven by working pumps.
In addition to testing whether the number of water sources within a certain radius
predicts pump functionality, I test whether the distance to the nearest alternative
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water source is correlated with functionality. Figure A.26 shows non-parametric
regressions of pump functionality on the distance to the nearest non-pump, pump
of a different technology and pump of the same technology. They show a clear
negative relationship between pump functionality and the distance to the nearest
pump of the same technology, but no relationship for non-pumps and pumps of a
different technology. Figure A.27 shows similar relationships when we only con-
sider the distance to working water sources as do probit estimates in Tables A.7
and A.8. These results show that pumps that are close to other pumps of the
same technology are more likely to be functional, but that the distance to pumps of
a different technology and to non-pump water sources does not predict functionality.
Finally, I also test whether ‘fragmentation’ of water source types and pump tech-
nologies predicts pump functionality rates at the ward and village level.37 I calculate
fragmentation using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI): fragmentation in ward
or village k is given by fragk = 1−
∑
j s
2
jk, where sjk is the share of type or tech-
nology j in ward or village k. Therefore a village which only has one type and
technology of water source would have a fragmentation value of zero, but a village
with a wide variety of types and technologies would have a fragmentation value
closer to one. Figures A.28 and A.29 show the distribution of the number of water
sources in each ward and village, and the distribution of type and technology frag-
37The administrative divisions in Tanzania are broken down as follows: 26 regions, containing
a total of 132 districts, with further sub-divisions into wards, villages and sub-villages.
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mentation in wards and villages.
Table A.9 shows regressions of ward functionality rates on fragmentation of type
and technology, as well as other ward characteristics. There is strong evidence
that wards with more fragmentation of pump technologies have lower functionality
rates, suggesting that water sources are more likely to be functional when there are
a greater number of similar water sources nearby. Similarly, Table A.10 shows that
villages with a greater variety of pump technologies have a lower pump functionality
rate. Interestingly, villages with more variety in water source types have a higher
pump functionality rate, once we control for pump technology fragmentation. It
is not clear what is driving this result, but the main pattern from the previous
specifications remains, that pumps are less likely to be functional when they are in
villages with fewer pumps of the same technology.
1.4.3 Correlated effects or social interactions?
Sections 1.4.1 and 1.4.2 have demonstrated two key empirical facts about handpump
functionality in Tanzania: there is positive correlation between pump functionality
and the number of pumps of the same technology nearby, but negative correlation
between pump functionality and the number of non-pumps nearby. Two main ex-
planations are possible. First, these facts may be caused by spatially correlated
shocks or unobservables (Manski’s ‘correlated effects’). However, the sign and size
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of the correlations depend upon water source type and technology, so these unob-
served variables must have technology-specific effects. Second, social interactions
may explain these correlations, if communities free ride on their neighbors’ pumps,
but also experience pump maintenance cost-reduction spillovers. I assess quantita-
tive and qualitative evidence for a number of ‘technology-specific correlated effects’
explanations in detail in section A.5 and do not find evidence of them. This section
gives a brief overview of the findings.
The first ‘correlated effects’ explanation that I test is whether pump technologies
are chosen based on community characteristics. For example, suppose that water
practitioners typically install pump technology A in rich communities, and pump
technology B in poor communities, and that rich communities are better able to
maintain their pumps. If rich communities tend to be clustered together, then
they will have the same technology and be more likely to have functional pumps,
generating the positive spatial correlation seen in the data. Areas with more poor
communities might have a greater variety in pump technology and a lower function-
ality rate, which might explain the negative correlation between pump functionality
and the number of non-pump water sources nearby.
The survey of water sector experts provides compelling evidence that pump tech-
nologies are not chosen based on community characteristics. As shown by the right
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panel of Figure A.33, in Tanzania the preferences of the installing organization are
the most important factor explaining the technology of pump installed, with commu-
nity characteristics and community preferences among the least important factors.
Conversations with water sector experts indicate that most installing organizations
have a preferred technology, so the technology installed in a given community is
largely decided by which of the more than 500 installing organizations installs a
pump in that community. I further test this explanation by estimating selection
regressions of pump technology on 36 community characteristics from the Tanzania
National Panel Survey (2008-09). The results are shown in Tables A.12, A.13 and
A.14 in section A.5. Of the 216 estimated coefficients in the type and technology
selection regressions, only 31 (14 percent) are significant at the 90 percent confi-
dence level, only slightly greater than we would expect if technology was decided
randomly.38
Given that installing organizations are largely responsible for the choice of tech-
nology and tend to install their preferred technology of pump, it might be installer
characteristics that drive these correlations. Suppose that two organizations install
38Note that the 90 percent confidence level is appropriate because the Tanzania National Panel
Survey (2008-09) only covers a small subset of communities in the water data, so the sample size
is greatly reduced and the power of this test is very low. Because of the small sample size, I split
the community characteristics into seven groups of variables and estimate a selection regression
for each group. The null hypothesis of all variables in a group being insignificant predictors of
type or technology is rejected at the 90 percent confidence level in 11 of 42 regressions. If we look
only at the technology selection regressions (i.e. exclude the pump selection regression), 26 of
180 coefficients (14 percent) are significant at the 90 percent confidence level, again only slightly
higher than we would expect if technology was randomly allocated.
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pumps in a given area, one of whom makes high quality installations of technology
A, and the other makes low quality installations of technology B, then this might
induce technology-specific spatial correlations in the functionality of pumps. To
control for this, I include installer and funder fixed effects in the main specifica-
tions, and there is very little change in the key estimated marginal effects.39 To
further test this explanation, I also re-estimate the main specifications but include
the number of pumps of the same technology and the same installer within 1.2km
as an explanatory variable, as well as the number of pumps of the same technology
but a different installer, as shown in Table A.16. I find no statistically significant
difference in the effects, showing that the positive correlation between pump func-
tionality and the number of pumps of the same technology nearby does not depend
on whether they are installed by the same organization.
The observed correlations may also be explained by the selection of pump tech-
nology based on physical conditions. If pump technology A is more suitable for
installation in certain physical conditions, then in areas with favorable conditions
there will be many similar pumps and they will be more likely to work. Similarly,
39I cannot include fixed effects for every installer or funder in the data, as there are more than
500 of each. I include fixed effects for every installer or funder that installs or funds more than
1 percent of pumps in the data, representing more than 60 percent and 50 percent of pumps
respectively. Of the 34 coefficients tested, only three are statistically significant at the 95 percent
level (all negative coefficients), suggesting that the performance of the vast majority of installing
organizations is not significantly different to the average. To test whether it is fixed effects of
smaller installers driving the results, I restrict the analysis to pumps installed by organizations
with more than 1 percent of installations in Table A.15, and find that the results are very similar
to the main specifications.
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in areas with unfavorable conditions, there will be more dissimilar water sources,
and the pump will be less likely to work. Although the preferences of the installing
organization are the most important factor explaining which technology is installed,
survey respondents indicate that hydrological factors are fairly important, and ge-
ological factors less so (Figure A.33).
I test this explanation in two ways. First, I estimate a selection regression of
pump technology on the groundwater variables from the British Geological Survey
(2012), the results of which are given in Table A.17. There is evidence that the type
of water source depends on groundwater variables, with pumps more likely to be
installed in areas where the depth to groundwater is less than 25m, and taps more
likely to be installed in areas with a deeper water table. Conditional on a pump
being installed, the evidence that there is selection of technology on groundwater
variables is slightly weaker: only 5 of the 40 estimated coefficients are significant
at the 95 percent level. Second, given that there is some evidence of selection of
technology based on groundwater variables, I test whether this explains the key
correlations in pump functionality observed in the data. I include interaction terms
between technology dummies and groundwater variables in the main specification:
if a technology is more suitable for certain groundwater conditions, these interac-
tion terms will account for any effect on pump functionality. As shown by Table
A.18, the main marginal effects are virtually unchanged, suggesting that selection
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of technology on physical conditions is not driving these correlations.40
A similar explanation to the selection of technology on physical conditions is that
certain technologies may be more likely to be installed on certain types of holes.
If physical shocks are specific to hole types then this might explain the observed
technology-specific correlations. As shown in Table 1.1, there are two main types of
hole that account for more than 93 percent of pumps in the data: machine drilled
boreholes, and hand dug shallow wells. Machine drilled boreholes tend to be deeper,
so if the water table falls below a certain level, this may affect pumps installed on
shallow wells, but not those installed on boreholes.41 However, again I test this
hypothesis, and find that while there is correlation between the functionality of
pumps of the same technology and type of hole, there is no correlation between
functionality of pumps with the same type of hole but a different technology (Table
A.19). These results suggest that it is pump technology rather than hole type that
explains the observed correlations.
I discuss a number of other possible ‘correlated effects’ explanations, and how I
control for them in section A.5. In particular, I show that spatial correlation in the
management of water sources (for example if individuals manage more than one
40Note that the groundwater variables from British Geological Survey (2012) incorporate infor-
mation on geology, geomorphology and rainfall.
41The water table is the level below which the ground is saturated with water: essentially this
is the depth to groundwater.
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pump) is unlikely to explain these correlations (Tables A.20 and A.21). Similarly,
I do not find evidence that spatial correlation in the timing of installation of spe-
cific technologies, technology-specific water demand, or technology specific effects
of community shocks can explain the observed spatial correlations.
1.4.4 Identification of network effects
After testing for a number of potential technology-specific correlated effects, I do
not find evidence that any of these mechanisms are explaining the key spatial cor-
relations observed in the data. However, the observed correlations can be explained
by the existence of free riding and pump maintenance cost-reduction spillover ef-
fects between communities. Note that these effects work in the opposite direction:
having an additional pump nearby reduces the incentive for a community to main-
tain their existing pump, but may also reduce the cost of maintaining it. If positive
spillovers are larger when neighboring water sources are more similar, this explains
why a pump is more likely to work if there are more pumps of the same tech-
nology nearby, as spillover effects will dominate free riding effects. However, if
there are many non-pump water sources nearby, the spillover effects may be very
small, free riding effects dominate, and a pump is less likely to be functional.42 As
discussed in section 1.2, there are a number of mechanisms through which these
positive spillovers may occur, and evidence from previous literature and my survey
42This can also explain why the number of pumps of a different technology within a certain
distance is not a significant predictor of pump functionality: it seems plausible that free riding
and positive spillover effects cancel each other out on average in these cases.
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responses suggest that these are important in explaining pump functionality.43
To overcome the identification challenge and distinguish social interactions from
correlated effects, I use whether two communities have the same technology of
pump as an exogenous shifter in the strength of pump maintenance spillovers that
are possible between them. To do this, I must make a simple assumption, that
spatially correlated shocks or unobservables are independent of pump technology.
The intuition of this assumption is that spatially correlated shocks or unobservables
may affect the functionality of pumps, but I am ruling out the possibility of them
having technology-specific effects. For example, while rainfall shocks are likely to be
spatially correlated and may affect pump functionality, I assume that they cannot
affect one technology of pump but not another. Section 1.4.3 tests how reasonable
this assumption is, by testing a number of hypotheses for how it might be violated.
Given that I did not find evidence that technology-specific unobservables explain
the observed spatial correlations in pump functionality, this identifying assumption
is relatively mild. I formally state the identifying assumption in the context of the
model in section 1.5.
43The main mechanisms for pump maintenance cost-reduction spillovers are: sharing costs of
maintenance, market development for spare parts and skilled labor, increased information shar-
ing, and skill development. Survey respondents agreed that more standardization of technology of
pumps would increase spare part availability, availability of pump mechanics, cooperation and cost
sharing. Respondents with expertise in Tanzania were unsure whether this would increase infor-
mation sharing, though respondents with more general experience in rural water supply generally
agreed that it would. See Figure A.37 in section A.4 for these survey results in full.
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1.5 A model of strategic interactions in a spatial network
Although the reduced form analysis provides evidence of free riding effects and
pump maintenance cost-reduction spillovers, it cannot disentangle these two oppos-
ing effects and can only estimate the ‘net effect’ of having an additional water source
of a particular type and technology nearby. To disentangle these two effects, esti-
mate their magnitude, and test the mechanisms through which they work, I develop
and estimate a model of strategic interactions between neighboring communities.
The model also allows me to estimate the effects of potential policy changes on
the functionality of water pumps and on health and education outcomes. These
counterfactuals give an estimate of the cost of fragmented water provision by a
multitude of organizations, relative to provision by a central authority that inter-
nalizes spillover and free riding effects.
Each community in the model has a single water pump, and must decide whether to
maintain it or not, given the actions of its neighbors.44 Communities’ maintenance
decisions are interdependent in two ways. First, a community’s cost of maintenance
44The unit of observation is a community, as defined by an observed water source (functional
or non-functional) in the data. For example if there are three water sources with the same village
listed in the data, I define this as three separate communities. This is a reasonable assumption,
as the users of each pump appoint a ‘water point committee’ to manage and maintain the water
source. Using the administrative definition of a village to define a community would not signifi-
cantly change the nature of the model, though would complicate estimation, as each community
would face a different action space. Given that the results of the robustness analysis using the
village and ward as the unit of analysis in section 1.4.2 were similar to those in the main spec-
ifications, I would expect the results of such a model to be qualitatively similar to the model I
estimate in this paper, using each pump to define a community.
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depends upon the maintenance decisions of its neighbors, as well as pump and com-
munity characteristics. The cost of maintenance is discounted for every neighboring
community that maintains its pump, with the size of the discount depending on how
similar the water sources are (type, technology and hole type). Second, if a commu-
nity decides not to maintain its pump then the pump is non-functional, and they
must collect water from a neighboring functional water source. The cost of access
depends upon the distance to the alternative source, as well as its characteristics
(for example if there are user fees). Community health and education outcomes
may depend on the community’s pump functionality and characteristics, as well as
those of its neighbors.
Model setup: There are a finite number of communities, each of which has a fixed,
exogenously determined spatial location. Each community has a binary mainte-
nance decision, mi ∈ {0, 1}.
Assumption 1. (Perfectly effective pump maintenance) Community i’s pump
is functional if and only if mi = 1.
Under assumption 1, pump functionality is deterministic, conditional on the main-
tenance decision of a community. In the data, we observe whether or not a pump
is functional, and this assumption allows us to treat functionality as a community
decision.45 However, this is not restrictive because in the model the cost of pump
45Pump functionality is binary in the data, and is equal to one if a pump produces any water
when tested by the data enumerator.
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maintenance is stochastic. I will formalize this shortly, but the intuition is that a
community draws a random cost of maintenance and then decides whether or not
to keep its pump functional, given this cost. Conceptually, this assumption has
two key implications: that there is always some cost that a community can pay
to keep its pump functional and that it must undertake some (possibly costless)
maintenance to keep the pump functional. Both of these implications are intuitive
and mild.46
Assumption 2. (Game setup and solution concept) Communities play a static
network game of complete information. They move simultaneously in a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium.
Assumption 2 sets up the game to reflect how communities make maintenance
decisions in reality, and the data that is available. I make the simplifying assumption
that communities move simultaneously in a static game because we don’t see the
exact timing of maintenance decisions in the data.47 I assume that communities
46Even in the case that a pump is badly damaged, a community could pay a (high) cost to ensure
that is functional, potentially by essentially reinstalling it. The only cases where this might be
impossible is if there is a severe drought and there is no groundwater available at any depth in a
given area. My understanding is that this is very rare in general, and in particular in Tanzania in
the period in which the data was collected. If there is no pump maintenance required for a given
observation in reality, this would be represented by a random draw that sets the cost of pump
maintenance to zero.
47Although I do not see the exact timing of maintenance decisions in the data, it is possible to
retrospectively construct a panel data set. The data was collected between 2011 and 2013, and
gives a ‘snapshot’ of all (functional and non-functional) water sources in Tanzania at a given point
in time. However, it also has information on the year in which each water source was installed,
and the year in which it broke down if it is non-functional. As such, it is possible to construct a
snapshot of water source availability in each year, and model this as a dynamic game, in which
communities move simultaneously in each period (year). Note that the further back we construct
this panel data, the more likely it is to be inaccurate, as there is a greater chance of water sources
in earlier years being missing from our current snapshot of data. This dynamic approach would
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play a game of complete information, as I think this is the best description of how
they make decisions - as discussed throughout this paper, neighboring communities
interact in their pump maintenance decisions, and are therefore likely to have a
good understanding of each others’ costs of maintenance. I use Nash equilibria in
pure strategies to restrict the number of equilbria I must consider in the estimation
of this model, though multiple equilibria are still possible.48
Assumption 3. (Community utility) The utility of community i is linear in its
outcomes, yi and the net costs of water, ci, and is given by: ui = yi − ci.
The outcomes, yi, are health and education outcomes and ci represents two net costs
of water: the net cost of pump maintenance and the net cost of water collection. A
community’s outcomes possibly depend on its maintenance decision, mi, allowing
there to be an indirect benefit of pump maintenance. However, this setup does not
preclude there also being a direct benefit of pump maintenance: this is accounted
for in the net costs of water, which could in principle be negative.49
be well-equipped to address a different set of questions pertaining to pump functionality, namely
the effect of sequencing of decisions within a network, and whether there is ‘aid dependency’,
where communities’ maintenance decisions depend on their expectations over the installation of
new pumps. This is a promising avenue for future research, and I discuss this in more detail in
section 1.8.
48As discussed in more detail in section 1.1, many previous papers assume that a pure strategy
Nash equilibria is being played in games of complete information (Berry (1992), Mazzeo (2002),
Tamer (2003), Andrews, Berry and Jia (2004), Jia (2008), Ciliberto and Tamer (2009)), but an
alternative approach would be to model this as an incomplete information game and consider
Bayes-Nash equilibria, which would guarantee a pure strategy equilibrium. This is a promising
avenue for future research, which I discussed in more detail in footnote 13.
49For example, a community might receive a large benefit from having water available in its
own community, and therefore have a negative ‘net cost’ of maintaining its pump.
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Outcomes of community i depend on its own maintenance decisions, mi and the
mean maintenance decisions of its neighbors, m¯−i, as well as its own community
characteristics and the mean characteristics of its neighbors, Xa = [Xai , X¯
a
−i]:
yi = β0 + β1mi + β2m¯−i + Xaβ3 + ξi (1.5.1)
where β3 is a vector of parameters and ξi is a random outcomes shock.
50 The set
{−i} represents the communities that are neighbors of community i, and will be
defined more precisely in section 1.6.51
The effects of X¯a−i on the outcomes of community i are ‘contextual’ effects in the
terminology of Manski (1993). However, as noted in the introduction, I distinguish
between actions and outcomes, and therefore between pure spillovers and strategic
interactions (endogenous effects). The effect of i’s neighbors’ actions, m−i, on its
outcomes are therefore ‘pure spillover’ effects.
50For ease of exposition, I present the case with a single outcome. It is straightforward to extend
this to multiple outcomes, by stacking the outcomes equations. I estimate the model using three
outcomes, and therefore for each β term I define β = [βs, βg, βb].
51As part of the estimation, I partition the data into clusters of communities, and I restrict
interactions to be between communities in the same cluster. {−i} is the set of communities that
are in i’s cluster.
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The cost of water consists of two terms, which I will discuss in turn:
ci = mi
(
Xbiψ
1 + Ni(δ)m
+ i
)
+ (1−mi)
(∑
r∈R
λr1(j = i
r)gij(dij,mj,X
c
j)
)
(1.5.2)
If a community chooses to maintain its pump, by setting mi = 1, it must pay a
cost of maintenance, given by the first term in equation (1.5.2). The numerator is a
linear function of pump and community characteristics and represents the baseline
cost of pump maintenance. N(δ) is a matrix of network connections, to be defined
shortly, with the ijth element giving the strength of network connection between
community i and community j. Ni(δ) represents the i
th row of the network connec-
tions matrix and m represents the full column vector of maintenance decisions.52
Intuitively, i’s cost of maintenance is discounted for each of its neighbors that main-
tains its pump, with the size of the discount dependent on the strength of network
connection between the two communities.
There is a random shock to the cost of maintenance for community i, given by
i, and this is potentially spatially correlated. As discussed in section 1.4.4, I as-
sume that spatially correlated shocks are independent of technology:
Assumption 4. (Spatial correlation of shocks) If shocks to the cost of main-
tenance of a water source i of technology j in location k are given by jik = ηi + η
j
k
52Ni(δ)m therefore gives the sum of the product of maintenance decisions and strength of
network connections between i and other communities.
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where ηi is an idiosyncratic shock, and η
j
k is a spatially correlated shock specific to
water sources of technology j ∈ {1, 2, ..., J}, then η1k = η2k = ... = ηJk = ηk ∀k.
This assumption allows me to use variation in whether two communities have the
same technology of pump as a shifter in the strength of spillovers possible between
them, in a way that I make more precise shortly. As this is a game of complete
information, i is known by community i and its neighbors, but is unobserved by
the econometrician. The cost of maintenance shock, i and outcomes shocks, ξi, are
possibly correlated.
If a community chooses not to maintain its pump, by setting mi = 0, it faces
a cost of accessing alternative water sources, given by the second term in equa-
tion (1.5.2). gij(·) represents community i’s cost of accessing community j’s water
source, which depends on the distance between them, dij, whether community j
maintains its pump, and some characteristics of community j, Xcj. The index i
r
represents the community with the rth ‘cheapest’ alternative water source that com-
munity i can access. R is a subset of the set of positive integers, Z>0, and gives the
number of alternative water sources that are relevant to i’s maintenance decision.
For example, if R = {1}, then only the cost of accessing the ‘cheapest’ alternative
matters, whereas if R = {1, 2} then the costs of the cheapest and second cheapest
alternative affect i’s decision. λr gives the weight of the r
th cheapest alternative
water source in the calculation of the overall cost of access. λ1 is normalized to
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one as it is not separately identified to the parameters in g(·), while subsequent λ
terms are estimated. In the estimation, I set R = {1, 2}, but estimate that λ2 ≈ 0,
suggesting that only the cheapest alternative water source is relevant to i’s main-
tenance decision.
The cost of community i accessing water from community j is given by:
gij(dij,mj,X
c
j) = min{C0, (1−mj)C0 +mj exp(γ0 + γ1dij + Xcjγ2)} (1.5.3)
where C0 is an outside option, representing unimproved water sources not in the
data (e.g. a stream, lake or river). Community i can therefore only access the water
source in community j if it is functional (mj = 1), and will only do so if the cost of
access is lower than the cost of the outside option.53
N(δ) is a fixed, weighted, undirected, symmetric matrix, with each element, nij,
representing the strength of network connections (and therefore the strength of
maintenance cost-reduction spillovers that are possible) between communities i and
j:
nij = exp(δ0 − δ1dij − δ21(TYi 6= TYj)
− δ31(TEi 6= TEj)− δ41(HTi 6= HTj))1(dij < c) (1.5.4)
53The cost of the outside option may include costs of using a lower quality water source, as well
as costs associated with collection.
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where TYi is the type of water source i (e.g. pump, tap), TEi is the technology of
pump i (e.g. Nira, Afridev), and HTi is the hole type for pump i (e.g. machine
drilled borehole or hand dug well). Note that a pump and non-pump water source
necessarily have different technologies and hole types. dij gives the distance be-
tween communities i and j, and c is a distance cutoff for i’s network, which controls
the density of the network and ensures that there are partially overlapping peer
groups, or ‘excluded peers’.54 The exponential function ensures that all network
connections are non-negative.
Equations (1.5.2) and (1.5.4) capture the intuition from the reduced form anal-
ysis. The cost of maintenance for community i is discounted for each one of its
neighbors that maintains its pump, with the discount larger for water sources that
are nearer, pumps of the same technology and installed on the same type of hole
(when δ1, δ2, δ3, δ4 > 0). Under Assumption 4, the cost of maintenance shock, i,
is uncorrelated with type, technology or hole type, which allows us to separately
identify positive spillover effects from spatially correlated unobserved effects.
Substituting equations (1.5.1) and (1.5.2) into the linear utility function for com-
munity i gives:
54As discussed in the introduction, the existence of excluded peers can help overcome the si-
multaneity problem inherent in the identification of social interactions (Bramoulle´, Djebbari and
Fortin (2009) and De Giorgi, Pellizzari and Redaelli (2010)). I use a cutoff of 1.7km in the esti-
mation. I choose a cutoff greater than the 1.2km used in the reduced form analysis because the
strength of connection is now a decaying function rather than a binary function.
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ui = (β0 + β1mi + β2m¯−i + Xaβ3 + ξi)−mi
(
Xbiψ
1 + Ni(δ)m
+ i
)
− (1−mi)
(∑
r∈R
λr1(j = i
r)gij(dij,mj,X
c
j)
)
(1.5.5)
Community i will therefore maintain its pump if and only if its utility from main-
taining the pump, u1i , is greater than its utility from letting it fail, u
0
i , giving the
best response function:
mi = 1 iff u
1
i > u
0
i
⇔ β1 − X
b
iψ
1 + Ni(δ)m
+
∑
r∈R
λr1(j = i
r)gij(dij,mj,X
c
j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
u¯i
> i (1.5.6)
mi = 0 otherwise
Therefore, each community plays a cutoff strategy, in which they maintain their
pump only if the cost of maintenance shock, i is smaller than a cutoff value, u¯i,
which depends on the maintenance decisions of i’s neighbors.
In section 1.6, I discuss estimation of the model, the data that I use, and how I iden-
tify the model parameters. I formally show identification of the parameters after I
discuss estimation, because the estimation procedure, which includes partitioning
the water sources in the data into geographic clusters, affects the identification of
certain parameters. Therefore, to aid the reader, I provide a brief overview of the
intuition behind the identification of parameters here, before showing this formally
52
in section 1.6.2.
The intuition behind identification of the model parameters proceeds in a few steps.
First, note that there are two equations to jointly estimate: the outcomes equation
(1.5.1) and the best response equation (1.5.6). Variation in outcomes and the
variables that explain them identifies β = [β0, β1, β2,β3] in equation (1.5.1). Sec-
ond, turning to equation (1.5.6), I make the common assumption that the cost of
maintenance shocks, i, have a mean of zero, which normalizes the location of the
parameters in the best response equation, and their scale is pinned down by β1.
Third, the cost of maintenance parameters, ψ, are identified by communities for
which Ni(δ)m = 0 (i.e. communities that have no neighbors maintaining their
water sources so receive no discount). Similarly, the cost of accessing an outside
option, C0, is identified by communities with no working alternative water source.
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Fourth, the cost of access parameters, γ = [γ0, γ1.γ2], are identified by communities
that have exactly one working alternative water source, and λ2 is identified by com-
munities with at least two working alternatives. Finally, the strength of spillover
parameters, δ, are identified through variation in whether communities have the
same water source type, technology and type of hole.
55Note that to separately identify C0 from ψ0 the constant term in X
b
iψ, the set of communities
without neighbors investing in maintenance must not be equal to the set of communities without
an alternative working water source. The cutoff distance, c, ensures that these two sets are distinct,
by limiting the set of communities from which a community may receive maintenance spillovers,
but imposing no cutoff distance to alternative water sources.
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1.6 Estimation: maximum simulated likelihood
I estimate the model by maximum simulated likelihood, allowing for spatial cor-
relation in the cost of maintenance shocks, i, and correlation between i and the
outcomes shocks, ξi. There are two equations to jointly estimate: the best response
function and the outcomes equation. I estimate the best response function using
pump-level data from the main source of data. However, due to privacy restrictions
on the Tanzania Population and Housing Census (2012), I am not able to match the
water point mapping data with the census data at the community level, and match
the datasets using outcomes data at the ward level. As I discuss in more detail in
section 1.6.1, there are 789 wards with outcomes data in the model, containing an
average of 11 pumps and 15 non-pump water sources. I therefore estimate the joint
likelihood as the product of ward likelihoods:
L =
W∏
w=1
Lw (1.6.1)
Lw = f(yw, Ew0 |Xw;θ) (1.6.2)
= f(yw|Ew0 ,Xw;θ)f(Ew0 |Xw;θ) (1.6.3)
The second term in equation (1.6.3) is the marginal probability of Ew0 , the observed
action profile of maintenance decisions in ward w, given community characteristics
in the ward, Xw, and a vector of parameters, θ. The first term is the conditional
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density of yw, the observed outcomes in community w, given E
w
0 ,Xw,θ. I discuss
how I estimate each of these parts of the ward likelihood in turn.
There are two key challenges in estimating the best response section of the like-
lihood, f(Ew0 |Xw;θ). First, community choices are not independent of each other:
community i’s optimal choice of mi depends on the choices made by other commu-
nities in i’s network. Therefore we cannot simply calculate the ward likelihood as
the product of the individual likelihoods.56 Second, because actions of each com-
munity are binary, multiple equilibria are possible. To overcome these challenges,
I partition each ward into non-overlapping clusters and assume that each cluster
plays an independent game. I can estimate the probability that each possible action
profile is an equilibrium in each cluster, and use this to estimate the likelihood of
the observed action profile. The ward likelihood is then the product of the cluster
likelihoods defined in that ward.
Assumption 5. (Within-cluster strategic interactions) Strategic interactions
only occur within non-overlapping geographic clusters.
Although assumption 5 allows me to overcome the two key identification challenges,
it places a potentially costly restriction on the interactions that the model allows. It
restricts the communities between which maintenance cost-reduction spillovers may
56See the online appendix of Acemoglu, Garc´ıa-Jimeno and Robinson (2015) for a similar dis-
cussion. In a moment conditions approach, individual moment conditions will not be independent
and this would violate Assumption 2 in Pakes, Porter, Ho and Ishii (2015).
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occur, and restricts the set of alternative water sources a community can access if
its pump is non-functional.57 However, I use a simple machine learning technique to
define clusters to minimize the cost of the restrictions placed on interactions. Note
that in Figure 1.1 water sources tend to be clustered in the data, around roads and
in areas where settlements are more likely. As I will discuss in more detail in section
1.6.1, I use a k-means clustering algorithm to ‘pick’ out the clusters observed in the
data, within which strategic interactions are most likely.
I partition each ward, w, into Kw clusters, k = 1, ..., Kw, each containing Nk
communities, i = 1, ..., Nk. Each community has two possible actions, so there are
2Nk possible action profiles in each cluster, which I denote as Ek0 , E
k
1 , ..., E
k
(2Nk−1),
where Ek0 is the observed action profile. To ensure that all observed action pro-
files are possible, and therefore that the likelihood is well defined, I must specify
an unbounded distribution for the cost of maintenance shocks, i. However, this
implies that for a given set of parameters any action profile is an equilibrium for a
certain set of cost shocks. To see this, fix an action profile in a given cluster. For
any possible set of parameters, this action profile can be rationalized as an equi-
librium if every community assigned to set mi = 1 receives a very large, negative
cost of maintenance shock, i → −∞, and if every community assigned to mi = 0
57As discussed in footnote 9, there is an inherent tradeoff in the choice of the number and size
of clusters that are defined. Definition of larger clusters allows interactions between a greater
number of communities, but increases the computational burden required to solve the network
game, reduces the number of cluster ‘observations’ in the network game, and therefore reduces
the power of the estimation.
56
receives a very large, positive cost of maintenance shock, i →∞. Therefore, every
possible action profile in a cluster has a non-zero probability of being an equilibrium.
To calculate the likelihood of the observed action profile in a cluster, we cannot
simply calculate the probability that the observed action profile is an equilibrium.
For a given set of cost shocks and parameters, multiple equilibria may be possi-
ble, so the sum of the probabilities that each action profile is an equilibrium might
exceed one. As such, the probability of an action profile being an equilibrium is
not equivalent to the probability that this equilibrium is the one that is actually
played. Therefore, to calculate the cluster likelihood, I use a probabilistic equilib-
rium selection rule to weigh the probability that the observed action profile is an
equilibrium against the probability that all other possible action profiles are equi-
libria. My use of an equilibrium selection rule in the estimation is similar to that
of Todd and Wolpin (forthcoming), and proposed by Bajari, Hong and Ryan (2010).
The cost of maintenance shocks, i, are possibly spatially correlated and correlated
with the outcomes shocks, ξi. I allow cost of maintenance shocks to be correlated
within a cluster, with ic representing the shock to community i in cluster c.
Assumption 6. (Distribution of shocks) Cost of maintenance shocks are spa-
tially correlated within a cluster, and correlated with outcomes shocks, with the
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following structure:
ic =η1c + η2i + η3i (1.6.4)
ξi =bη2i + η4i (1.6.5)
where η1c, η2i, η3i, η4i are independent normal distributions with variances σ
2
1, σ
2
2, σ
2
3
and σ24 respectively.
Therefore, η1c is a shock that is common to cluster c, and η2i, η3i, η4i are all idiosyn-
cratic shocks. b determines whether cost of maintenance shocks are positively or
negatively correlated with outcomes shocks, though its magnitude is not separately
identified to σ22, so b ∈ {−1, 1}. I estimate σ = {σ1, σ2, σ3, σ4, b}.
The procedure to estimate f(Ew0 |Xw;θ) is as follows:
1. Choose a set of parameter values: θ = {δ,ψ,β,γ,σ}
2. For each possible action profile, l, in each cluster, k, calculate cutoff values of
i for each community, u¯il
3. Simulate a large number of shocks, (ic, ξi)
4. For each cluster, k, estimate the probability that each action profile, l, is an
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equilibrium:58
Pr(Ekl ) =
∏
{i∈k:mkil=0}
Pr(i > u¯il)
∏
{i∈k:mkil=1}
Pr(i ≤ u¯il)
5. Using a parametric probabilistic equilibrium selection rule, h(·), calculate like-
lihood of the observed equilibrium action profile:
f(Ek0 |Xk;θ) = h(Pr(Ek0 ),Pr(Ek1 ), ...,Pr(Ek(2Nk−1));θ)
6. Calculate f(Ew0 |Xw;θ) =
∏Kw
k=1 f(E
k
0 |Xk;θ)
There are a number of candidate functional forms to use for the equilibrium se-
lection rule (an excellent overview is given by Bajari, Hong and Ryan (2010)).
In the main analysis, I use a simple ‘weighted average’ equilibrium selection rule,
f(Ek0 |Xk;θ) = Pr(E
k
0 )∑2Nk−1
l=0 Pr(E
k
l )
. To check the robustness of the results, I use two other
equilibrium selection rules, the logistic function, with a smoothing parameter of 0.1,
f(Ek0 |Xk;θ) = exp(Pr(E
k
0 )/0.1)∑2Nk−1
l=0 exp(Pr(E
k
l )/0,1)
and simply maximizing the probability that the
observed action profile is an equilibrium, f(Ek0 |Xk;θ) = Pr(Ek0 ). In both cases the
results are qualitatively similar.59
58I use the smoothed logistic estimator to calculate these probabilities, with a smoothing pa-
rameter of 0.3. Specifically, I estimate the probability that a community plays mi = 1 in action
profile l as 1S
∑ exp((u¯il−i)/0.3)
1+exp((u¯il−i)/0.3) where I average over the number of simulated shocks, S.
59While the results are qualitatively similar when I use the logistic function with a smoothing
parameter of 0.1, the likelihood is very sensitive to the choice of smoothing parameter. The
behavior of the likelihood function under the ‘weighted average’ equilibrium selection rule is much
more stable, so I use it in the main analysis.
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To estimate the outcomes section of the likelihood, f(yw|Ew0 ,Xw;θ), I must ag-
gregate the outcomes equation to the ward level, as this is the level at which I
have outcomes data from the Tanzania Population and Housing Census (2012).
Averaging equation (1.5.1) over all communities in a ward gives:60
yw = β0 + β1
1
nw
nw∑
i=1
mi + β2
1
nw
nw∑
i=1
m¯−i + Xawβ3 + ξw (1.6.6)
where ξw =
∑nw
i=1 ξi and nw is the number of communities in ward w.
To calculate the density of the observed outcomes, given the observed action profile
and community characteristics in a ward, I rearrange the density expression so that
it is in terms of the random variable ξw to give:
f(yw|Ew0 ,Xw;θ)
= f(ξw = yw − β0 − β1 1
nw
nw∑
i=1
mi − β2 1
nw
nw∑
i=1
m¯−i −Xawβ3︸ ︷︷ ︸
v¯w
|Ew0 ) (1.6.7)
I define v¯w and drop the conditioning on Xw,θ for ease of notation. However,
because i and ξi are possibly correlated, conditioning on the observed action profile
60For ease of exposition, I present ward averages as if each community is the same size. In
practice, I must weight by the number of individuals in each community when calculating ward
averages to make them comparable to the outcomes data, which averages over all individuals in a
ward.
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of maintenance decisions affects this density. Intuitively we are calculating the
density of ξw at v¯w, given that we have observed a particular set of maintenance
decisions in ward w. This is equivalent to conditioning on the fact that the cost of
maintenance shocks are such that no community in ward w wants to deviate from
their equilibrium strategy, which we can rewrite as:
f(yw|Ew0 ,Xw;θ) = fξw(v¯w|{i ≥ u¯i}wmi=0, {i < u¯i}wmi=1︸ ︷︷ ︸
E
) (1.6.8)
where E is the set of cost of maintenance shocks that rationalize the observed action
profile as an equilibrium given Xw,θ. To calculate this density, we therefore must
integrate over all possible sets of w in E .
f(yw|Ew0 ,Xw;θ) =
∫
w∈E
fξw(v¯w|w)f(w)dw (1.6.9)
To estimate this integral, I make repeated draws of i from the set of shocks that
rationalized the observed action profile as an equilibrium in the calculation of
f(Ew0 |Xw;θ). Formally, I make repeated draws of {i s.t. {i ≥ u¯i}wmi=0 ∩ {i <
u¯i}wmi=1}nwi=1. For each draw, I calculate w =
∑nw
i=1 i and the density of ξw at v¯w for
this particular value of w:
fξw(v¯w|w) =
1
σξw
√
1− ρ2w
φ
(
v¯w − ρw σξwσw w
σξw
√
1− ρ2w
)
(1.6.10)
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where var(ξw) = σ
2
ξw
, var(w) = σ
2
w , corr(ξw, w) = ρw, all of which are functions
of structural model parameters. I derive this result and the terms for σ2ξw , σ
2
w and
ρw in section A.6 in the appendix.
I perform a series of simulation exercises to test how this estimation procedure
performs with different sample sizes and different levels of variation in the key vari-
ables. I present a brief selection of results from these exercises in section A.7. Figure
A.41 shows the shape of the simulated likelihood function around the true param-
eter values used to simulate the data. The simulated likelihood has a maximum at
the true parameters and is well behaved around this point.61 Figure A.42 shows
selected results of Monte Carlo exercises to test the performance of the estima-
tion procedure as we increase the sample size. In general, the procedure produces
accurate estimates of the true model parameters when there are more than 3,000
observations and variation in the key variables is similar to the level observed in
the data.
1.6.1 Data used to estimate the model
The model assumes that players move simultaneously in a static model of strategic
interactions. To estimate this model, I make two additional adjustments to the
61The simulated likelihood is generally well behaved and attains a maximum around the true
parameter values when I use the ‘weighted average’ equilibrium selection rule. When I use the
logistic function for the equilibrium selection rule, the behavior of the simulated likelihood is
sensitive to the choice of smoothing parameter. For each of the equilibrium selection rules, the
simulated likelihood is ‘more smooth’ as we increase the number of simulations used, as we would
expect.
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subsample used for the reduced form analysis in section 1.4. First, I drop all ob-
servations that broke down more than five years before data collection, as these
communities did not face a maintenance decision at a similar time to the mainte-
nance decision faced by their neighbors in the model. This means that the pump
functionality rate in the subsample will be higher than that in the overall data,
at 70.8 percent rather than 62.6 percent. Second, instead of dropping individual
observations with missing data on the year of data collection or year of installation,
I drop entire wards, to ensure that there are no ‘holes’ in the network model. These
two adjustments reduce the sample size from 10,667 handpumps in the reduced
form to 8,514 pumps in estimating the model.
I estimate the model of strategic interactions using communities with pumps as
the decision-making agents. I take the functionality of non-pump water sources
(mostly taps) to be exogenous to the game played by communities with pumps, as
these water sources are typically managed in a more centralized fashion, rather than
by community-based management. Although these water sources are not players in
the model, I must include them in the data as communities may free ride on them or
possibly receive some maintenance spillovers from them.62 The subsample therefore
includes 11,890 non-pump water sources, to give a total of 20,404 water sources in
789 wards with outcomes data from the Tanzania Population and Housing Census
62I estimate whether functional non-pump water sources create a maintenance spillover for
neighboring pumps, and find that this effect is very close to zero.
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(2012).
I use k-means clustering, a simple machine learning method, to partition the data
into clusters. In each ward, I define clusters, S = {s1, ..., sk, ..., sK} to solve
argmin
S
K∑
k=1
∑
x∈sk
‖x− µk‖2 (1.6.11)
where x are GPS coordinates of observations assigned to cluster k, and µk gives the
GPS coordinates of the centroid of cluster k. Intuitively, we are choosing centroids
for K clusters, then assigning each observation to the cluster with the nearest cen-
troid, to minimize the sum of squared distances between an observation and the
centroid of the cluster to which it is assigned. Figure A.5 in section A.1 gives a
visual example of the clusters defined in the data.
I have to limit the size of each cluster because the estimation procedure requires me
to calculate the probability of 2Nk action profiles being an equilibrium. Therefore I
set the maximum cluster size at 10, and create 3431 clusters with an average of 4.1
pumps in a cluster.63 Figure A.5 in section A.1 shows the distribution of the num-
ber of pump and non-pump water sources in each cluster. Note that a significant
minority of clusters are defined without a pump water source, so I do not estimate
63Note that the standard k-means clustering algorithm does not set a maximum size of cluster.
Therefore to impose the maximum, I redefine clusters with an initial size greater than 10.
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the model for these clusters, but treat the functionality of their non-pump water
sources as exogenous.
In estimating the model, I use three outcomes variables at the ward level from
the Tanzania Population and Housing Census (2012): the child survival rate, girls’
school attendance rate and boys’ school attendance rate. The child survival rate
can be interpreted as one minus the child mortality rate, but for ease of interpre-
tation I use the survival rate so that higher numbers in all three outcomes indicate
‘better’ outcomes.64 In addition to the maintenance decisions of communities in
each ward, I use three other variables to explain these outcomes: the adult literacy
rate (from the 2012 census), a dummy for the ward being listed as rural, and the
average distance of communities in the ward to one of Tanzania’s largest eleven
64The child survival rate calculated using the census is a fairly crude measure, as the census
does not record the age of deaths. Each household is asked how many children have ever been
born in the household and how many of these children have survived until the time that the census
is taken. I divide the number of children that have survived by the number ever born to get a
crude survival ‘rate’.
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cities. I therefore estimate three outcomes equations:65
survw = β
s
0 + β
s
1
1
nw
nw∑
i=1
mi + β
s
2
1
nw
nw∑
i=1
m¯−i
+ βs3adultlitw + β
s
4ruraldumw + β
s
5distcityw + ξ
s
w (1.6.12)
attgw = β
g
0 + β
g
1
1
nw
nw∑
i=1
mi + β
g
2
1
nw
nw∑
i=1
m¯−i
+ βg3adultlitw + β
g
4ruraldumw + β
g
5distcityw + ξ
g
w (1.6.13)
attbw = β
b
0 + β
b
1
1
nw
nw∑
i=1
mi + β
b
2
1
nw
nw∑
i=1
m¯−i
+ βb3adultlitw + β
b
4ruraldumw + β
b
5distcityw + ξ
b
w (1.6.14)
The baseline cost of pump maintenance, given in equation (1.5.2), is a linear function
of community and pump characteristics: the age of a pump (agei), whether users
must pay to use it (payi), and dummies for the four most common technologies
(Afridev, India Mk II, SWN 80 and Nira):
Xbiψ = ψ0 + ψ1agei + ψ2payi + ψ3TE1i + ψ4TE2i + ψ5TE3i + ψ6TE4i (1.6.15)
The cost of a community i accessing water from community j in the case that i’s
pump is non-functional (see equation (1.5.3)) depends on the distance they have to
travel, whether they have to pay to use the alternative water source, and whether
65As noted in footnote 50, it is straightforward to extend the model to three outcomes. The
best response equation will now contain βs1 + β
g
1 + β
b
1 instead of just β1, and there are now 18
parameters to estimate.
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it is a pump or a tap:
gij(dij,mj,X
c
j) =min{C0, (1−mj)C0 +mj
exp(γ0 + γ1dij + γ2payj + γ3pumpdumj + γ4tapdumj)} (1.6.16)
1.6.2 Identification of model parameters
Given a large number of clusters, and sufficient variation in the size and composition
of clusters, as well as in the key explanatory variables, each of the key parameters
of the model are identified (with the exception of λ1, which is normalized to one).
This section demonstrates identification of the parameters using a sequential expla-
nation for ease of exposition.
First, consider the outcomes equation, (1.6.6), which is estimated using ward level
data. Identification of the β terms is straightforward when there is sufficient vari-
ation in the explanatory variables.66 Next, note that β1 also appears in the best
response equation (1.5.6), where it acts as a normalizing constant, as it is already
identified from the outcomes equation. β1 is the treatment effect of having a func-
tional water source on outcomes, but in the best response equation it normalizes the
scale of parameters that affect a community’s utility. I make the common assump-
tion that the cost of maintenance shocks, i, have a mean of zero, which normalizes
the location of parameters in the best response equation.
66Note that 1nw
∑nw
i=1mi 6= 1nw
∑nw
i=1 m¯−i in wards where there are clusters with only a single
functional water source. In the data approximately 35 percent of wards have different values for
these explanatory variables, allowing us to separately identify β1 and β2.
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The ψ terms, which govern the baseline cost of maintenance of a pump given its
age, technology and use of fees, are identified by communities that do not receive a
cost of maintenance discount, but which have access to working alternative water
sources.67 The best response of these communities is to maintain their pump if and
only if β1−Xbiψ+
∑
r∈R λr1(j = i
r)gij(dij,mj,X
c
j) > i. This best response allows
us to identify the ψ terms, including the constant term ψ0 because we already have
identification of β1.
Given identification of the ψ parameters and significant variation in the distances,
types, technologies and hole types between pumps in clusters, it is straightforward
to see that we can identify the δ parameters for communities that have at least
one neighbor investing in maintenance of their water source. As shown by Table
A.1 and Figure A.3 in section A.1, we have significant variation in the number of
non-pumps, pumps of a different technology and pumps of the same technology
within certain distances in the data. The histograms in Figure A.27 in section A.3
show that there is also significant variation in the distance to the nearest working
alternative water source.
67Note that a community receiving no discount in its cost of maintenance, Ni(δ)m = 0, does not
imply that there are no working alternative water sources available. This is because the strength
of spillovers between two communities is zero when the distance between them is greater than the
cutoff c. However, a community can still access water from alternative sources that are further
away than this cutoff. There are 1347 such communities in the data used to estimate the model.
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In the estimation I set R = {1, 2} to test the effect of the cheapest and second
cheapest alternative working water source on community i’s maintenance decision.
λ1 is not separately identified to the γ parameters affecting the cost of accessing an
alternative water source, so I normalize it to one. I estimate λ2, which is identified
by the best response equation of communities with at least two working alternative
water sources.68 Intuitively, λ2 is identified by the effect of the second cheapest
alternative water source on the maintenance decision of community i, relative to
the effect of the cheapest alternative.
The cost of a community accessing an outside option if its pump is not func-
tional, C0, is identified by the best response of communities without any work-
ing alternative water sources in their cluster.69 Note that these communities must
necessarily also have Ni(δ)m = 0 and so their best response is given by: mi =
1 iff β1 −Xbiψ + (1 + λ2)C0 > i. Given that β1, ψ, λ2 are separately identified, we
can therefore also identify C0.
To see how the γ terms, which affect the cost of i accessing neighboring func-
tional water sources, are identified, consider the best response function for com-
68There are 7619 such communities in the data used to estimate the model
69I assume that communities can only access alternative water sources in their own cluster,
and there are 308 communities without any working alternative in their cluster. Without any
restriction on which alternative water sources a community may access, every community would
have an alternative water source available at some distance. Modeling and estimating an outside
option is a good reflection of reality, as communities are likely to prefer using an unprotected
water source, such as a stream or pond, to traveling many kilometers to collect water.
69
munities with exactly one available functional alternative in their cluster: mi =
1 iff β1 − X
b
iψ
1+Ni(δ)m
+ exp(γ0 + γ1di1 + X
c
1γ2) + λ2C0 > i.
70 Given the identification
of the other parameters in this equation, we can identify the γ parameters.
Finally, the σ terms are identified by: the variance in functionality not explained
by the model, and the extent to which this is correlated within clusters; and the
variance in outcomes not explained by the model, and how this is correlated with
unexplained variance in functionality.
1.7 Results: model estimates and policy evaluation
The estimated structural parameters are presented in Table 1.3, along with their
standard errors.71 The vast majority of parameters are estimated precisely, with
small standard errors, with the exception of ψ1, λ2, δ4, σ5, σ6 and the β4, β5 terms,
which estimate the effect of being a rural ward and of distance to a major city on
each of the three outcomes. I discuss each of the groups of parameters in turn.
One result of interest is the effect of pump maintenance on our three outcomes,
given by the β1, β2 terms in equations 1.6.12, 1.6.13 and 1.6.14. To interpret these
coefficients, first note that in the structural outcomes equation at the community
level (equation 1.5.1) β1 represents the effect of a community’s own maintenance
70There are 587 such communities in the data used to estimate the model.
71I calculate standard errors by numerically estimating the Hessian at the estimated parameter
values.
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Table 1.3: Estimated structural parameters. Estimated parameters presented
in groups corresponding to different parts of the model.
Outcomes: child survival rate
βs0 β
s
1 β
s
2 β
s
3 β
s
4 β
s
5
0.64 0.54 -0.45 0.14 -0.001 -0.028
(0.025) (0.002) (0.019) (0.025) (0.006) (0.025)
Outcomes: girls’ school attendance
βg0 β
g
1 β
g
2 β
g
3 β
g
4 β
g
5
0.13 0.103 0.065 0.65 0.013 -0.045
(0.025) (0.003) (0.019) (0.025) (0.006) (0.025)
Outcomes: boys’ school attendance
βb0 β
b
1 β
b
2 β
b
3 β
b
4 β
b
5
0.09 0.041 0.089 0.72 -0.001 -0.049
(0.026) (0.003) (0.021) (0.027) (0.006) (0.027)
Cost of maintenance
ψ0 ψ1 ψ2 ψ3 ψ4 ψ5 ψ6
1.02 -0.002 -0.43 -0.31 -0.15 -0.26 -0.41
(0.005) (0.007) (0.016) (0.016) (0.003) (0.007) (0.002)
Cost of access
γ0 γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 λ2 C0
-3.98 0.24 2.66 -0.97 1.68 0.007 0.078
(0.001) (0.065) (0.131) (0.061) (0.030) (0.018) (0.000)
Network parameters
δ0 δ1 δ2 δ3 δ4
-0.43 0.19 2.01 2.47 1.03
(0.016) (0.007) (0.381) (0.295) (0.894)
Variance of shocks
σ1 σ2 σ3 σ4 σ5 σ6
0.50 0.38 0.34 0.041 0.002 0.15
(0.040) (0.0001) (0.003) (0.022) (0.019) (0.027)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, calculated by numerically estimating the Hessian at the
estimated parameter values.
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decision on its own outcomes (direct effects) and β2 represents the average mainte-
nance decisions of a community’s neighbors on on its own outcomes (‘pure spillover
effect’). However, because we only observe outcomes at the ward level, it is more
natural to interpret them jointly.72 Specifically, the effect of the pump functionality
rate in a ward on its outcomes is approximately βˆ1 + βˆ2.
The estimates indicate that there is a significant positive effect of water pump
functionality on rates of child survival and school attendance of boys and girls.
The results suggest that an increase in pump functionality rates of 10 percentage
points would result in a 0.9 percentage point increase in the child survival rate, a
1.7 percentage point increase in girls’ school attendance, and a 1.3 percentage point
increase in boys’ school attendance. The estimates of the other parameters in the
outcomes equation indicate that there is no significant effect of a ward being rural
or the distance from a ward to a major city on child survival or school attendance.
There is a large and significant positive effect of the adult literacy rate on child
survival and school attendance rates for both boys and girls, as we would expect.
The estimates of the cost of maintenance parameters are all significant, with the
72Note that although 1nw
∑nw
i=1mi and
1
nw
∑nw
i=1 m¯−i are highly positively correlated, they are
not equal. The first term averages pump maintenance decisions over all communities in a ward,
while the second takes an average of an average (of all pumps but i in a given cluster). These
two terms are different if a ward contains a cluster with only one pump that is functional, as in
this case the first term is equal to one for that cluster, but the second term is equal to zero. In
the data, these two values are different in approximately 35 percent of wards, allowing separate
identification of β1 and β2.
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exception of ψ1, the effect of pump age on the cost of maintenance, which is essen-
tially estimated as equal to zero. This is a slightly surprising result, as the reduced
form analysis showed that older pumps are less likely to be functional. However,
as shown by Figure A.4, the hazard rate of pump breakdown is fairly constant for
the first 20 years after installation, which might indicate that maintenance costs
do not increase over this period. ψ2 is negative and significant, indicating that it
is ‘cheaper’ for a community to maintain a pump if it charges user fees. This is
consistent with the reduced form evidence, which estimated that pumps are more
likely to be functional if they charge user fees. One interpretation of this result
is that it is easier for a community to overcome the collective action problem to
carry out maintenance if resources have already been collected for this purpose.
The negative and significant estimates for ψ3, ψ4, ψ5, ψ6 indicate that it is cheaper
to maintain a pump of one of the four most common technologies relative to a less
common technology.
The estimates of the cost of access parameters indicate which variables are im-
portant in explaining the effect of free riding between communities. γ1 is significant
and positive, which implies that it is more costly to access a pump if it is further
away, as we would expect. Similarly, γ2 is positive and significant, indicating that it
is more expensive to access an alternative water source that charges user fees. This
effect is large: taken literally, the results indicate that a community would always
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prefer an outside option (e.g. a lake or river) to accessing a pump that charges user
fees, but would be willing to travel up to 10km for free access to an alternative pump.
λ2 is insignificant and very close to zero, suggesting that communities only free ride
on the ‘cheapest’ alternative water source, rather than the first and second cheapest.
The estimates of the network parameters are also consistent with the reduced form
evidence. δ1 is significant and positive, implying that the strength of pump mainte-
nance spillovers between two communities decreases as the distance between them
increases. The significant and positive estimates for δ2 and δ3 indicate that the
strength of spillovers between two communities are stronger when they each have
pumps of the same technology. δ4 is positive but insignificant, suggesting that the
type of hole that a pump is installed on does not affect the strength of pump main-
tenance spillovers.
To improve the interpretation of the estimated network coefficients, I calculate
the change in the pump maintenance discount a community receives as more of its
neighbors decide to maintain their water sources. Table 1.4 calculates this change
in discount for a community when its first, second and third neighboring communi-
ties decide to maintain their water sources. I estimate that having neighbors with
a different type of water source (i.e. a tap) provides only a small discount to the
cost of pump maintenance. Having a pump of a different technology nearby pro-
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vides a slightly larger discount, but having a pump of the same technology nearby
has a much larger effect: I estimate that the costs of pump maintenance fall by 26
percent if a single pump of the same technology is maintained 0.6km away. Having
more than one pump nearby increases the size of this discount, though there is a
diminishing marginal effect.
Table 1.4: Estimated pump maintenance discounts. The estimated dis-
count on the cost of maintenance for community i when its first, second and third
neighbors maintain their water sources of various types and technologies.
Cumulative discount from... Non-pump
water source
Pump, diff.
technology
Pump, same
technology
...first neighbor 0.4% 2.8% 25.8%
...second neighbor 0.8% 5.5% 41.0%
...third neighbor 1.2% 8.1% 51.0%
Notes: Discounts calculated for neighboring water sources 0.6km away, and using a value of 0.5
for whether two pumps are installed on the same type of hole, as the estimated coefficient on
hole type was statistically insignificant. I use a distance of 0.6km to make this roughly
comparable to the reduced form estimates in section 1.4, as this is approximately the average
distance to neighboring communities within a 1.2km radius.
To further aid the interpretation of the model estimates, I calculate the overall
marginal effect of having an additional water source nearby on the probability that
a pump is functional, and thus compare the structural estimates to the reduced form
parameters estimated in section 1.4.73 I use the model to decompose this overall
marginal effect into two terms: the effect from positive maintenance spillovers and
from free riding. Table 1.5 shows that the maintenance spillovers from a nearby
73I calculate this marginal effect for a community with median characteristics for all explanatory
variables in the model.
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non-pump water source or a pump of a different technology are small relative to the
(negative) free riding effect, resulting in an overall negative effect on the probability
that a pump will be functional. However, when there is an additional pump of the
same technology nearby, the positive spillover effects dominate, and the pump is
more likely to be functional. The estimated net effects from the model are broadly
similar to those estimated in the reduced form, with small differences in the mag-
nitude of the estimated parameters.74
Table 1.5: Marginal effect of additional neighboring water source on
pump functionality. The net effect of a community having an additional water
source 0.6km away on the probability that its pump will be functional is given in
percentage point changes, and decomposed into a spillover effect and free riding
effect.
Non-pump
source
Pump, different
technology
Pump, same
technology
Spillover effect (model) 0.05 0.33 3.45
Free riding effect (model) -0.89 -0.89 -0.89
Net effect (model) -0.84 -0.56 2.56
Net effect (reduced form) -0.38 -0.08 3.03
Notes: The marginal effects are calculated for a community and pump with median
characteristics for each of the variables in the model. The reduced form estimate of the net effect
of additional water sources is taken from the specification that uses the number of working water
sources of various types as explanatory variables (see the final panel in Table A.6).
The estimated effects presented in table 1.5, of having an additional water source
nearby on a pump’s functionality, are partial equilibrium effects, as they hold fixed
the actions of other communities. In practice, other communities will also respond
74The difference in magnitude may be a result of using a greater number of explanatory variables
and fixed effects in the reduced form estimates.
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to having an additional water source nearby, which will induce secondary network
effects. I use the model to analyze the general equilibrium effects of two policies
proposed by the Tanzanian government in section 1.7.2.
1.7.1 Model fit
1.7.1.1 Within-sample fit
It is challenging to assess the fit of the model in the presence of multiple equilib-
ria, because even if the model is well specified and the estimates of the structural
parameters are correct, when we simulate outcomes the equilibria chosen in the
simulation may not correspond to the one being played in the data. Therefore,
to assess how well the model fits the sample used to estimate it, I use the model
estimates to simulate maintenance decisions and outcomes in 100 datasets, and cal-
culate the proportion of times each community maintains its pump or not. Using
this method, the model fits the key patterns of pump functionality in the data
well. The pump functionality rate in the data is 70.8 percent. The model predicts a
functionality rate of 71.6 percent and classifies 70.6 percent of observations correctly.
Figure A.6 in section A.1 shows the distribution of cluster functionality rates in
the data and predicted by the model, by plotting overlapping histograms. In the
data, there are a large number of clusters in which all pumps are functional, and
a significant minority in which no pumps are functional, with a reasonable number
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with functionality rates between 0.5 and 1. The model captures this pattern well,
though slightly over-predicts the number of clusters in which all or no pumps are
functional.
Figure A.7 shows the functionality rate of pumps by the fragmentation of tech-
nology in their cluster.75 There is a clear pattern in the data that pumps are less
likely to be functional if they are in clusters with higher fragmentation of technol-
ogy. The model predicts both this pattern and the level of functionality rates very
well.
Figure A.8 shows the functionality rate of pumps by the number of other pump
and non-pump water sources in its cluster. In the data, there is a clear pattern
that pumps are more likely to be functional if they are in a cluster with a greater
number of other pumps and the model captures this fact well, predicting the func-
tionality rate of different cluster sizes very accurately. The data also shows that in
general pumps are less likely to be functional if they are in a cluster with more non-
pump water sources, though this relationship is not quite monotonic. The model
predicts this broad pattern reasonably, though it does not do as well at predicting
the pump functionality rate for clusters with five or more non-pump water sources,
over-predicting the functionality rate in each case. This indicates that I may be
75As in section A.3.0.3, I calculate fragmentation using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI):
technology fragmentation in cluster k is given by fragk = 1 −
∑
j s
2
jk, where sjk is the share of
technology j in cluster k.
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under-estimating the extent of free riding on non-pump water sources.
Although the main goal of this research is to explain the functionality of water
pumps, and the model I develop and data that I use to estimate it are not focused
on explaining outcomes, we can also analyze how well the model fits the health and
education outcomes observed in the data. Figure A.9 plots the outcomes in the
data and the outcomes predicted by the model in each ward, for each of the three
outcomes. If the model predictions were perfect, each of these points would be on
the 45 degree line, plotted in blue. We can see that the model does not predict
patterns of child survival rates very well, with a lot of variance in the data left
unexplained by the model. This is not particularly surprising, as there are many
factors that explain child survival beyond water availability that are not included
in the model. However, the model does a good job of explaining the patterns of
school attendance in the data, explaining 46 percent of the variance in girls’ school
attendance and 52 percent of boys’ school attendance, with water availability and
the adult literacy rate the most important explanatory factors.
1.7.1.2 Out-of-sample fit
I also use data from outside of the sample used to estimate the model to assess
its fit. As discussed in section 1.3.1, the data used to estimate the model was col-
lected between 2011 and 2013 as part of a national water point mapping exercise
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conducted by GeoData Consultants Limited on behalf of the Tanzanian Ministry
of Water and Irrigation. However, 42 of 132 districts were mapped between 2005
and 2008 in a pilot water point mapping exercise carried out by three international
NGOs, and I use this data to analyze the out-of-sample fit of my model estimates.76
I assess model fit using data on 9,119 water sources, 5,138 of which are pumps,
from 486 wards in the 2005-2008 dataset, 303 (62%) of which are not included in
the 2011-2013 sample I use to estimate the model.77 I take the baseline character-
istics of the 2005-2008 data, and use my model to predict the functional status of
the pumps in the data. I define clusters of water sources as in section 1.6.1, and
the distribution of cluster sizes (given in Figure A.10) is similar to the distribution
of clusters defined in the 2011-2013 data used to estimate the model (Figure A.5).
The model fits the key patterns of the out-of-sample data well. The overall pump
functionality rate in the data is 68.5%, and the model predicts a functionality rate
of 67.2%. The model classifies the functionality status of 69.1% of observations cor-
rectly, which is only slightly lower than the within-sample fit, which classifies 70.6%
76The pilot water point mapping exercise was carried out by WaterAid in partnership with
Engineers Without Borders and SNV, an international not-for-profit development organization
based in the Netherlands.
77Note that although the 2011-2013 dataset is from a national water point mapping exercise, I
excluded some districts from the data because a significant proportion of observations were missing
key data, as described in section 1.6.1. These districts were largely the same ones as those covered
by the pilot mapping exercise in 2005-2008, which explains why there is little geographic overlap
between the sample used to estimate the model and the data used to test its out-of-sample fit.
Note that these two samples are not entirely independent, as some of the observations used to
estimate the model are in wards also covered by out-of-sample data, collected approximately five
years earlier. I can also assess out-of-sample fit excluding these wards, and the results are similar.
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of observations correctly. Figure A.11 shows the distribution of cluster pump func-
tionality rates in the out-of-sample data and predicted by the model, by plotting
overlapping histograms. The model captures the distribution of cluster functional-
ity rates well, and fits the data slightly better than the within-sample fit.
Figure A.12 shows the functionality rate of pumps by the fragmentation of technol-
ogy in their cluster, in both the out-of-sample data, and predicted by the model.78
As in the data used to estimate the model, pumps are less likely to be functional if
they are in clusters with higher fragmentation of technology and the model predicts
both this pattern and the level of functionality rates very well. Figure A.13 shows
the functionality rate of pumps by the number of other pump and non-pump water
sources in its cluster, both in the out-of-sample data and predicted by the model.
Again, the model predicts the functionality rate and key patterns in the data well.
1.7.2 Counterfactual policy evaluation
I use the model to estimate the effects of two policies proposed by the Tanzanian
government in an attempt to improve rural water supply. The first policy is the
standardization of pump installations to a single technology, which would increase
maintenance cost-reduction spillovers between nearby communities but would not
affect free riding in my model. The second policy requires all communities to charge
78As in section A.3.0.3, I calculate fragmentation using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI):
technology fragmentation in cluster k is given by fragk = 1 −
∑
j s
2
jk, where sjk is the share of
technology j in cluster k.
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user fees for their water sources, which would decrease free riding but have no
effect on spillovers in my model. I estimate the effect of each policy on the pump
functionality rate and child outcomes.
1.7.2.1 Technology standardization: effects on pump functionality and
child outcomes
As discussed in section 1.2, many water sector practitioners, including the ma-
jority of respondents to my survey, are in favor of more standardization of pump
technologies to improve the quality of pump installation and maintenance. For-
mal technology standardization has been attempted in fifteen sub-Saharan African
countries with the support of UNICEF (MacArthur (2015)). It was proposed in
Tanzania in the Tanzania National Water Policy (2002), but has not been imple-
mented in practice: the proportion of pumps installed using the technologies chosen
for standardization has actually decreased since 2002 (see Figure A.1).
Table 1.6 shows the change in pump functionality, child survival and school atten-
dance rates predicted by the model as a result of standardizing the technology of
installed pumps to each of the four most common technologies. The model predicts
that if all pumps were standardized to the technology that it estimates is cheapest
to maintain, the Nira pump, the functionality rate would increase by 6.1 percentage
points, from 71.6 percent to 77.7 percent. There are two channels through which
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this effect works: first, by switching every pump to the technology that is easiest
to maintain (the ‘technology effect’); and second, through increased maintenance
cost-reduction spillovers. I estimate that the increase in spillovers accounts for 3.2
percentage points of the increase in functionality, just over half of the total effect.
Figure A.14 shows that the increase in functionality rates would be largest in clus-
ters with greater technology fragmentation at baseline, which is intuitive, because
it is these clusters that will gain most from fragmentation. Figure A.15 shows that
the functionality rate would increase by a similar amount in clusters of different
sizes, though pumps in clusters with more pumps and fewer non-pumps are still
more likely to be functional.
The increase in positive spillovers means that standardization to a sub-optimal tech-
nology could still increase the functionality rate: standardization to the Afridev or
SWN 80 technologies would increase the functionality rate by 3.6 and 2.1 percentage
points respectively (Table 1.6). However, standardization to the worst performing
technology in the sample, the India Mark II pump, would decrease the functionality
rate by 1.4 percentage points, despite an increase in spillovers.79
I also use the model to predict the effect of technology standardization on child
survival and school attendance, as shown in the bottom panel of Table 1.6. The
79In the data sample used to estimate the model, the India Mark II pump has a functionality
rate of 67.1 percent, compared to 74.1 percent for the Nira, 75.1 percent for the Afridev and 71.9
percent for the SWN 80.
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Table 1.6: Predicted effect of technology standardization. Estimated ef-
fect of standardization to each of the four most common technologies on pump
functionality, child survival and school attendance rates, in percentage points.
Technology standardized to:
Nira Afridev SWN
80
India
Mk
Change in functionality
Technology effect 2.9 0.4 -1.1 -4.5
Spillover effect 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2
Net effect 6.1 3.6 2.1 -1.4
Change in outcomes
Child survival 0.36 0.18 0.08 -0.17
Girl attendance 0.61 0.31 0.14 -0.27
Boy attendance 0.48 0.25 0.11 -0.21
Notes: The baseline rate of functionality predicted by the model without standardization is 71.6
percent. The baseline rates of outcomes are 81.6 percent for child survival, 73.9 percent for girls’
school attendance and 71.1 percent for boys’ school attendance.
model predicts that if technology was standardized to the best performing technol-
ogy, the Nira pump, there would be a modest positive effect on school attendance
and child survival rates. I estimate that girls’ school attendance would increase by
0.61 percentage points, with a smaller increase for boys, at 0.48 percentage points.
This is consistent with previous evidence which shows that girls’ school attendance
is more sensitive to water availability than that of boys (UNDP (2006)).80 Figure
A.16 shows that outcomes would improve in the vast majority of wards, and would
improve by a greater amount in wards with lower initial rates of child survival and
school attendance, reducing geographic inequality in these outcomes. Figure A.20
shows that the increase in these outcomes would be greatest in wards with higher
80This study estimated that school attendance is 12 percent higher for girls located within 15
minutes of a water source relative to those who live more than an hour away, but the difference
in school attendance rates for boys was much smaller.
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initial fragmentation of technology, as we would expect.
1.7.2.2 Universal user fees: effects on pump functionality and child out-
comes
The second proposed policy that I use my model to evaluate is the universal in-
troduction of user fees. Guidelines in the Tanzania National Water Policy (2002)
stipulate that communities should charge user fees, but as shown in Table 1.1 in
section 1.3, only 35 percent of pumps and 49 percent of non-pump water sources
charge users for water, either per bucket, per month or per year. I use the model to
evaluate the effects of increasing the proportion of pumps charging fees to 100 per-
cent. Requiring all communities to charge user fees increases functionality through
two channels in my model: first by reducing free riding, and second, by reducing
communities’ cost of maintenance. This reduced cost of maintenance might result
from helping communities to overcome the collective action problem in pump main-
tenance, by making resources for maintenance more readily available.81
As shown in Table 1.7, I estimate that universal user fees would increase the func-
81Note that the model only estimates the first order effects of universal user fees on pump func-
tionality and human capital outcomes. It is possible that this policy would have secondary effects,
by changing households’ other consumption and investment expenditure, by having distributional
impacts within communities (including possibly increasing the financial burden on the very poor-
est households), or by affecting relationships and therefore spillovers between communities in the
long run. These effects would not be captured by the model. The model also treats the charging of
user fees as exogenous from the point of view of the community (i.e. they cannot choose whether
or not to charge user fees). I do not model communities’ choice of user fees in order to keep the
model tractable, and although this is a simplification, I think it is reasonable: as shown by the
results of my survey in Figure A.39, installing organizations play a significant role in determining
whether user fees are charged, and so it is often not a choice made solely by the community.
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Table 1.7: Predicted effect of universal user fees. Estimated effect of all water
sources charging fees on pump functionality, child survival and school attendance
rates, in percentage points.
Universal user fees
Change in functionality
Resources effect 8.9
Free riding effect 1.8
Net effect 10.7
Change in outcomes
Child survival 0.5
Girl attendance 1.7
Boy attendance 1.2
Notes: The baseline rate of functionality predicted by the model without standardization is 71.6
percent. The baseline rates of outcomes are 81.6 percent for child survival, 73.9 percent for girls’
school attendance and 71.1 percent for boys’ school attendance.
tionality rate of pumps by about 11 percentage points. The first mechanism driving
this effect, the increased availability of resources for pump maintenance at the com-
munity level (the ‘resources effect’), is larger, explaining 8.9 percentage points of
this increase in functionality. The second mechanism, the reduction in free riding
between communities, causes a 1.8 percentage point increase in pump functionality
rates. Figures A.17 and A.18 show that universal user fees would increase pump
functionality rates in clusters of all levels of technology fragmentation, and of all
sizes, and would attenuate differences in functionality rates by technology fragmen-
tation and size.
The large increase in the functionality rate of pumps resulting from universal user
fees would have a positive effect on child survival and school attendance rates. I
estimate that the child survival rate would increase by 0.5 percentage points, and
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that school attendance rates would increase by 1.2 percentage points for boys and
1.7 percentage points for girls. Figure A.19 shows that estimated outcomes would
improve in nearly all wards, with the largest improvements in child survival and
school attendance rates in wards with lower initial rates. Figure A.20 shows that
universal user fees would improve outcomes in wards with high and low technology
fragmentation by a similar amount.
1.8 Conclusion
This paper estimates the costs of fragmented provision of water in rural Tanzania
by estimating a structural network model to analyze the water pump maintenance
decisions of communities. I find evidence that a lack of coordination between orga-
nizations installing water sources, combined with decentralized ‘community based
management’ of water pumps, decreases the functionality rate of these pumps. In a
country where only 46 percent of people in rural areas have access to an improved
source of drinking water within 1km of their home, and approximately one third of
water pumps are broken down, I estimate that policy changes proposed by the Tan-
zanian government, but not implemented in practice, would significantly increase
pump functionality rates. Standardization of pump technologies installed in Tan-
zania would increase the functionality rate of pumps by about 6 percentage points,
and universal collection of fees at water sources would increase functionality rates
by about 11 percentage points. I estimate that both policies would have a modest
87
positive effect on school attendance rates, and that this effect would be larger for
girls, who are typically responsible for water collection.
I model pump maintenance decisions in a static network game of complete in-
formation, in which communities simultaneously choose whether to maintain their
pumps. To distinguish social interactions from spatially correlated unobservables, I
use exogenous variation in the similarity of neighboring water sources as a shifter in
the strength of maintenance spillovers that are possible between them. Estimation
of this network game must account for the possibility of multiple equilibria because
the action space of each community is binary. To overcome this estimation chal-
lenge, I partition the data into clusters in two dimensional space using a clustering
algorithm, then I calculate the probability that each possible action profile in each
cluster is an equilibrium, and use an equilibrium selection rule to estimate the like-
lihood of the observed action profile in each cluster.
This research allows me to estimate the negative effects of low coordination be-
tween more than 500 organizations that have installed water sources in Tanzania.
My findings contribute to the empirical literature on the costs of low state capacity
in developing countries, and the effects of poor aid coordination in countries where
non-state actors play an important role in providing public goods. However, this
paper does not analyze the provision of these public goods in a dynamic setting,
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and this provides a promising avenue for future research. The timing of installation
and maintenance decisions might be important factors in a community’s decision to
maintain its pump or not. For example, if a community expects a new pump to be
installed if it fails to maintain its existing pump, this will affect their maintenance
decision, and possibly those of its neighbors. Estimation of a dynamic model could
therefore estimate the costs of ‘aid dependency’ as well as ‘aid coordination’ (or
lack thereof).
This paper is among the first to empirically estimate the effects of free riding and
spillovers in the provision of local public goods in a network setting. There are many
exciting avenues for future research in this area, in both developing and developed
countries. In developing countries, the provision of public goods by non-state actors
is likely to lead to strategic interactions in investments in health, education, trans-
port infrastructure and other locally provided public goods. In developed countries,
free riding and spillover effects may be important determinants of local investments
in law and order, transport infrastructure, public schools and the reduction of pol-
lution. In each case, identifying social interactions and estimating network models
remains challenging, but this paper demonstrates methods of overcoming these chal-
lenges that are appropriate in its empirical setting, and that may be successfully
applied in other contexts.
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Chapter 2
Program Evaluation in the Presence of
Strategic Interactions
This chapter is co-authored with Daron Acemoglu and Camilo Garc´ıa-Jimeno
Abstract
Recent improvements in program evaluation techniques have allowed researchers
to estimate the spillover effects of programs and policies, in addition to the direct
effects. However, in some settings, there may be an interaction between the direct
effects and the spillover effects of a treatment, if the size of spillovers depends on
an individual’s own treatment status. These interactions are strategic: an indi-
vidual’s treatment status will depend on the treatment of their neighbors. This
paper shows that, in the presence of strategic interactions, reduced form estimates
of direct effects and spillover effects are biased, even when a two-step experimental
design is used. We propose a two-step procedure to test for and correct this bias.
The first step is a simple regression-based test for strategic interactions. Condi-
tional on finding evidence of strategic interactions, the second step uses a simple,
parsimonious model adapted from Acemoglu, Garc´ıa-Jimeno and Robinson (2015)
to estimate the underlying structural parameters and effects of treatment. When
the treatment variable is continuous, the second step involves joint estimation of
two linear equations. However, when treatment is binary, the approach requires a
Heckman-style selection bias correction because individuals can choose whether or
not to comply with their assignment to treatment. We demonstrate our procedure
using simulated data.
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2.1 Introduction
The evaluation of programs and policies has become a major research area in eco-
nomics. Research often focuses on the direct effects of treatment on program par-
ticipants, but the spillover effects of a program may also be important for two key
reasons. First, ignoring spillover effects may bias estimates of the direct effect,
due to ‘contamination’ of the control group. Second, these effects are often of eco-
nomic interest in their own right: we might significantly over- or under-estimate the
overall effects of a program if we ignore its spillover effects. Recent innovations in
experimental designs have improved identification of spillover effects, however this
paper shows that in settings where direct effects and spillover effects of a treatment
interact, reduced form estimates of direct effects and spillover effects are biased.
Direct effects and spillover effects of a treatment interact if the size of the spillover
effects on an individual depend on her own treatment status.82 For example, in
public health interventions to reduce communicable diseases, spillover effects may
occur through reduced infection rates, but the benefits from reduced infection might
depend on whether an individual is already infected, and therefore on their initial
treatment status. There are therefore three possible effects of a program or treat-
ment: the direct effect of the treatment on those who receive it; the ‘pure spillover’
82Equivalently, direct and spillover effects interact if the direct effects an individual receives
depend on the treatment status of her neighbors. This different framing is conceptual, and the
key point is that the size of the direct effects and spillover effects depend on each other.
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effect of the treatment, the size of which is independent of an individual’s treatment
status; and an interaction effect, in which the size of the spillover depends on an
individual’s treatment status.
Previous research typically estimates the direct and spillover effects of a treatment
using a reduced form approach, but ignores possible interactions between the two
effects. Researchers estimate a regression with some measure of individual outcomes
on the left hand side, and the treatment status of the individual and her neighbors
as explanatory variables. Recognizing that treatment status may be endogenous,
recent papers have used instruments for individual treatment status, and the treat-
ment status of an individual’s neighbors, sometimes using a two-step ‘randomized
saturation’ experimental design, in which the proportion of people assigned to treat-
ment in a given area is randomized, as well as the treatment status of individuals.
However, in cases where there is an interaction between direct effects and spillover
effects of a treatment, estimates from this reduced form approach will be biased,
because the explanatory variables and their instruments will be correlated with the
omitted interaction term.
Obtaining unbiased estimates of the direct and spillover effects of a treatment when
these effects interact is not trivial. In particular, adapting the reduced form ap-
proach by simply adding an interaction term to the outcomes regression will not
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result in unbiased estimates of the effects of treatment. To understand why, first
note that interactions between the direct and spillover effects of a treatment are
strategic: when these interactions are present, an individual’s treatment status
will depend on the treatment status of her neighbors. Therefore, if an individual
changes treatment status, there is a secondary equilibrium effect from the resulting
changes in her neighbors’ treatment statuses. A reduced form approach does not
model these best responses and equilibrium effects, and therefore cannot estimate
the underlying structural parameters that determine the direct and spillover effects
of a treatment. Indeed, we show that in a simple model with linear best responses,
the reduced form approach is not estimating the correct structural parameters, and
results in an expression with more unknown parameters than equations to estimate
them. However, by explicitly modeling the best responses of interacting individuals,
a simple structural model can provide the necessary additional sources of identifi-
cation.
The contribution of this paper is methodological: we develop a two-step proce-
dure that tests whether direct effects and spillover effects interact, and produces
bias-corrected estimates of the effects of treatment in the presence of interactions,
using a simple structural model. The first step of the procedure tests whether the
interaction of these effects is important, by estimating an instrumental variables
regression of individual treatment on neighbors’ treatment. If the estimated co-
93
efficient on neighbors’ treatment is significant, then we have evidence of strategic
interactions in individuals’ treatment choices, and reduced form estimates of the
effects of treatment will be biased. The second step of the procedure uses a sim-
ple model of strategic interactions in treatment choice to identify the structural
parameters that determine the effects of treatment. When the treatment variable
is continuous, this consists of estimating a linear best response equation and out-
comes equation, using instruments for individual and neighbors’ treatment. In cases
where the treatment variable is binary, we estimate the best response equation using
a Probit model, and use a Heckman-style selection correction term to consistently
estimate the outcomes equation. In both cases it is efficient to estimate the system
of equations jointly, using a method of moments estimator.83
We derive the bias of the reduced form approach in the presence of strategic inter-
actions by using a simple model of strategic interactions with heterogeneous effects
and linear best responses. There are two main sources of bias of the reduced form
estimates: the omission of the strategic interactions, and the estimation of an av-
erage direct effect of treatment when true effects are heterogeneous. We estimate
the size and direction of the bias under different parameter values using simulated
data. We show that when the direct and spillover effects are complementary (the
83Note that estimation by maximum likelihood is not possible when there are strategic interac-
tions, because individual likelihoods are not independent of each other, so we cannot take the joint
likelihood as the product of the individual likelihoods. We discuss this in more detail in section
2.3.2.
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omitted interaction term is positive), the estimates of the average direct effect of
treatment has a large positive bias. This is because the omission of both the (posi-
tive) interaction term and the heterogeneous effects results in a positive correlation
between individual treatment and the error term. However, when the omitted in-
teraction term is negative, these sources of bias work in opposite directions, and the
overall bias is smaller. Similarly, the bias of the estimates of the spillover effects
is typically small, as the two sources of bias work in opposite directions regardless
of the sign of the omitted interaction term.84 Simulations show that our two-step
procedure produces unbiased estimates of the structural parameters and the effects
of treatment.
Our research builds on a relatively recent program evaluation literature that seeks
to estimate the spillover effects of a treatment. We classify this literature into three
‘generations’ of studies, with later generations employing more robust methods of
identification, with weaker corresponding assumptions.
The first generation of studies randomly assign units to treatment or control, but do
not have plausibly exogenous variation in the intensity of neighbors’ treatment with
which to estimate the size of spillovers.85 Some studies estimate spillover effects on
84The intuition for why the two sources of bias work in opposite directions in the estimation of
the spillover effects is not simple, but we give a more mathematical explanation of this in Section
2.4.
85‘Units’ can refer to either individuals or clusters in a cluster-randomized design. In the lat-
ter case, if spillovers occur within a cluster, and not between a cluster, then overall effects of
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individuals who are not eligible for treatment (see Baird, Bohren, McIntosh and
O¨zler (2014) for a good overview of these ‘partial population experiments’), while
others simply look at the effects on people who do not select into treatment. How-
ever, the proportion of an individual’s neighbors that receive treatment may depend
on eligibility rules or self-selection into treatment, so these studies rely on strong
assumptions of exogeneity.
The second generation of studies use geographic variables to define a radius around
a unit of observation and use the random treatment assignment of other units within
this radius as exogenous variation in intensity of neighbors’ treatment. Miguel and
Kremer (2004) uses this approach in a study of the effects of mass school-based
deworming in Kenya. Each school is randomly assigned to either the treatment or
control, and the authors use schools’ GPS coordinates to calculate the proportion of
pupils within 3km and 3-6km that are assigned to treatment. They find evidence of
positive cross-school externalities, with health and education outcomes improving
for students in schools neighboring treatment schools. Bobba and Gignoux (2014)
applies the same idea to Progresa and finds evidence that the cash transfer program
had positive spillover effects on secondary school participation.
The third generation of studies use a two-step ‘randomized saturation’ experimen-
the treatment (including spillover effects) can be estimated, though this overall effect cannot be
decomposed into direct effects and spillover effects.
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tal design.86 In the first step, clusters are defined and the proportion of individuals
that will be assigned to treatment in each cluster is randomized. In the second
step, individuals within each cluster are randomly assigned to treatment or con-
trol according to the proportion drawn in the first step. Crepon, Duflo, Rathelot
and Zamora (2013) evaluates the impacts of a job placement assistance program
in France using a two-step experimental design. In the first step, clusters (labor
markets) are randomly assigned to one of five proportions (0%, 25%, 50%, 75% and
100%), and then in the second step eligible individuals are assigned to treatment or
control in these proportions. The authors find some evidence of negative spillover
effects of the program on non-participants. Angelucci and Di Maro (2016) evaluate
the impact of a microloan program in Mexico and employ a two-step randomiza-
tion design, though the authors do not use the variation in treatment intensity to
estimate spillover effects in their current paper.
Our two-step procedure depends on the availability of instruments such as those
used in the second and third generation of studies. In particular, our first step,
the regression-based test of strategic interactions, requires exogenous variation in
individual treatment and the intensity of neighbors’ treatment, as does estimation
of the best response and outcomes equation in the second step. Our approach is de-
pendent on the availability of such data and therefore builds directly on the progress
86Baird, Bohren, McIntosh and O¨zler (2014) uses the term ‘randomized saturation’ and provides
a more detailed discussion of these studies.
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made in this recent literature.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 sets out a simple
general model of treatment effects in the presence of strategic interactions and de-
rives the bias of the reduced form approach in a special case of the model with a
linear best response equation. Section 2.3 sets out our two-step procedure for cases
with a continuous treatment variable and for cases with a binary treatment vari-
able. Section 2.4 uses simulated data to demonstrate the bias of the reduced form
procedure at different parameter values, and to show that our proposed method
correctly estimates the underlying structural parameters. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Methodological Framework
2.2.1 A simple model of treatment effects with strategic interactions
Suppose that we are interested in the effect of some continuous treatment variable,
xi ∈ X where X ⊂ R+, on a continuous outcome variable, yi ∈ R, and that
we want to estimate the spillover effects of the treatment, as well as the direct
effects. There are n individuals in our sample, and we assume that we have some
measure of network connections between them, which are summarized in a weighted,
undirected, symmetric n× n matrix, N, where the ijth element, nij, represents the
strength of connection between individuals i and j. nij is positive if i and j are
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neighbors, and zero otherwise.87 We allow i’s treatment and the treatment of i’s
neighbors to affect outcomes in the following way:
yi = c0 + f(xi;κ) + g(Nix; γ) + h(xi,Nix;φ) + i (2.2.1)
where c0 is a constant and E[i] = 0. The function f(·) is the direct effect of in-
dividual i’s treatment, xi. The second term, g(·), is the ‘pure’ spillover effect: the
effect of i’s neighbors’ treatment on i’s outcomes. This is a function of Nix, the
product of the ith row of the network connections matrix, Ni, and the full vector
of treatments, x. The third term, h(·), allows interactions between individual i’s
treatment and her neighbors’ treatment to affect her outcomes. Intuitively, it is pos-
sible, and in some empirical settings it is likely, that the size of the spillover effects
of i’s neighbors’ treatment on i’s outcomes depends upon i’s treatment status. For
example, in many public health interventions, spillover effects come from increased
group immunity or decreased risk of infection, and the size of these spillover effects
for individual i may depend upon i’s own treatment status.
In the second and third generation studies discussed in section 2.1, researchers
have access to instruments for individual treatment, zi, and for the treatment of
i’s neighbors, zic, where the subscript c indicates i’s community or ‘cluster’. In the
87Each individual is not connected to itself, i.e. nij = 0 ∀i = j. We allow for the strength of
connections to vary between different pairs of neighbors (i.e. N is a weighted matrix), and this
nests cases where the measure of network connections is binary, nij ∈ {0, 1}.
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absence of the interaction term, h(·), valid instruments allow for unbiased estimates
of the direct and spillover effects of treatment if f(·) and g(·) are known. However,
if the estimated outcomes equation mistakenly omits the interaction term, it is clear
that the estimates of κ and γ will be biased, even if the functions f(·) and g(·) are
known and we have valid instruments, zi and zic. This is because ˜i is correlated
with f(·) and g(·):
yi = c0 + f(xi;κ) + g(Nix; γ) + (h(xi,Nix;φ) + i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
˜i
(2.2.2)
We formally derive this bias, and the parameters it depends on, using an instru-
mental variables estimator in a linear special case of the model in section 2.2.2.
We propose a simple test of whether the omission of these interaction terms will
result in biased estimates, namely whether i’s choice of treatment, xi, depends on
her neighbors’ treatment, Nix. The intuition is straightforward: if the effect of
i’s neighbors’ treatment on i depends on i’s own treatment, then this will induce
strategic interactions between neighbors, and xi will depend on Nix. To show this
formally, we assume that utility of individual i is linear in outcomes and the cost
of obtaining treatment, C(·):
Ui = yi − C(xi; θ) (2.2.3)
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Individual i chooses her treatment, xi, to maximize utility, Ui, given the actions
(treatments) of her neighbors. If f(xi;κ)+h(xi,Nix;φ)−C(xi; θ) is continuous, real
valued and strictly quasi-concave in xi, and X is a non-empty, convex and compact
set, then i has a unique best response to her neighbors’ treatment, x∗i (Nix), with
interior solutions characterized by:
fx(x
∗
i ;κ) + hx(x
∗
i ,Nix;φ)− Cx(x∗i ; θ) = 0 (2.2.4)
Note that if x∗i is independent of Nix, then there are no strategic interactions
between i and her neighbors, and there is no interaction term, h(·). In this case,
omission of the interaction term, h(·), does not bias the estimates of the direct and
spillover effects, κ and γ, in equation (2.2.2).88 We can test the null hypothesis
that there are no strategic interactions by estimating a best response function of
the form:
xi = j(Nix, zi; β) + ei (2.2.5)
where the optimal treatment of individual i depends on the treatment of her neigh-
bors, and possibly on exogenous variables (instruments), zi. We can estimate this
88In cases where there is a boundary solution for x∗i for all individuals, marginal changes in
Nix will not change x
∗
i . Therefore x
∗
i is locally independent of Nix and omission of h(·) will
not bias estimates of κ and γ. This will be the case in empirical settings where all individuals
take the maximum amount of treatment, which we commonly see in programs where the benefits
of treatment far outweigh the costs, for example in unconditional cash transfer programs. It is
also the case in intent to treat estimates, where we are interested in the effect of assignment to
treatment, and so there is necessarily perfect ‘compliance’.
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equation non-parametrically, or using a flexible functional form for j(·). However,
if j(·) is monotonic in Nix, and Nix and zi are separable, then we can test the null
hypothesis by estimating a linear best response of the form:
xi = β0 + β1Nix + β2zi + ei (2.2.6)
In many cases, we may reasonably expect Nix to be endogenous, as it is likely that
neighbors share unobserved characteristics or shocks that may affect their treat-
ment choices, and so we should estimate this best response equation by using zic as
an instrument for Nix. We can now test whether there are strategic interactions
by testing the null hypothesis, H0 : β1 = 0 against the two-sided alternative, using
standard two stage least squares estimation.
There are two serious implications of finding evidence of strategic interactions. First,
estimates of the direct effects and spillover effects will be biased if the strategic in-
teractions are ignored. We derive this bias, and the parameters it relies upon, in a
simple linear case of the model in section 2.2.2. Second, including the interaction
term in a reduced form estimation of the outcomes equation does not allow you to
identify the key structural parameters that determine the direct effects and spillover
effects, even if you know the functional form of f(·), g(·), h(·) and have valid instru-
ments. The intuition for this is subtle: because of the strategic interactions, if i
chooses to increase her treatment, then there is a direct effect on her outcomes, but
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also a second order effect as a result of her neighbors responding to her increase of
xi and the change in spillover effects that this causes. A reduced form approach
cannot capture these second order effects, and mistakes them for a direct effect of
xi on yi. In section 2.2, we model these second order effects in order to identify
the underlying structural parameters, and estimate the direct effects and spillover
effects of the treatment.
2.2.2 Bias of reduced form estimates in the linear model
We derive the bias of reduced form estimates in a linear version of our model similar
to that in Acemoglu, Garc´ıa-Jimeno and Robinson (2015), and show that a reduced
form approach cannot identify the true structural parameters that determine direct
and spillover effects.89
We assume that the researcher has access to instruments for both an individual’s
treatment, zi, and her neighbors’ treatment, zic. It is most intuitive to think of
these treatments as generated by a two-step experimental design, similar to that
employed by Crepon, Duflo, Rathelot and Zamora (2013), and we will discuss our
setup in the context of that paper. The experimental design in Crepon, Duflo,
Rathelot and Zamora (2013) is intended to measure the externalities of a job place-
89Acemoglu, Garc´ıa-Jimeno and Robinson (2015) studies the direct and spillover effects of lo-
cal state capacity in Colombia, in a network game in which local municipalities have strategic
interactions in their choice of investments in state capacity. The outcome in municipality i is a
function of its own investment, the investment of its neighbors, and an interaction between its
own investment and its neighbors’ investments (given by equation 1 in the paper).
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ment assistance program in France on individuals not assigned to treatment, as well
as the direct benefits to those assigned to the program.90 The paper uses a two step
experimental design: in the first step municipalities are randomly assigned to an
intensity of treatment (0%, 25%, 50%, 75% or 100% of job seekers to be assigned
to treatment); in the second step individuals in these municipalities are randomly
assigned to treatment in the proportions determined by the first step.
The authors estimate the effects of the treatment by regressing outcomes, yi, on
i’s treatment, xi, and the treatment of i’s neighbors, Nix, excluding possible in-
teractions between xi and Nix. We derive the bias of estimates of the direct and
spillover effects in the case where the interaction term is incorrectly omitted, using
a linear version of the model presented in section 2.2.1. Outcomes, yi are given by:
yi = c0 + κixi + γNix + φxiNix + i (2.2.7)
The first term is the direct effect of individual i’s treatment on her outcomes. The
second term is the ‘pure spillover’ effect of i’s neighbors’ treatment on her outcomes,
and the third term is the interaction between individual i’s participation and her
neighbors’ participation. Note that in Crepon, Duflo, Rathelot and Zamora (2013)
the authors define Nix as the proportion of individuals within a cluster that receive
90The authors find a positive effect of assignment to the job training program on employment
outcomes, but that these gains are transitory and appear to come partly at the expense of workers
who did not benefit from the program.
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treatment, and so implicitly set nij = 1/nc for all i and j in the same municipality
(cluster) and nij = 0 otherwise, where nc is the number of individuals in cluster c.
All individuals in a cluster therefore have the same values for zic, so we drop the i
subscript in these terms to simplify notation and zc is now the proportion of people
randomly assigned to treatment in cluster c.
Note that we model the direct effect as heterogeneous, in particular using the form:
κi = κ+ ϕzi + ξi (2.2.8)
where ξi is a mean-zero random shock, and cov(zi, i) = cov(zi, ξi) = 0. There are
two reasons for this functional form. First, we include an idiosyncratic shock to
the direct effect of treatment, ξi, because in its absence the best response function
for each individual conditional on zi would be deterministic and thus unable to
rationalize any variance in observed responses. Second, we must specify how the
instrument, zi, in our case the random assignment of an individual to treatment or
control, affects the treatment received by an individual, xi. There are two natural
ways to include zi in our model: as an augmentation of the direct effects of treat-
ment (as part of κi), or as a decrease in the cost of treatment (as part of C(·) in
equation (2.2.3)). Note that including zi linearly in κi is equivalent to including it
as a linear cost of treatment; we choose the former option to simplify the derivation
of the bias from a reduced form instrumental variables estimation.
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Given the functional form of the heterogeneous effects, we define the average direct
effect of the treatment, κ¯.91
κ¯ = κ+ ϕz¯ + ξ¯ (2.2.9)
(κi − κ¯) = ϕz˜i + ξ˜i (2.2.10)
where z¯ and ξ¯ represent the mean values of zi and ξi respectively, and z˜i = zi − z¯
and ξ˜i = ξi − ξ¯i. Note that ξ˜i →p ξi because ξ¯i →p 0.
If we attempt to estimate the average direct effect of the treatment and the pure
spillover effect using a reduced form approach, and omitting the interaction term,
we will get biased estimates. To demonstrate this bias in the context of this model,
we first rewrite equation (2.2.7), including the interaction term and heterogeneous
effects in the error term:
yi = c0 + κ¯xi + γNix + (φxiNix + (κi − κ¯)xi + i) (2.2.11)
To formally derive the bias, set xˆi = [xi Nix] and zˆi = [zi zc], and stack these
terms in matrices, Xˆ and Zˆ. If we estimate κ and γ the parameters by instrumental
91What we call the ‘average direct effect of the treatment’ is not quite analogous to the ‘average
treatment effect’, or ATE. In our setting, the ATE would be the average marginal effect of an
increase in treatment, which would include effects through the interaction term, Nix,a and second
order ‘equilibrium effects’ that result from strategic interactions.
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variables, we get:
[
ˆ¯κIV
γˆIV
]
= (Zˆ′Xˆ)−1Zˆ′Y (2.2.12)
=
([
z′i
z′c
] [
xi Nix
])−1

[
z′i
z′c
] [ xi xiNix Nix z˜ixi ξ˜ixi ]

κ¯
φ
γ
ϕ
1
 + i


=
[
κ¯+
γ+
σzcNixσzi(xiNix)−σziNixσzc(xiNix)
σzixiσzcNix−σziNixσzcxi
φ+
σzcNixσzi(z˜ixi)−σziNixσzc(z˜ixi)
σzixiσzcNix−σziNixσzcxi
ϕ+
σzcNixσzi(ξ˜ixi)
−σziNixσzc(ξ˜ixi)
σzixiσzcNix−σziNixσzcxi
σzixiσzc(xiNix)−σzcxiσzi(xiNix)
σzixiσzcNix−σziNixσzcxi
φ+
σzixiσzc(z˜ixi)−σzcxiσzi(z˜ixi)
σzixiσzcNix−σziNixσzcxi
ϕ+
σzixiσzc(ξ˜ixi)
−σzcxiσzi(ξ˜ixi)
σzixiσzcNix−σziNixσzcxi

where σab is the covariance between variables a and b. The proof of this result,
including the missing steps in this calculation, is given in the Appendix.
There are three sources of bias in these reduced form estimates, given by the three
additional terms in the equation above. The first source of bias comes from the
omission of the interaction term, and depends upon the importance of these inter-
actions in determining outcomes: if φ is small, then this bias is small. The second
and third sources of bias come from the estimation of homogeneous effects of treat-
ment, rather than heterogeneous effects. The second term depends on ϕ, the extent
to which assignment to treatment effects the direct effect of treatment, κi. The
third term is a type of selection bias, and comes from ignoring random shocks to
the direct effect of treatment, ξi. These shocks will be correlated with the amount
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of treatment chosen, xi, and omitting them results in endogeneity of xi, and biased
estimates of κ¯ and γ. We explore the size and direction of these sources of bias in
more detail through simulation in section 2.4.
A further important result of this derivation is that the reduced form approach
attempts to estimate κ¯ and γ, but in the presence of strategic interactions and
heterogeneous effects, has two equations in four unknowns. This is in addition to
the previously discussed problem, that a reduced form approach does not consider
second order (equilibrium) effects of treatment resulting from strategic interactions
between individuals, and so cannot estimate the structural parameters that deter-
mine the direct, spillover and interaction effects. Our approach, which we outline in
the next section, uses a simple model of strategic interactions to provide two addi-
tional sources of identification so that we can estimate these structural parameters.
2.3 A two-step structural bias-correction procedure
We propose a two step procedure to identify the structural parameters that deter-
mine direct effects and spillover effects of a treatment in the presence of strategic
interactions. The first step is a simple regression-based test of whether strategic
interactions are present; if there is evidence of strategic interactions, our second
step uses a simple model to give additional sources of identification and estimate
the underlying structural parameters.
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Our approach uses a simplified version of the model of strategic interactions in
Acemoglu, Garc´ıa-Jimeno and Robinson (2015), the solution to which depends on
whether the treatment variable is continuous or binary, and on the choice set of
agents assigned to treatment and control. In particular, we consider three cases:
settings with a continuous treatment variable; settings with a binary treatment
variable in which there are some ‘always takers’ (i.e. individuals can access the
treatment even if they are assigned to the control group); and settings with a binary
treatment variable in which there are no always takers (only individuals assigned
to treatment can access the treatment). We discuss how our two step procedure
should be applied in each case, and which parameters can be identified.
In each case, the first step of the procedure is a simple test for the presence of
strategic interactions, and therefore whether exclusion of the interaction term in-
duces bias in the estimates of κ¯ and γ. The intuition of the test is relatively
straightforward: does xi depend on Nix? We test the null hypothesis H0 : β1 = 0
in a regression of individual treatment, xi, on the treatment of i’s neighbors, Nix:
xi = β0 + β1Nix + β2zi + ei (2.3.1)
where zi is person i’s assignment to treatment. As Nix is endogenous, we use an
instrument, zc, to estimate β1.
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The exact specification tested depends on whether xi is continuous or binary, and
whether there are always takers, but in each case the test is equivalent to test-
ing whether φ = 0. We derive the exact test in the context of the model and
demonstrate this equivalence in each case in the following sections. If there is no
evidence against the null hypothesis, then there is no evidence of bias induced by
the omission of the interactions term. However, if there is evidence for strategic
interactions, then we propose a second step, in which we estimate the equilibrium
outcomes equation and use our simple model to identify key parameters.
2.3.1 Continuous treatment variable
In the case of a continuous treatment variable, xi ∈ R+, we can identify the struc-
tural parameters by estimating the best response equation and equilibrium outcomes
equation in our simple model of strategic interactions. As in equation (2.2.7), the
outcome of individual i depends on a heterogeneous direct effect of i’s treatment, xi,
a pure spillover effect of her neighbors’ treatment, Nix, and an interaction between
i’s treatment and her neighbors’ treatment:
yi = c0 + κixi + γNix + φxiNix + i (2.3.2)
κi = κ+ ϕzi + ξi (2.3.3)
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Individual i chooses her level of treatment, xi, to maximize quadratic utility:
Ui = yi − θ
2
x2i (2.3.4)
Taking first order conditions gives the equilibrium best response equation:92
xi =
φ
θ
Nix +
κi
θ
(2.3.5)
We can substitute the best response equation into the outcomes equation to give
equilibrium outcomes:
yi = c0 + θx
2
i + γNix + i (2.3.6)
because in equilibrium κixi + φxiNix = θx
2
i . Note that the equilibrium outcomes
equation is a function of x2i and Nix, and that neither the direct effect of treatment,
or the effect of the interaction term can be identified by using a simple regression
of outcomes on treatment. However, we can identify each of the parameters of the
model by estimating both the best response equation, 2.3.5, and the equilibrium
outcome equation, 2.3.6, provided that we have valid instruments for xi and Nix.
The equilibrium outcomes equation identifies θ and γ. Then, given θˆ, estimating
92Existence of pure strategy equilibria follows immediately from concavity and Kakutani’s fixed
point theorem, and there is a unique interior equilibrium given by the solution to a set of linear
best response equations. If |λmin(N(δ))|<
(
φ
θ
)−1
then this interior equilibrium is unique, as
shown in Bramoulle´, Kranton and D’Amours (2014).
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the best response equation, xi =
φ
θ
Nix +
1
θ
(κ+ ϕzi + ξi), identifies φ, κ and ϕ. We
can estimate these two equations separately, as a two-step estimator, but it will be
more efficient to estimate them jointly using a method of moments estimator with
the sample analogs of the following moments:
E
[(
zi
zc
)(
xi − φ
θ
Nix− 1
θ
(κ+ ϕzi)
)]
= 0 (2.3.7)
E
[(
zi
zc
)(
yi − c0 − θx2i + γNix
)]
= 0 (2.3.8)
2.3.2 Binary treatment variable, with always takers
In cases with a binary treatment variable, xi ∈ {0, 1}, we do not have a first order
condition to derive the best response equation, and as a result cannot obtain a
single equilibrium equation for outcomes as we did in section 2.3.1. There are two
separate cases to consider: binary treatment with and without always takers, where
an ‘always taker’ is an agent who receives treatment (xi = 1) even when they are
assigned to the control group (zi = 0). There are only minor differences between
the cases, and we consider each in turn.
Consider our benchmark outcomes equation:
yi = c0 + κixi + γNix + φxiNix + i (2.3.9)
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Here xi ∈ {0, 1}, and as before we have κi = κ + ϕzi + ξi, E[ξi] = 0, E[i] = 0.
Note that x2i = xi, so we rewrite the utility function in equation (2.3.4) so that it
is linear:
Ui = yi − θxi (2.3.10)
The choice of xi is given by the best response function:
xi =
{
1 if κ+ ϕzi − θ + φNix ≥ −ξi
0 if κ+ ϕzi − θ + φNix < −ξi
(2.3.11)
We assume that the ξi terms are normally distributed and estimate equation (2.3.11)
with a Probit IV using zc as an instrument for Nix. Testing whether the coefficient
on Nix is statistically significant from zero provides a test of H0 : φ = 0, and
therefore provides the first step of our two step procedure. Estimating this best
response equation allows us to recover estimates for:
α˜ ≡ κ− θ
σξ
(2.3.12)
ϕ˜ ≡ ϕ
σξ
(2.3.13)
φ˜ ≡ φ
σξ
(2.3.14)
Next, consider the equilibrium outcome equations for the treated and untreated
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groups:
yi|xi=0 = c0 + γNix + i|xi=0 (2.3.15)
yi|xi=1 = c0 + κ+ ϕzi + ξi|xi=1 + (φ+ γ)Nix + i|xi=1 (2.3.16)
There will be selection into treatment based on the unobserved ξi. To see this, note
that the best response of individual i follows a cutoff rule, whereby i chooses xi = 1
if and only if ξi is above some threshold value. As shown by equation (2.3.11), this
threshold depends on the value of zi and Nix (and by extension its instrument, zc).
Treated individuals with a higher value of zi and zc are likely to have a lower value of
ξi on average, giving cov(zi, ξi|xi=1) 6= 0, cov(zi, ξi|xi=0) 6= 0, cov(zc, ξi|xi=1) 6= 0 and
cov(zc, ξi|xi=0) 6= 0. This will bias our estimates of equation (2.3.16), and also our
estimates of equation (2.3.15) if cov(ξi, i) 6= 0. Therefore, to estimate these equa-
tions consistently, we use Heckman’s selection correction. The selection correction
for equation (2.3.15) is relatively standard, but estimating equation (2.3.16) is com-
plicated slightly by the composite error term, ξi|xi=1+i|xi=1. We derive each in turn.
First, define
(
i
ξi
)
∼ N
[(
0
0
)
,
(
σ2 ρσσξ
ρσσξ σ
2
ξ
)]
(2.3.17)
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In estimating equation (2.3.15), we must estimate E[i|xi = 0] which is given by:
E[i|ξi < −(κ+ ϕzi − θ + φNix)]
=E
[
ρσξi
σξ
+ ηi|ξi < −(κ+ ϕzi − θ + φNix)
]
=E
[
ρσξi
σξ
|ξi < −(κ+ ϕzi − θ + φNix)
]
+ E [ηi|ξi < −(κ+ ϕzi − θ + φNix)]
=
ρσ
σξ
E [ξi|ξi < −(κ+ ϕzi − θ + φNix)]
=
ρσ
σξ
−φ
(
−(κ+ϕ−θ+φNix)
σξ
)
Φ
(
−(κ+ϕ−θ+φNix)
σξ
) = ρσ
σξ
λ0i
where φ() and Φ() represent the density and cumulative distribution functions for
the standard normal distribution, and λ0i is an inverse mills ratio. The first step
is from an orthogonal decomposition, i =
ρσξi
σξ
+ ηi such that ηi is orthogonal to
ξi. We can use the estimated coefficients from our best response equation, given in
equations (2.3.12), (2.3.13) and (2.3.14), to give us an estimate of λ0i :
λˆ0i =
−φ
(
−(α˜ + ϕ˜zi + φ˜Nix)
)
Φ
(
−(α˜ + ϕ˜zi + φ˜Nix)
) (2.3.18)
We can now estimate equation (2.3.15), correcting for the selection bias:
yi|xi=0 = c0 + γNix +
ρσ
σξ
λˆ0i + ηi (2.3.19)
We estimate this on the untreated subsample, using zc as an instrument for Nix
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which gives us consistent estimates of the pure spillover effect, γˆ, and the constant
term, cˆ. Note that the coefficient on λˆ0i gives us an estimate of
ρσ
σξ
.
Estimating the outcomes equation for the treated group follows a very similar
methodology, although the Heckman selection correction is non-standard because
there is a composite error term, with ξi|xi=1 in the outcomes equation. We calcu-
late the expected value of the composite error term, given that an individual has
selected into treatment:
E[ξi + i|ξi ≥ −(κ+ ϕzi − θ + φNix)]
=E[ξi|ξi ≥ −(κ+ ϕzi − θ + φNix)] + E[i|ξi ≥ −(κ+ ϕzi − θ + φNix)]
=E[ξi|ξi ≥ −(κ+ ϕzi − θ + φNix)] + ρσ
σξ
E[ξi|ξi ≥ −(κ+ ϕzi − θ + φNix)]
=
(
1 +
ρσ
σξ
) φ(−(κ+ϕ−θ+φNix)
σξ
)
1− Φ
(
−(κ+ϕ−θ+φNix)
σξ
) = (1 + ρσ
σξ
)
λ1i
where the second step comes from the same orthogonal decomposition used for the
untreated group. As before, we can use the estimated coefficients from the best
response to give us an estimate of λ1i :
λˆ1i =
φ
(
−(α˜ + ϕ˜zi + φ˜Nix)
)
1− Φ
(
−(α˜ + ϕ˜zi + φ˜Nix)
) (2.3.20)
Finally, we can use zc as an instrument for Nix to estimate the outcomes equation
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for the treated group:
yi|xi=1 = c0 + κ+ ϕzi + (φ+ γ)Nix +
(
1 +
ρσ
σξ
)
λˆ1i + ηi (2.3.21)
Note that zc is now a valid instrument for Nix. We previously worried that
cov(zc, i|xi=1) 6= 0 because of selection into treatment, but now that we are control-
ling for selection, with λˆ1i , we have cov(zc, ηi) = 0. Estimation of equation (2.3.21)
gives us estimates of ϕˆ as well as the reduced form parameters:
aˆ = c+ κ (2.3.22)
βˆ = φ+ γ (2.3.23)
Combining this with our estimates of γˆ and cˆ from estimation of the outcomes
equation for the untreated subgroup, equation (2.3.19), we can identify κˆ = aˆ − cˆ
and φˆ = βˆ − γˆ. These estimates, combined with those from the best response
equation, given by equations (2.3.12), (2.3.13) and (2.3.14), gives us two sources of
identification for σξ, and allows us to identify θˆ = κˆ − α˜σˆξ. The variance of the
disturbance terms is given by var(ηi) = σ
2
 (1 − ρ2), which we can estimate with
σˆη
2 = var(ηˆi). This gives us two equations in two unknowns for ρ and σ, and so
they are separately identified. We therefore have point identification for all of the
structural parameters in our model.
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Note that the estimate of the outcomes equation for the treated group, equation
(2.3.21), may suffer from collinearity. This is because the key input variables to λˆ1i
are the same as the explanatory variables in the outcomes equation (zi and Nix) and
because the inverse mills ratio is close to a linear function over a significant range of
values. However, the outcomes equation for the untreated group, equation (2.3.19),
does not generally suffer from collinearity, because λˆ0i is a function of zi which does
not appear as an explanatory variable in the outcomes equation.93 Therefore ρσ
σξ
is
identified in equation (2.3.19), and can be used to estimate the coefficient on λˆ1i in
equation (2.3.21), (1 + ρσ
σξ
). Holding this coefficient fixed, collinearity is no longer
a problem for estimation of equation (2.3.21).
The above explanation assumes that the outcomes equations, (2.3.19) and (2.3.21),
are estimated sequentially (for example using 2SLS) for ease of exposition. How-
ever, they can also be estimated jointly with a cross equation restriction on the
coefficients on λˆ0i and λˆ
1
i , and joint estimation will be more efficient. Estimation by
maximum likelihood is not feasible because of the nature of strategic interactions
in our model: the individual likelihoods are conditioned on the treatment status of
other players, so we cannot calculate the joint likelihood by taking the product of in-
93Estimation of the outcomes equation for the untreated subgroup, equation (2.3.19), might
suffer from collinearity if there is little or no variation in zi.
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dividual likelihoods, as these are not independent of each other.94 However, we can
jointly estimate the outcomes equations, (2.3.19) and (2.3.21), using the method
of moments estimator.95 First, define the exogenous variables in each outcomes
equation:
z0i =
(
zc
λˆ0i
)
and z1i =
(
zc
λˆ1i
)
Note that E[z0i ηi] = E[z1i ηi] = 0, allowing us to specify moment conditions for the
outcomes equations of the treated and untreated subgroups:
E
[
z0i
(
yi − c0 − γNix− ρσ
σξ
λˆ0i
)
1(xi = 0)
]
= 0
E
[
z1i
(
yi − (c0 + κ)− ϕzi − (φ+ γ)Nix−
(
1 +
ρσ
σξ
)
λˆ1i
)
1(xi = 1)
]
= 0
We can use the sample analogs of these moments in our estimation. Calculation of
94The likelihood for individual i is given by:
Li(xi, yi|Nix,Θ) = Pr(xi = 0, y = yi|Nix)1(xi=0) Pr(xi = 1, y = yi|Nix)1(xi=1)
=(f(y = yi|xi = 0,Nix) Pr(xi = 0|Nix))1(xi=0)
(f(y = yi|xi = 1,Nix) Pr(xi = 1|Nix))1(xi=1)
Because each individual likelihood conditions on the treatment of i’s neighbors, Nix, we can-
not take the overall likelihood as a product of the individual likelihoods because they are not
independent: L 6= ∏Ii=1 Li(xi, yi|Nix,Θ)
95Note that we cannot estimate the best response equation, (2.3.11), jointly with the outcomes
equations by adding it as a moment inequality. This is because we need to make a functional form
assumption on the ξi terms in order to model and correct for the selection bias. In particular, we
assume that the ξi terms are normally distributed to estimate the Heckman correction terms that
we use in the outcomes equations, (2.3.19) and (2.3.21). We need to estimate these correction
terms, and therefore the best response equation, separately to the method of moments estimator,
and fix these correction terms in the method of moments estimator to make sure that they are
consistent with how we have modeled the selection into treatment.
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standard errors must account for the fact that λˆ0i and λˆ
1
i are ‘generated regressors’.
96
2.3.3 Binary treatment variable, with no always takers
As in the case of binary treatment with ‘always takers’, there is no first order
condition for the best response equation in the binary treatment case without always
takers:
xi =

0 if zi = 0
1 if zi = 1 and κ+ ϕ− θ + φNix ≥ −ξi
0 if zi = 1 and κ+ ϕ− θ + φNix < −ξi
(2.3.24)
We now have three groups to consider: the control group (zi = 0), compliers
(zi = 1, xi = 1) and never takers (zi = 1, xi = 0). Note that in the case with
no always takers, we can never separately identify κ and ϕ. To see why, consider
our outcomes equation yi = c0 + (κ + ϕzi + ξi)xi + γNix + φxiNix + i. Separate
identification of κ and ϕ requires variation in zi among individuals who have xi = 1,
but when there are no always takers, (xi = 1) implies that (zi = 1), so this is clearly
not possible.
As before, we can use zc as an instrument for Nix to estimate the best response
equation for individuals assigned to treatment (compliers and never takers) using a
96Depending on the empirical context in question, researchers should consider also allowing
standard errors to be spatially correlated.
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Probit IV, to give:
α˜ =
κ+ ϕ− θ
σξ
(2.3.25)
φ˜ =
φ
σξ
(2.3.26)
There are now outcomes equations for each of the three subgroups:
yi|zi=0 = c0 + γNix + i (2.3.27)
yi|zi=1,xi=0 = c0 + γNix + i|zi=1,xi=0 (2.3.28)
yi|zi=1,xi=1 = c0 + (κ+ ϕ+ ξi|zi=1,xi=1) + (φ+ γ)Nix + i|zi=1,xi=1 (2.3.29)
We estimate the outcomes equation for the compliers, equation (2.3.29) and never
takers, equation (2.3.28) using selection bias correction terms similar to those in
section 2.3.2. We take our estimates of α˜ and φ˜ from the best response equation
and calculate:
λˆ0i =
−φ
(
−(α˜ + φ˜Nix)
)
Φ
(
−(α˜ + φ˜Nix)
) (2.3.30)
λˆ1i =
φ
(
−(α˜ + φ˜Nix)
)
1− Φ
(
−(α˜ + φ˜Nix)
) (2.3.31)
121
As before, we can now estimate outcomes equations (2.3.28) and (2.3.29), correcting
for the selection bias:
yi|zi=1,xi=0 = c0 + γNix +
ρσ
σξ
λˆ0i + ηi (2.3.32)
yi|zi=1,xi=1 = (c0 + κ+ ϕ) + (φ+ γ)Nix +
(
1 +
ρσ
σξ
)
λˆ1i + ηi (2.3.33)
Estimation of the outcomes equation for the control group, equation (2.3.27), does
not require a selection correction because individuals in the control group did not
face a compliance decision, and this identifies c0 and γ.
In this case, collinearity is a problem for estimation of both equations (2.3.32)
and (2.3.33). This is because the input variable for λˆ0i and λˆ
1
i is the same as the
single explanatory variable in the outcomes equations. However, as in section 2.3.2,
we can use ‘cross-equation restrictions’ coming from the structure of the model to
ensure that the parameter estimates are consistent. For example, if we estimate the
outcomes equations sequentially, we can proceed as follows:
1. Estimate the outcomes equation for the control group, equation (2.3.27) to
identify c0 and γ.
2. Fixing our estimates, cˆ0, γˆ, estimate the outcomes equation for the never-
takers using the selection bias correction, equation (2.3.32). This identifies
ρσ
σξ
.
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3. Fixing our estimates, cˆ0, γˆ,
ρ̂σ
σξ
, estimate the outcomes equation for compliers
using the selection bias correction, equation (2.3.33). This identifies φ and
(κ+ ϕ).
4. As before, we can then use the estimates from the best response to identify
σξ and θ. We can use the variance of the residuals, ηˆi, and
ρ̂σ
σξ
to separately
identify ρ and σ, because var(ηi) = σ
2
 (1 − ρ2). Therefore all structural
parameters are separately identified apart from κ and ϕ.
As in section 2.3.2, although I have described this identification argument sequen-
tially as if each of these outcomes equations is estimated separately, it is more
efficient to estimate these equations jointly, using the method of moments estima-
tor. As before, we define the exogenous variables in the outcomes equations (2.3.32)
and (2.3.33):
z0i =
(
zi
λˆ0i
)
and z1i =
(
zi
λˆ1i
)
We now define three moment conditions and use their sample analogs in estimation:
E [zi (yi − c0 − γNix)1(zi = 0)] = 0
E
[
z0i
(
yi − c0 − γNix− ρσ
σξ
λˆ0i
)
1(zi = 1, xi = 0)
]
= 0
E
[
z1i
(
yi − (c0 + κ+ ϕ)− (φ+ γ)Nix−
(
1 +
ρσ
σξ
)
λˆ1i
)
1(zi = 1, xi = 1)
]
= 0
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2.4 Simulations
To demonstrate our proposed methodology, we simulate data from the linear model
with a continuous treatment variable, as presented in section 2.3.1. We estimate
the average direct effect of the treatment, κ¯, and the pure spillover effect, γ, using a
standard two stage least squares estimation of the outcomes equation that ignores
strategic interactions and heterogeneous effects, and show that these estimates are
biased. We then implement our two step procedure, by estimating the best response
equation and equilibrium outcomes equation, and show that our estimated param-
eters are very close to the true parameter values used to simulate the data.
To simulate data, we follow the linear model with a continuous treatment variable
set out in section 2.3.1, and follow the experimental design used in Crepon, Duflo,
Rathelot and Zamora (2013) where possible. We use a relatively simple network
structure, in which we define non-overlapping clusters of individuals. Individuals
within a cluster are connected, but there are no network connections between clus-
ters.97 We define 150 clusters with 50 individuals in each one and, following Crepon,
Duflo, Rathelot and Zamora (2013), we randomly assign each cluster to have 0, 25,
50, 75 or 100 per cent of people assigned to treatment, zc ∈ {0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1}.
Given the zc draws, we then assigned individuals in each cluster to treatment using a
97The network matrix, N is therefore block diagonal, with elements on the leading diagonal
equal to zero and positive network connections within a cluster are row-normalized: nij = 1/nc
if i, j are in the same cluster, where nc is the number of individuals in a cluster, and nij = 0
otherwise.
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Bernoulli draw: P (zi = 1|i in cluster c) = zc. We draw random shocks, (i, ξi), and
allow these to be correlated for individuals and within clusters, and then calculate
the unique interior solution using the vector equation analog of the best response
given in equation (2.3.5):
x = (I − φ
θ
N)−1
1
θ
K (2.4.1)
where K is a vector of the κi terms. Finally, we generate a vector of outcomes
equations using equation (2.3.2), and check whether the uniqueness condition holds
for each simulation.98 More detail on the parameters used in the simulations can
be found in the Appendix.
For each simulation we estimate two sets of parameters. First, we estimate the
reduced form outcomes equation without the interactions term, xiNix, or hetero-
geneous effects by two stage least squares with zi and zc as instruments for xi and
Nix, as in equation (2.2.11). This gives us estimates of the average direct effect
of the treatment, ˆ¯κRF , the pure spillover effects, γˆRF , and the constant term, cˆRF .
Second, we estimate the key structural parameters of our simple model by estimat-
ing the best response equation and equilibrium outcomes equation, again using zi
and zc as instruments, as outlined in section 2.3.1: κˆS, γˆS, φˆS, ϕˆS, θˆS, cˆS.
98If |λmin(N(δ))|<
(
φ
θ
)−1
then this interior equilibrium is unique, as shown in Bramoulle´,
Kranton and D’Amours (2014).
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Parameter estimates from 10 representative simulated datasets are given in Ta-
ble 2.1.99 It is clear that the estimates from the reduced form outcomes equation
are biased, while the estimates using the structural two-step correction procedure
are very close to the true parameters used to simulate the data, and this is true
across a range of parameter values. Furthermore, it is clear that the bias tends to
be larger for the reduced form estimates of the average direct effect of treatment,
ˆ¯κRF , than for the pure spillover effect, γˆRF .
To better understand what determines the size of the bias in the reduced form
estimates, we decompose the bias using equation (2.2.12) derived in section 2.2.2.
Recall that the bias is comprised of three terms: the first term in equation (2.2.12)
is the bias induced by the omission of strategic interactions, while the second and
third terms are a result of ignoring heterogeneity in the direct effects of the treat-
ment. The size of each of these biases for each of our 10 simulated datasets are
given in Table 2.2.
The decomposition of the three sources of bias in Table 2.2 presents a few in-
teresting results. First, the bias from the third term is relatively small. This is
99We show results from 10 simulated datasets with parameter values that are representative of
our simulation results and help to demonstrate how the bias in the reduced form estimates change
as we vary key parameters. More details, and the specific parameter values used are given in the
Appendix. Results from a greater number of simulations are available upon request.
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Table 2.1: Parameter estimates using reduced form and two-step correc-
tion procedure. Parameter estimates using the reduced form approach are biased,
and the bias is larger for the estimates of the average direct effect of the treatment,
κ¯. The estimates using the two-step structural correction procedure are very close
to the true parameters used to simulate the data in each of our ten simulations.
Reduced Structural estimates
True parameters form Best response Outcomes
Sim κ ϕ φ γ θ ˆ¯κRF γˆRF κˆS ϕˆS φˆS θˆS γˆS
1 5 3 1 2 2 25.45 1.60 5.10 2.98 0.98 2.00 2.00
2 5 3 0 2 2 12.91 1.95 5.10 2.98 -0.04 2.00 2.00
3 5 3 -1 2 2 8.61 2.12 5.10 2.98 -1.08 2.00 2.00
4 5 3 1.5 2 2 49.11 1.01 5.10 2.98 1.48 2.00 1.99
5 5 1.5 1 2 2 22.46 1.78 5.22 1.48 0.94 2.00 1.99
6 5 -2 1 2 2 15.43 1.87 4.80 -2.02 1.04 2.00 2.01
7 3 3 1 2 2 17.61 1.60 3.04 2.98 0.98 2.00 2.00
8 5 3 1 0.2 2 25.45 -0.20 5.10 2.98 0.98 2.00 0.20
9 5 3 1 5 2 25.45 4.60 5.10 2.98 0.98 2.00 5.00
10 5 3 1 2 0.2 -3.49 1.88 5.11 2.99 1.02 0.20 2.00
Table 2.2: Decomposition of the bias of the reduced form estimates. For
each simulation, the bias is decomposed into the three terms derived in equation
(2.2.12).
True Reduced Sources of bias in equation (2.2.12)
pars form 1st term 2nd term 3rd term
Sim κ γ ˆ¯κRF γˆRF κ γ κ γ κ γ
1 5 2 25.45 1.60 6.14 5.98 12.7 -6.3 -0.12 0.09
2 5 2 12.91 1.95 -0.13 -0.12 6.4 0.1 -0.07 0.05
3 5 2 8.61 2.12 -2.32 -2.25 4.3 2.4 -0.05 0.04
4 5 2 49.11 1.01 17.8 17.3 24.5 -18.0 -0.21 0.19
5 5 2 22.46 1.78 5.19 5.14 11.2 -5.4 -0.21 0.16
6 5 2 15.43 1.87 3.91 3.98 7.7 -4.0 0.10 -0.07
7 3 2 17.61 1.60 4.26 4.06 8.8 -4.4 -0.08 0.07
8 5 0.2 25.45 -0.20 6.14 5.98 12.7 -6.3 -0.12 0.09
9 5 5 25.45 4.60 6.14 5.98 12.7 -6.3 -0.12 0.09
10 5 2 -3.49 1.88 -8.35 -8.12 -1.7 8.1 0.00 -0.07
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intuitive, as it depends upon correlation between randomly drawn z terms and the
product of a random shock, ξi and the treatment xi. Although this bias increases as
we increase the variance of the ξi terms, it remains small relative to the bias from
the first two terms.
More significantly, when φ > 0 (in all simulations but 2 and 3), the bias of the
estimates of the average direct effects of the treatment are large. This is because
when φ > 0, the bias from the omission of strategic interactions (the first term)
is in the same direction as the bias coming from ignoring heterogeneous effects of
treatment (the second and third terms). This finding is intuitive. By excluding
the interaction term, xiNix, there is a positive correlation between the error term
and xi, and the resulting bias exaggerates the true direct effect of the treatment.
Ignoring heterogeneous effects will also exaggerate estimates of the true effect as
people with a higher unobserved valuation of treatment will select more treatment,
and those with low unobserved values of treatment will select less (or no) treat-
ment. Note that in simulation 2, φ = 0 and the bias from omitting the interactions
is therefore close to zero. In simulation 3, φ is negative, so the bias from omitting
the interactions is towards zero, as the error term is negatively correlated with xi.
In this case, the overall bias is smaller, as the two sources of bias work in opposite
directions and offset each other.
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The estimates of the pure spillover effect, γ, tend to have a much smaller bias,
because the two main sources of bias work in opposite directions and largely offset
each other. Bias from omitting the interactions term generally has the same sign
as φ: if φ is positive, then Nix is positively correlated with the error term and γˆRF
is too high, but if φ is negative then Nix is negatively correlated with the error
term and γˆRF is too low. The bias from the second term has the opposite sign to
the first term. Ignoring heterogeneous effects does not directly effect the estimates
of the pure spillover effect and so the intuition for this is not very clear. However,
mathematically, the derivation in equation (2.2.12) implies that if the first bias term
has the same sign as φ, and the second bias term has the opposite sign (as is the
case in all of our simulations), then
σzc(xiNix)
σzc(z˜ixi)
>
σzi(xiNix)
σzi(z˜ixi)
The largest covariances in this expression are likely to be σzc(xiNix) and σzi(z˜ixi), so
this condition holds in each of our simulations.100
100To derive this condition, first note that the denominator for each of the bias terms is the
same, and is always positive because σzixi > σziNix and σzcNix > σzcxi by construction of the
instruments. Now, consider the case where φ > 0. If the first term of bias is positive, then
we have σzixiσzc(xiNix) > σzcxiσzi(xiNix). If the second term of bias is negative, then we have
σzixiσzc(z˜ixi) > σzcxiσzi(z˜ixi). Finally, if we dividethis first inequality by the second inequality,
then we must have
σzc(xiNix)
σzc(z˜ixi)
>
σzi(xiNix)
σzi(z˜ixi)
. A similar exercise can be carried out for φ < 0.
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2.5 Conclusion
Spillover effects may be important in the evaluation of the overall effects of many
programs and policies, from health interventions to cash transfers. However, causal
identification of these spillover effects is generally challenging. Recent research has
made great improvements in the identification and estimation of spillover effects, in
particular with the use of two step ‘randomized saturation’ experimental designs.
However, we show that reduced form estimates of the direct effects and spillover
effects of treatment are biased in the presence of strategic interactions, even when
using high quality experimental data. We develop a two-step procedure, in which
the first step tests for strategic interactions, and the second step gives bias-corrected
estimates of the effects of treatment in their presence.
Our approach requires very high quality data, similar to that used in the most
sophisticated papers that estimate the spillover effects of programs and policies.
In particular, we need exogenous variation in both individual treatment and the
intensity of neighbors’ treatment to implement our two-step procedure. Such data
is not always available, and challenges remain in the estimation of spillover effects
of programs and policies, particularly in settings where effect sizes are likely to be
small and diffuse. However, where appropriate data is available, researchers should
test for the presence of strategic interactions and, if necessary, can use a simple
model to get unbiased estimates of the structural parameters and treatment effects.
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Appendices
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Appendix A: Chapter 1
A.1 Additional figures and tables
Figure A.1: Annual proportion of pumps of each technology installed.
The proportion of Nira and SWN 80 pumps installed in Tanzania has declined since
the Tanzania National Water Policy (2002) attempted to standardize to these two
technologies in 2002.
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Figure A.2: Location, type and technology of water sources in Tanzania.
Water point mapping data, Tanzania (2013).
Type of water source
Technology of water source
Notes: The left hand side image shows the water sources in the main source of data and their
functionality status. The right hand side image zooms in on a specific region, Morogoro. Regions
with missing data are excluded. Map with functionality of water source is shown in Figure 1.1 in
section 1.3.1.
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Table A.1: Summary statistics for centrality measures, different cutoff
distances. Median, mean and standard deviation for the number of water sources
within 1.2km, 0.7km and 1.7km.
1.2km cutoff 0.7km cutoff 1.7km cutoff
Med. Mean S.D. Med. Mean S.D. Med. Mean S.D.
No. non-pumps 0 2.83 6.84 0 1.50 4.08 1 4.08 9.05
No. pumps, diff tech 0 1.64 3.96 0 0.83 1.98 1 2.51 6.47
No. pumps, same tech 1 2.44 3.81 0 1.32 2.33 2 3.44 5.22
No. pumps 2 4.08 6.05 1 2.16 3.25 3 5.95 9.42
No. water sources 4 6.91 10.61 2 3.65 5.86 6 10.03 15.5
Figure A.3: Histograms of the number of water sources within 1.2km,
0.7km or 1.7km. Histograms for non-pumps, pumps of a different technology
and pumps of the same technology. Each distribution is positively skewed and
has approximately half of observations without a water source of that type within
1.2km.
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Figure A.4: Hazard rate of pump breakdown. The Kaplan-Mier estimator
shows that the hazard rate of pump breakdown is almost constant for the first
20 years (95 percent confidence interval given by pink dotted line). The survivor
function shows that nearly all pumps are broken after 35 years.
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Figure A.5: Definition of clusters using k-means clustering. Example of
cluster definitions using k-means clustering (top), and distribution of cluster sizes,
by number of pumps and number of all water sources in each cluster (bottom).
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Figure A.6: Within-sample model fit: distribution of cluster pump func-
tionality rate. Overlaid histograms show that the distribution of the cluster pump
functionality rate in the data and predicted by the model are reasonably similar.
Notes: Cluster pump functionality rate refers to the proportion of pumps in each cluster that are
functional.
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Figure A.7: Within-sample model fit: pump functionality rate by cluster
technology fragmentation. The model fits the level and slope of the pump
functionality rate well.
Notes: I calculate fragmentation using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI): technology
fragmentation in cluster k is given by fragk = 1−
∑
j s
2
jk, where sjk is the share of technology j
in cluster k.
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Figure A.8: Within-sample model fit: pump functionality rate by cluster
size. The model fits the level and slope of the pump functionality rate in the data
well for the number of pumps in a cluster. The fit is less good for the number of
non-pump water sources in a cluster, particularly for larger clusters.
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Figure A.9: Within-sample model fit: outcomes. The model does not predict
the child survival rate in wards very accurately, but it does explain a large amount
of the variance in school attendance rates of boys and girls.
Notes: Perfect predictions would fall on the 45 degree line (drawn in blue).
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Figure A.10: Definition of clusters in 2005-2008 data. Distribution of cluster
sizes, by number of pumps and number of all water sources in each cluster in the
2005-2008 data used for out-of-sample fit.
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Figure A.11: Out-of-sample model fit: distribution of cluster pump func-
tionality rate. Overlaid histograms show the distribution of cluster pump func-
tionality rates in the 2005-2008 data and predicted by the model.
Notes: Cluster pump functionality rate refers to the proportion of pumps in each cluster that are
functional.
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Figure A.12: Out-of-sample model fit: pump functionality rate by cluster
technology fragmentation. The model fits the level and slope of the pump
functionality rate in 2005-2008 data well.
143
Figure A.13: Out-of-sample model fit: pump functionality rate by cluster
size. The model fits the level and slope of the pump functionality rate in the 2005-
2008 data well, for both the number of pumps and non-pumps in a cluster.
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Figure A.14: Standardization of technology counterfactual: pump func-
tionality rate by cluster technology fragmentation. Predicted functionality
rates shown for standardization to the best performing technology, the Nira pump.
Standardization of technology results in larger increases in pump functionality rates
for clusters with a high initial fragmentation of technology.
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Figure A.15: Standardization of technology counterfactual: pump func-
tionality rate by cluster size. Predicted functionality rates shown for stan-
dardization to the best performing technology, the Nira pump. Pump functionality
rates increase across clusters of all sizes, though pumps are still more likely to be
functional if they are in a cluster with more pumps and fewer non-pumps.
146
Figure A.16: Standardization of technology counterfactual: change in
outcomes. The initial outcomes of each ward are given on the horizontal axis, with
the percentage change in the outcomes as a result of standardization of technology
given on the vertical axis. The model predicts that standardization of technology
increases the rates of child survival and school attendance in the vast majority of
wards. The increases are larger for wards with a lower initial level of these outcomes.
Notes: Change in outcomes shown for counterfactual in which pumps are standardized to the
best performing technology, the Nira pump.
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Figure A.17: Universal user fees counterfactual: pump functionality rate
by cluster technology fragmentation. Charging universal user fees significantly
increases the average functionality rate for clusters with different levels of fragmen-
tation. It attenuates the negative effect of technology fragmentation, though the
functionality rate is still slightly lower in clusters with higher technology fragmen-
tation.
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Figure A.18: Universal user fees counterfactual: pump functionality rate
by cluster size. Universal user fees significantly increase the average functionality
rate for clusters of all sizes. They attenuate the effects of different numbers of water
sources in a cluster, though the functionality rate is still slightly higher in clusters
with more pumps and fewer non-pump water sources.
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Figure A.19: Universal user fees counterfactual: change in outcomes. The
initial outcomes of each ward are given on the horizontal axis, with the percentage
change in the outcomes as a result of universal user fees given on the vertical axis.
The model predicts that universal user fees increase the rates of child survival and
school attendance in the vast majority of wards. The increases are larger for wards
with a lower initial level of these outcomes.
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Figure A.20: Counterfactual policies: outcomes by ward fragmentation.
Both counterfactual policies predict increased pump functionality and a resulting
increase in outcomes across wards with various levels of initial technology fragmen-
tation. However, standardization of technology would lead to significantly larger
gains in outcomes for wards with a higher initial fragmentation of technology, while
universal user fees would have a similar effect on outcomes in wards with different
levels of initial fragmentation.
Technology standardization Universal user fees
Notes: The counterfactual in which pumps are standardized is shown for standardization to the
best performing technology, the Nira pump.
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A.2 Pump technology details
Figure A.21: Afridev pump. Picture, technical details and design.
Figure A.22: India Mark II pump. Picture, technical details and design.
Notes: Information from Rural Water Supply Network (RWSN) (2005).
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Figure A.23: Nira/Tanira pump. Picture, technical details and design.
Figure A.24: SWN 80 pump. Picture, technical details and design.
Notes: Information from Rural Water Supply Network (RWSN) (2005).
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Figure A.25: Afridev pump components and approximate cost.
Notes: Information from Rural Water Supply Network (RWSN) (2007).
Table A.2: Reasons for pump breakdown. Primary reason given for break-
down of water pumps in 2005-2008 Tanzania data.
Breakdown type Freq. Percent
Dried 143 26.3%
Major housing issue 25 4.6%
Major rising main issue 121 22.3%
Minor housing issue 42 7.7%
Minor rising main issue 105 19.3%
No longer used 79 14.6%
Water contaminated 28 5.2%
Notes: Information taken from the 2005-2008 Tanzanian water point mapping dataset (main
analysis uses 2013 data). Breakdown classified as ‘minor’ if malfunctioning components cost less
than $10 to replace according to Figure A.25.
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A.3 Reduced form: robustness tests
Table A.3: Alternative specifications, 1.2km cutoff. Each panel shows the
key estimated marginal effects of separate probit regressions with pump function-
ality as the dependent variable. A pump is more likely to be functional if there are
more pumps nearby (panels 2 and 4). This positive correlation is driven by pumps
of the same technology (panels 3 and 5). The overall number of water sources has
no significant predictive power over pump functionality (panel 1).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Number of water sources within 1.2km 0.147** 0.113* 0.0116 0.0352 -0.0150
(0.0713) (0.0678) (0.0661) (0.0613) (0.0713)
Number of pumps within 1.2km 0.506*** 0.484*** 0.329*** 0.363*** 0.340**
(0.186) (0.135) (0.115) (0.131) (0.157)
Number of pumps, same tech within 1.2km 1.56*** 1.02*** 0.912*** 1.04*** 1.01***
(0.284) (0.205) (0.201) (0.215) (0.222)
Number of non-pump sources within 1.2km -0.212 -0.245** -0.314*** -0.296*** -0.321***
(0.134) (0.111) (0.111) (0.113) (0.119)
Number of links to pumps, 1.2km cutoff 0.591*** 0.583*** 0.445*** 0.470*** 0.472***
(0.196) (0.146) (0.127) (0.143) (0.171)
Number of non-pump sources within 1.2km -0.190* -0.245** -0.291*** -0.346*** -0.331***
(0.114) (0.106) (0.107) (0.104) (0.112)
Number of pumps, diff tech within 1.2km -0.437* 0.0822 0.0957 0.0222 -0.156
(0.232) (0.185) (0.194) (0.191) (0.243)
Number of pumps, same tech within 1.2km 1.74*** 1.12*** 1.06*** 1.13*** 1.17***
(0.293) (0.224) (0.215) (0.202) (0.221)
Observations 10,667 10,667 10,667 10,667 10,667
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the ward level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1. Marginal effects reported in percentage points. The control variables used in each
specification correspond to those used in the main specification (reported in Table 1.2 the key
marginal effects of which are in the final panel of this table).
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A.3.0.1 Centrality robustness specifications
Table A.4: Alternative specifications, 0.7km cutoff. The correlations are
very similar when we use a cutoff of 0.7km instead of 1.2km. Each panel shows
the key estimated marginal effects in probit regressions with pump functionality as
the dependent variable. The fifth panel shows the estimates that are analogous to
the main specifications (including non-pumps, pumps of a different technology and
pumps of the same technology as the key regressors).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Number of water sources within 0.7km 0.229* 0.141 -0.0204 0.0296 -0.0400
(0.135) (0.123) (0.117) (0.114) (0.120)
Number of pumps within 0.7km 0.885*** 0.734*** 0.504** 0.599** 0.478*
(0.255) (0.230) (0.224) (0.235) (0.270)
Number of pumps, same tech within 0.7km 2.18*** 1.25*** 1.13*** 1.36*** 1.24***
(0.421) (0.324) (0.318) (0.331) (0.340)
Number of non-pump sources within 0.7km -0.284 -0.288* -0.394** -0.369** -0.380**
(0.199) (0.167) (0.168) (0.168) (0.173)
Number of pumps within 0.7km 0.981*** 0.829*** 0.617*** 0.702*** 0.593**
(0.256) (0.239) (0.233) (0.244) (0.280)
Number of non-pump sources within 0.7km -0.266 -0.290* -0.393** -0.364** -0.372**
(0.180) (0.162) (0.162) (0.161) (0.165)
Number of pumps, diff tech within 0.7km -0.687* 0.200 -0.165 -0.253 -0.459
(0.414) (0.404) (0.414) (0.396) (0.444)
Number of pumps, same tech within 0.7km 2.36*** 1.33*** 1.27*** 1.49*** 1.36***
(0.441) (0.338) (0.320) (0.331) (0.338)
Observations 10,667 10,667 10,667 10,667 10,667
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the ward level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1. Marginal effects reported in percentage points. The control variables used in each
specification correspond to those used in the main specification (reported in Table 1.2).
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Table A.5: Alternative specifications, 1.7km cutoff. The correlations are
very similar when we use a cutoff of 1.7km instead of 1.2km. Each panel shows
the key estimated marginal effects in probit regressions with pump functionality as
the dependent variable. The fifth panel shows the estimates that are analogous to
the main specifications (including non-pumps, pumps of a different technology and
pumps of the same technology as the key regressors).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Number of water sources within 1.7km 0.125** 0.128*** 0.0563 0.0705* 0.0460
(0.0541) (0.0461) (0.0412) (0.0401) (0.0509)
Number of pumps within 1.7km 0.333** 0.371*** 0.253*** 0.266** 0.291***
(0.161) (0.121) (0.0902) (0.104) (0.110)
Number of pumps, same tech within 1.7km 1.26*** 0.916*** 0.782*** 0.866*** 0.897***
(0.285) (0.186) (0.179) (0.196) (0.185)
Number of non-pump sources within 1.7km -0.146 -0.179** -0.216** -0.195** -0.220**
(0.112) (0.0893) (0.0895) (0.0925) (0.0992)
Number of pumps within 1.7km 0.391** 0.443*** 0.334*** 0.339*** 0.386***
(0.173) (0.130) (0.101) (0.115) (0.123)
Number of non-pump sources within 1.7km -0.150* -0.186** -0.212** -0.187** -0.206**
(0.0903) (0.0833) (0.0857) (0.0880) (0.0941)
Number of pumps, diff tech within 1.7km -0.310** 0.0452 -0.0351 -0.0920 -0.0581
(0.151) (0.0984) (0.109) (0.109) (0.152)
Number of pumps, same tech within 1.7km 1.44*** 1.01*** 0.902*** 0.992*** 0.991***
(0.276) (0.204) (0.194) (0.205) (0.196)
Observations 10,667 10,667 10,667 10,667 10,667
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the ward level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1. Marginal effects reported in percentage points. The control variables used in each
specification correspond to those used in the main specification (reported in Table 1.2).
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Table A.6: Alternative specifications, working water sources, 1.2km cut-
off. The correlations in functionality are very similar if we just look at the num-
ber of working water sources within 1.2km, instead of the total number of water
sources. The positive correlations are driven by the number of working pumps of
the same technology, with a negative correlation between pump functionality and
the number of working non-pump water sources within 1.2km. Each panel shows
the key estimated marginal effects in probit regressions with pump functionality as
the dependent variable. The fifth panel shows the estimates that are analogous to
the main specifications (including non-pumps, pumps of a different technology and
pumps of the same technology as the key regressors).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Number of working water sources, 1.2km 0.600*** 0.506*** 0.353*** 0.386*** 0.382***
(0.137) (0.103) (0.101) (0.108) (0.122)
Number of working pumps, 1.2km 1.65*** 1.47*** 1.22*** 1.26*** 1.47***
(0.532) (0.354) (0.327) (0.350) (0.290)
Number of working pumps, same tech, 1.2km 3.56*** 2.81*** 2.67*** 2.80*** 2.92***
(0.489) (0.381) (0.339) (0.352) (0.330)
Number of working non-pump sources, 1.2km -0.298** -0.288** -0.359** -0.329** -0.376**
(0.151) (0.132) (0.142) (0.145) (0.148)
Number of working pumps, 1.2km 1.75*** 1.56*** 1.31*** 1.33*** 1.58***
(0.587) (0.389) (0.350) (0.369) (0.304)
Number of working non-pump sources, 1.2km -0.343*** -0.347*** -0.376*** -0.342*** -0.381***
(0.110) (0.122) (0.128) (0.131) (0.131)
Number of working pumps, diff tech, 1.2km -0.359 0.107 -0.186 -0.276 -0.0868
(0.297) (0.309) (0.257) (0.277) (0.339)
Number of working pumps, same tech, 1.2km 3.76*** 2.93*** 2.82*** 2.94*** 3.03***
(0.466) (0.406) (0.343) (0.345) (0.337)
Observations 10,667 10,667 10,667 10,667 10,667
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the ward level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1. Marginal effects reported in percentage points. The control variables used in each
specification correspond to those used in the main specification (reported in Table 1.2).
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A.3.0.2 Distance specifications
Figure A.26: Non-parametric distance specifications, all water sources.
Non-parametric regression of pump functionality on distance to the nearest non-
pump water source, pump of a different technology and pump of the same technol-
ogy, plotted above histograms of distances observed in the data. There is no linear
relationship between pump functionality and the distance to the nearest non-pump
or pump of a different technology, but a negative relationship with distance to the
nearest pump of the same technology.
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Figure A.27: Non-parametric distance specifications, working water
sources. Non-parametric regression of pump functionality on distance to the near-
est working water sources show a similar negative relationship between pump func-
tionality and distance to the nearest working pump of the same technology.
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Table A.7: Probit distance specifications, all water sources. There is a
negative relationship between pump functionality and distance to the nearest alter-
native pump of the same technology. This is significant whether we estimate this
separately or jointly with distance to non-pumps and pumps of a different technol-
ogy. The distance to non-pumps or pumps of a different technology does not predict
pump functionality.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dist. nearest non-pump, km 0.0571 0.0919 0.110 0.0685 0.142
(0.205) (0.223) (0.209) (0.213) (0.221)
Dist. nearest pump, diff tech, km 0.218 0.0967 0.236 0.248 0.311*
(0.162) (0.174) (0.175) (0.176) (0.177)
Dist. nearest pump, same tech, km -0.734*** -0.436*** -0.349** -0.374** -0.329**
(0.143) (0.150) (0.147) (0.150) (0.153)
Dist. nearest non-pump, km -0.00321 0.0951 0.0830 0.0353 0.0955
(0.211) (0.227) (0.212) (0.213) (0.220)
Dist. nearest pump, diff tech, km 0.260 0.107 0.243 0.260 0.308*
(0.166) (0.176) (0.178) (0.177) (0.178)
Dist. nearest pump, same tech, km -0.756*** -0.447*** -0.367** -0.388** -0.342**
(0.146) (0.151) (0.148) (0.151) (0.154)
Observations 10,667 10,667 10,667 10,667 10,667
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the ward level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1. Marginal effects reported in percentage points. The control variables used in each
specification correspond to those used in the main specification (reported in Table 1.2).
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Table A.8: Probit distance specifications, working water sources. Regres-
sions of pump functionality on the distance to the nearest working water sources
show a significant and negative relationship between pump functionality and the
distance to the nearest pump of the same technology. Again, there is no significant
relationship between pump functionality and distance to non-pumps or pumps of a
different technology.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dist. nearest working non-pump, km -0.331* -0.167 -0.0676 -0.121 -0.117
(0.177) (0.147) (0.148) (0.144) (0.155)
Dist. nearest working pump, diff tech, km -0.0356 0.00542 0.121 0.156 0.201
(0.167) (0.135) (0.136) (0.138) (0.139)
Dist. nearest working pump, same tech, km -1.67*** -1.24*** -1.11*** -1.11*** -1.09***
(0.109) (0.117) (0.116) (0.119) (0.122)
Dist. nearest working non-pump, km -0.258 -0.0819 0.00140 -0.0517 -0.0643
(0.160) (0.143) (0.142) (0.139) (0.148)
Dist. nearest working pump, diff tech, km 0.117 0.0558 0.144 0.163 0.183
(0.131) (0.128) (0.130) (0.132) (0.134)
Dist. nearest working pump, same tech, km -1.66*** -1.23*** -1.12*** -1.11*** -1.09***
(0.107) (0.118) (0.116) (0.119) (0.122)
Observations 10,667 10,667 10,667 10,667 10,667
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the ward level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1. Marginal effects reported in percentage points. The control variables used in each
specification correspond to those used in the main specification (reported in Table 1.2).
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A.3.0.3 Cluster-level analysis
This section presents analysis at the ward and village level, by aggregating individ-
ual pump data. The main relationship of interest is whether the ‘fragmentation’ of
water source types and technologies is a significant predictor of functionality rates at
the village or ward level. I calculate fragmentation using the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index (HHI): fragmentation in cluster k is given by fragk = 1−
∑
j s
2
jk, where sjk is
the share of type/technology j in cluster k. The specifications presented here show
the relationship between fragmentation and functionality rates of all water sources
at the ward level, and the functionality rates of pumps only at the village level.
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Figure A.28: Number and fragmentation of water sources in wards. The
left plot shows the distribution of the number of water sources in a ward, the middle
plot shows shows the distribution of type fragmentation, and the right plot shows
the distribution of technology fragmentation at the ward level.
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Figure A.29: Number and fragmentation of water sources in villages. The
left plot shows the distribution of the number of pumps in a village, for villages with
at least one pump, the middle plot shows the distribution of type fragmentation,
and the right plot shows the distribution of technology fragmentation at the village
level.
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Table A.9: Ward-level regressions. Linear regressions of water source func-
tionality rates on fragmentation of type and technology at the ward level. The
functionality rate is higher when there is less fragmentation of technology. Func-
tionality rates are also higher when there is a higher proportion of women in the
Ward, a finding consistent with other literature showing women are more likely to
invest in public goods.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ward type fragmentation -0.352*** -0.0998** -0.274*** 0.0300
(0.0255) (0.0456) (0.0376) (0.0566)
Ward technology fragmentation -0.269*** -0.150*** -0.0931*** -0.165***
(0.0232) (0.0329) (0.0334) (0.0410)
Total no. water sources in Ward 0.00134*** 0.000227 0.00126*** 0.000226 0.00129*** 0.000232
(0.000155) (0.000208) (0.000147) (0.000207) (0.000153) (0.000208)
Average age at record -0.00605*** -0.00644*** -0.00646***
(0.000906) (0.000900) (0.000897)
Proportion that pay for use 0.178*** 0.173*** 0.173***
(0.0230) (0.0229) (0.0229)
Ward area, (km squared) 4.99e-06 4.31e-06 4.43e-06
(6.03e-06) (5.76e-06) (5.80e-06)
Ward total population -6.00e-06 -6.34e-06 -6.16e-06
(5.30e-06) (5.09e-06) (5.09e-06)
Ratio of females to males 0.279*** 0.238** 0.232**
(0.0927) (0.0925) (0.0920)
Ward population density -1.33e-07 -1.17e-07 -1.18e-07
(2.60e-07) (2.56e-07) (2.51e-07)
Ward nationality fractionalization -0.114 -0.105 -0.102
(0.154) (0.152) (0.152)
Constant 0.634*** 0.181 0.629*** 0.341 0.647*** 0.324
(0.0152) (0.521) (0.0161) (0.524) (0.0164) (0.530)
Observations 1,376 1,376 1,376 1,376 1,376 1,376
R2 0.160 0.529 0.131 0.536 0.165 0.536
District fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Proportion data in each month No Yes No Yes No Yes
Proportion of types in Ward No Yes No Yes No Yes
Ward census variables No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Estimated coefficients reported.
Pay for use includes per bucket, month or year. Ward census variables include dependency ratio,
population per water source, number of pumps in ward, number of water sources in ward.
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Table A.10: Village-level regressions. Linear regressions of pump functional-
ity rate on fragmentation of type and technology at the village level. The pump
functionality rate is higher when there is less fragmentation of technology, and more
pumps in a village (both in absolute number and as a proportion of overall water
sources). Holding these variables fixed, the pump functionality rate is higher when
there is more type fragmentation.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Village type fragmentation 0.0487 0.0806 0.255*** 0.230***
(0.0454) (0.0682) (0.0569) (0.0759)
Village technology fragmentation -0.113*** -0.111*** -0.234*** -0.174***
(0.0312) (0.0354) (0.0383) (0.0392)
Total number of pumps in village 0.00546*** 0.00627*** 0.0102*** 0.0102*** 0.00866*** 0.00802***
(0.00195) (0.00209) (0.00192) (0.00197) (0.00196) (0.00206)
Village pump proportion 0.0727 4.183** -0.0287 2.005*** 0.0918* 4.126**
(0.0491) (1.865) (0.0373) (0.594) (0.0495) (1.984)
Total no. water sources in Ward 2.11e-05 -0.00116 -0.00150 -0.00218** -0.000124 -0.00126
(0.00105) (0.00102) (0.00101) (0.000994) (0.00106) (0.00103)
Average age at record -0.000399 -0.000607 -0.000314
(0.00115) (0.00114) (0.00114)
Proportion that pay for use 0.163*** 0.158*** 0.160***
(0.0225) (0.0224) (0.0224)
Ward area, (km squared) -1.04e-05 -1.06e-05 -9.21e-06
(7.92e-06) (7.68e-06) (7.66e-06)
Ward total population -9.43e-07 -5.79e-07 4.95e-07
(9.14e-06) (9.08e-06) (9.02e-06)
Ratio of females to males -0.126 -0.131 -0.129
(0.158) (0.158) (0.158)
Ward population density 6.26e-07 6.77e-07 6.86e-07
(9.81e-07) (9.26e-07) (9.58e-07)
Ward nationality fractionalization -0.147 -0.130 -0.121
(0.215) (0.214) (0.215)
Constant 0.506*** -3.175* 0.624*** -1.008 0.515*** -3.097
(0.0456) (1.886) (0.0353) (0.681) (0.0457) (2.003)
Observations 2,635 2,635 2,635 2,635 2,635 2,635
R2 0.008 0.139 0.013 0.141 0.020 0.145
District fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Proportion data in each month No Yes No Yes No Yes
Proportion of types in village No Yes No Yes No Yes
Ward census variables No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Estimated coefficients reported.
Pay for use includes per bucket, month or year. Ward census variables include dependency ratio,
population per water source, number of pumps in ward, number of water sources in ward.
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A.4 Survey of water practitioners
To help understand what is driving the patterns of installation and functionality
of different types of water sources observed in the data, I conducted a survey of
water sector experts. This survey was carried out using Survey Gizmo, an online
surveying tool. It was sent to a wide variety of stakeholders with significant ex-
perience working in the provision of water in rural areas of low income countries.
It was distributed through multiple channels: directly to personal contacts in the
water sector, via email lists (in collaboration with non-governmental and monitor-
ing organizations working in the sector), and to participants of online discussion
groups about rural water supply. After the initial responses were collected, I also
wrote a blog summarizing my research which was published on the websites of three
prominent organizations to encourage further responses.101 The survey responses
are summarized in the following Figures. In all Figures (apart from Figure A.30),
I report a summary from all respondents, and from only those with experience
specific to Tanzania.
101The blog was published by the International Water and Sanitation Centre (IRC) , Rural Water
Supply Network (RWSN) , and the Water Point Data Exchange (WPDx) .
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Figure A.30: Sector and country experience of respondents. The majority of respondents have worked for an
international NGO at some point, though there is a wide variety of experience from other sectors, including positions for
developing country organizations and governments. Only a minority of respondents have experience specific to Tanzania.
169
Figure A.31: Location of installation. The most important factor determining where a water source is installed is
the existing access to an improved water source.
170
Figure A.32: Type of installation. The most important factor for deciding the typeof an installation is the preferences
of the installing organization, particularly in Tanzania where all respondents ranked this as the single most important
factor. Community characteristics and community preferences are not ranked as important factors, particularly in
Tanzania, where all respondents said that community preferences were not important at all in determining the type of
water source installed.
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Figure A.33: Technology of installation. The most important factor for deciding the technology of an installation
is the preferences of the installing organization, particularly in Tanzania where all respondents ranked this as the single
most important factor. Community characteristics and community preferences are not ranked as important factors,
particularly in Tanzania.
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Figure A.34: Coordination of installing organizations. Respondents indicated that there is very little coordination
between installing organizations in choice of location for a water source or the type or technology that is installed
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Figure A.35: Community preferences. Respondents think that beneficiaries have stronger preferences over the type
of water source they get (i.e. a pump or a tap) relative to their preferences for one technology of pump over another.
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Figure A.36: Factors explaining pump breakdown. It is clear that most respondents think that there are a number
of important factors explaining pump functionality, the most important of which are community resources, installation
quality and a lack of post-construction institutional support. To control for the second and third factors, we must include
installer fixed effects in the analysis. In Tanzania, physical shocks were ranked as the least important factor explaining
functionality.
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Figure A.37: Effects of pump technology standardization. Respondents strongly agreed that increased standard-
ization would increase the availability of spare parts and pump mechanics, and agreed that it would increase cooperation
and cost-sharing. They also agreed that there may be potential benefits of having a variety of different types and
technologies of water sources.
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Figure A.38: Appointment of water point committee. Water point committee members seem to be chosen by
the community in Tanzania, and in a mixture of ways in other countries.
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Figure A.39: Choice of user fees. Installing organizations seem to exert significant influence over how user fees
are determined, though respondents think that communities have more influence over this in Tanzania relative to other
countries.
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Figure A.40: Water point committee management responsibilities. There seems to be a mix of respondents who
think that water point committees (WPCs) typically manage a single pump, and those who reported WPCs managing
multiple pumps
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A.5 Tests of correlated effects
Table A.11: Summary of tests of technology-specific correlated effects. I
test seven possible explanations for the spatial correlations explaining pump func-
tionality demonstrated in section 1.4. This table gives a brief overview of each
explanation and how I test it.
Potential source
of correlation
Survey evidence Reduced form evidence
Selection of tech on
community
characteristics
- Installer preferences most important
factor in choice of technology
(Figure A.32)
- Community characteristics and
preferences among least important
factors (Figure A.32).
- Selection regressions of technology on
community characteristics from
Tanzania National Panel Survey (2008-09)
(Tables A.12 and A.13)
Installer/funder
fixed effects
- Installation quality fairly important in
explaining functionality (Figure A.36)
- Include installer and funder fixed effects
(Table 1.2)
- Restrict to installations by largest orgs
(Table A.15)
- Interact same installer with same tech
(Table A.16)
Selection of tech on
physical conditions
- Installer preferences most important
factor in choice of technology
(Figure A.32)
- Hydrological factors fairly important,
geological factors less so (Figure A.32)
- Technology selection on groundwater
(Table A.17)
- Include groundwater variables and
interaction with technology
(Table A.18)
- Interaction of hole type with technology
(Table A.19)
Technology-specific
physical shocks
- Physical shocks least important factor
explaining functionality (Figure A.36)
- Control for hole type and groundwater
variables (Table 1.2)
- Include interaction of groundwater
variables and technology (Table A.18)
Spatial correlation
in management
- Community ownership fairly important
factor explaining functionality
(Figure A.36)
- Ward/village-level analysis (Section A.3.0.3)
- Pump name as proxy for same ownership:
exclude if same name (Table A.20), and
treat as single observation (Table A.21)
Technology-specific
effects of
community shocks
- Community resources fairly important
factor explaining functionality
(Figure A.36)
- Interact technology with district
(Table A.22)
Spatial correlation
in timing of
installation
NA
- Control for year of installation and
interaction with technology
(Table A.23)
Technology-specific
water demand
shocks
- Only 0.12% households use handpumps
for agriculture
(Tanzania National Panel Survey (2008-09))
- Control for number of users (Table 1.2)
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A.5.1 Are different technologies installed in different types of commu-
nities?
Tables A.12, A.13 and A.14 present regressions of the proportion of water points
that are pumps (column 1), and the proportion of pumps that are of each technology
(columns 2 to 6), on community characteristics in the National Panel Survey (NPS,
2007-08). They test whether 36 variables from the NPS are significant predictors
of water source type or technology, at the enumeration area (EA) level from the
surveys. The sub-sample of observations that can be matched to an enumeration
area restricts the sample size, so the explanatory variables are split across eight
regressions (shown by each panel).
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Table A.12: Type and technology selection regressions. The majority of
explanatory variables are not significant predictors of pump technology, and the
number of statistically significant predictors is roughly what we would expect if
technology was randomly assigned.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pump Afridev India SWN Nira Rope
Pre-primary school available -0.0202 0.0707 0.0816 0.0629 -0.186** -0.0155
(0.0545) (0.0534) (0.0728) (0.0612) (0.0885) (0.0201)
Government primary school available 0.158* -0.0389 -0.156 0.0561 0.0739 0.00356
(0.0850) (0.159) (0.188) (0.120) (0.192) (0.00511)
Private primary school available -0.134* -0.0504 0.0162 0.0509 0.00673 0.00619
(0.0729) (0.0703) (0.157) (0.111) (0.162) (0.0126)
Government secondary school available -0.00906 -0.0503 0.0743 0.00813 -0.0195 0.0277
(0.0563) (0.0529) (0.0783) (0.0748) (0.0899) (0.0207)
Private secondary school available 0.00309 -0.111** 0.0610 0.0354 -0.128 -0.00999
(0.0952) (0.0462) (0.169) (0.152) (0.147) (0.0154)
R2 0.023 0.036 0.030 0.014 0.052 0.042
F stat 1.418 2.703 0.644 0.333 1.390 0.664
F p-value 0.219 0.0244 0.667 0.892 0.234 0.651
Government health center available -0.0253 -0.0230 0.0860 -0.0682 0.0387 0.0169
(0.0506) (0.0526) (0.0708) (0.0602) (0.0849) (0.0139)
Government hospital available -0.159** -0.0367 0.287* -0.245*** -0.0794 -0.00689
(0.0709) (0.0901) (0.169) (0.0575) (0.146) (0.00526)
Private health center available 0.103 -0.0395 0.00944 0.146 -0.113 -0.00129
(0.0765) (0.0694) (0.0917) (0.0950) (0.116) (0.00750)
Private hospital available 0.0308 -0.113** -0.204*** -0.0624 0.444** -0.00860
(0.125) (0.0453) (0.0586) (0.167) (0.174) (0.00672)
R2 0.020 0.014 0.060 0.058 0.050 0.016
F stat 1.482 4.706 8.122 4.983 2.446 0.577
F p-value 0.209 0.00155 9.30e-06 0.00101 0.0508 0.680
Daily market available 0.0953 -0.0741 0.0925 -0.0770 0.0853 0.00578
(0.0644) (0.0488) (0.0796) (0.0610) (0.102) (0.0129)
Weekly market available 0.0554 0.0249 0.0496 -0.0312 0.0270 0.0187
(0.0589) (0.0660) (0.0844) (0.0676) (0.100) (0.0245)
Milling machine available 0.0974 -0.0796 0.0468 0.0210 -0.0728 0.0153
(0.0591) (0.0792) (0.0898) (0.0792) (0.115) (0.0104)
Bank available 0.0613 -0.0611 0.208 -0.0185 -0.104 -0.000689
(0.105) (0.0625) (0.130) (0.120) (0.119) (0.00568)
SACCO available -0.0836 -0.00434 0.0737 0.0403 -0.0803 -0.0158
(0.0551) (0.0587) (0.0815) (0.0759) (0.0916) (0.0107)
R2 0.034 0.034 0.063 0.017 0.029 0.029
F stat 1.666 1.435 1.427 0.476 0.723 0.495
F p-value 0.144 0.218 0.221 0.794 0.607 0.779
Observations 208 112 112 112 112 112
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.13: Type and technology selection regressions. The majority of
explanatory variables are not significant predictors of pump technology, and the
number of statistically significant predictors is roughly what we would expect if
technology was randomly assigned.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pump Afridev India SWN Nira Rope
Birth registration available 0.0914 -0.112** 0.0305 0.0870 0.0151 -0.0114
(0.0601) (0.0507) (0.0856) (0.0764) (0.0970) (0.00828)
Police station/post available 0.00584 0.0445 0.216 -0.206*** -0.0300 -0.00296
(0.0886) (0.0964) (0.137) (0.0697) (0.148) (0.00342)
Court available -0.0191 -0.0869* 0.0774 0.0762 0.0563 -0.00643
(0.0835) (0.0494) (0.129) (0.103) (0.137) (0.00506)
Post office available -0.0749 -0.121** -0.158 -0.101** 0.281* -0.00544
(0.104) (0.0574) (0.125) (0.0452) (0.163) (0.00464)
R2 0.012 0.064 0.055 0.069 0.036 0.009
F stat 0.760 4.266 1.202 5.575 1.087 0.480
F p-value 0.553 0.00305 0.314 0.000409 0.367 0.750
Number of public goods projects 0.0342* 0.0215 -0.0190 -0.0139 0.0474 -0.00288
(0.0206) (0.0221) (0.0205) (0.0170) (0.0357) (0.00237)
Received public funding for public goods -0.0881 0.0447 0.199** 0.162** -0.384*** 0.0176
(0.0852) (0.0636) (0.0883) (0.0692) (0.130) (0.0124)
Received NGO funding for public goods 0.0147 -0.0688 0.0440 0.0965 -0.134 -0.00698
(0.0807) (0.0808) (0.106) (0.105) (0.139) (0.00560)
Received other funding for public goods -0.0258 -0.0475 0.0197 0.0147 0.00185 0.00254
(0.0567) (0.0577) (0.0843) (0.0712) (0.0977) (0.0104)
R2 0.019 0.028 0.026 0.030 0.080 0.009
F stat 0.896 1.189 1.524 1.939 2.706 0.698
F p-value 0.467 0.320 0.200 0.109 0.0341 0.595
Observations 208 112 112 112 112 112
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.14: Type and technology selection regressions. The majority of
explanatory variables are not significant predictors of pump technology, and the
number of statistically significant predictors is roughly what we would expect if
technology was randomly assigned.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pump Afridev India SWN Nira Rope
Farmer’s co-operative group in village? 0.0662 0.0296 -0.154** -0.0397 0.170** 0.00716
(0.0517) (0.0552) (0.0715) (0.0618) (0.0821) (0.0147)
SACCO in village? -0.0189 -0.00908 0.0962 0.0570 -0.127 -0.0126
(0.0565) (0.0642) (0.0829) (0.0689) (0.0895) (0.0127)
Number of village assemblies in last year 0.00850 0.00375 0.0264** -0.0101 -0.0123 0.000883
(0.0108) (0.00983) (0.0128) (0.00786) (0.0162) (0.00146)
Ward tribunal available? -0.0320 -0.0386 0.0682 0.0311 -0.0718 0.0131
(0.0719) (0.0964) (0.0956) (0.0740) (0.119) (0.00933)
Christianity most common religion 0.0583 -0.00203 -0.0171 0.0503 -0.0506 0.0169
(0.0532) (0.0605) (0.0720) (0.0628) (0.0871) (0.0132)
Inheritance procedure gender-neutral 0.00709 -0.0295 -0.0662 -0.145 0.133 0.0151
(0.0624) (0.0751) (0.0947) (0.0960) (0.106) (0.0115)
R2 0.017 0.008 0.078 0.058 0.069 0.029
F stat 0.526 0.198 1.805 1.299 1.585 0.450
F p-value 0.788 0.977 0.105 0.264 0.159 0.844
Years leader in position -0.00725 -0.00104 0.00356 -0.0110* 0.00385 0.000389
(0.00549) (0.00661) (0.00852) (0.00642) (0.0106) (0.000529)
Leader member of CCM party? 0.0124 -0.0439 0.0118 0.156*** -0.115 0.0118
(0.0813) (0.113) (0.122) (0.0386) (0.160) (0.00886)
Education level of leader -0.00817 -0.140** 0.103 0.0562 0.0186 0.00382
(0.0455) (0.0572) (0.0717) (0.0687) (0.0693) (0.00671)
Female community leader -0.219*** -0.0990 -0.280*** -0.0772 0.256 0.00196
(0.0707) (0.0625) (0.0825) (0.106) (0.209) (0.0164)
Age of leader -0.00378 -0.00602* 0.00126 0.00745** -0.00125 0.000236
(0.00255) (0.00311) (0.00418) (0.00305) (0.00420) (0.000791)
Leader is Christian 0.0365 0.0669 0.00718 0.0736 -0.165* 0.0167
(0.0522) (0.0523) (0.0740) (0.0619) (0.0858) (0.0131)
R2 0.041 0.101 0.038 0.088 0.051 0.018
F stat 2.285 1.649 4.568 3.884 1.036 0.534
F p-value 0.0372 0.141 0.000371 0.00153 0.406 0.782
Observations 208 112 112 112 112 112
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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A.5.2 Do installer or funder fixed effects explain correlations between
pump functionality and nearby pumps of the same technology?
Table A.15: Main specifications, large installers only. Restricting the sample
to only those pumps installed by organizations who installed more than 1 percent
of pumps, and including fixed effects for each of these installers, does not change
the key marginal effects.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Number of non-pump sources within 1.2km -0.105 -0.255* -0.372*** -0.324** -0.367***
(0.153) (0.132) (0.131) (0.133) (0.131)
Number of pumps, diff tech within 1.2km -0.895** 0.0382 0.151 0.0263 -0.213
(0.378) (0.273) (0.281) (0.280) (0.300)
Number of pumps, same tech within 1.2km 1.61*** 0.923*** 0.859*** 1.01*** 0.834***
(0.306) (0.228) (0.241) (0.246) (0.259)
Observations 6,396 6,396 6,396 6,396 6,396
R2 0.018 0.149 0.191 0.210 0.213
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the ward level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1. Marginal effects reported in percentage points. The control variables used in each
specification correspond to those used in the main specification (reported in Table 1.2).
Table A.16: Main specifications, same installer interaction. Including
whether pumps were installed by the same organization as an interaction term
with the number of pumps of the same technology does not have a significant effect
in the preferred specifications.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Number of non-pump sources within 1.2km -0.536* -0.686** -0.838*** -0.771*** -0.820***
(0.314) (0.284) (0.283) (0.286) (0.299)
Number of pumps, diff tech within 1.2km -1.41** -0.0160 -0.319 -0.504 -0.592
(0.649) (0.500) (0.549) (0.535) (0.694)
Number of pumps, same tech within 1.2km 7.17*** 5.64*** 4.17*** 4.31*** 4.21***
(1.82) (1.40) (1.09) (1.08) (1.07)
No. pumps, same tech, same installer, 1.2km -3.43* -3.65** -1.90 -1.57 -1.62
(1.98) (1.53) (1.32) (1.36) (1.34)
Observations 10,667 10,667 10,667 10,667 10,667
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the ward level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1. Marginal effects reported in percentage points. The control variables used in each
specification correspond to those used in the main specification (reported in Table 1.2).
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A.5.3 Are different technologies more appropriate for different physical
conditions, leading to a correlation between functionality and the
number of similar pumps nearby?
If some technologies of pump are more likely to be functional in certain physical
conditions than others, and if installing organizations use this information, then
pumps are both more likely to be functional and more likely to be close to other
pumps of the same technology when physical conditions are favorable for that tech-
nology. I test this explanation using three measures of groundwater derived from
data on geological, rainfall and hydrological conditions.
The dataset comes from the British Geological Survey (BGS), and the methods
used to construct it are described in more detail in MacDonald, Bonsor, Dochar-
taigh and Taylor (2012). It includes three measures at 5km resolution: groundwater
storage (calculated using the saturated thickness and effective porosity of rock, in
units of mm), groundwater productivity (liters per second measured at an existing
borehole), and depth to water (meters). The dataset gives groundwater estimates
for the whole of Africa, and is based on hydrogeological and geological reports,
maps and data, as well as 283 separate studies within 152 publications, and has
undergone peer review by 12 regional experts.
Table A.17 estimates probit regressions of water source type (specification (1))
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and pump technology (specifications (2) to (6)) on the key groundwater variables.
There is reasonably strong evidence of selection of water source type (handpump or
not) on groundwater variables, with handpumps more likely to be installed when
the depth of groundwater is less than 25m, and less likely to be installed when
the groundwater productivity is less than 1 liter per second. These results make
intuitive sense. Given that a handpump is installed, the evidence that there is se-
lection of the technology on groundwater variables is much weaker: only 5 of the
40 estimated coefficients are significant at the 95 percent level.
Although the results in Table A.17 do not give strong evidence for selection of
pump technology on groundwater variables, they do suggest that India Mark II
pumps are less likely in areas with low groundwater storage or productivity, and
that SWN pumps are more likely in areas with a grater depth to groundwater. To
see if this is explaining the regressions in the main specifications, I include these
groundwater variables, and their interaction with pump technologies, in the main
specifications. The results in Table A.18 show that including these interaction terms
hardly changes the main estimated marginal effects. This suggests that the selec-
tion of pump technology in areas with favorable physical conditions is unlikely to
explain the key observed correlations.
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Table A.17: Water source type and technology selection on groundwater
variables. There is strong evidence for selection of water source type (pump or not)
on groundwater variables (specification (1)), but only weak evidence that there is
selection of pump technologies on groundwater variables (specifications (2) to (6)).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Pump Afridev India SWN Nira Rope
Groundwater depth 0-7m 0.0892*** -1.74e-05 -0.0331 -0.103** 0.0900* 0.0283*
(0.0187) (0.0289) (0.0444) (0.0521) (0.0520) (0.0145)
Groundwater depth 7-25m 0.0738*** 0.0147 -0.0105 -0.129*** 0.0924 0.0606
(0.0236) (0.0315) (0.0407) (0.0423) (0.0612) (0.0506)
Groundwater productivity 5-20 l/s 0.0446* -0.0172 -0.0229 0.00719 -0.0155 0.00297
(0.0239) (0.0199) (0.0298) (0.0380) (0.0369) (0.0120)
Groundwater productivity 1-5 l/s 0.0475 -0.0141 -0.0524 -0.0661 0.0975* 0.0466
(0.0413) (0.0268) (0.0376) (0.0473) (0.0548) (0.0468)
Groundwater productivity 0.5-1 l/s -0.0473** -0.00598 -0.0986*** 0.0626 0.0533 0.0194
(0.0220) (0.0244) (0.0306) (0.0564) (0.0475) (0.0350)
Groundwater storage, <1000mm 0.00838 -0.00600 -0.0303 0.0344 -0.0117 -0.0109
(0.0216) (0.0216) (0.0262) (0.0403) (0.0340) (0.0224)
Groundwater storage, 1000-10,000mm -0.0146 -0.0318* -0.000827 0.0204 -0.000571 0.0171
(0.0194) (0.0173) (0.0266) (0.0353) (0.0336) (0.0281)
Groundwater storage, 0mm 0.117 -0.00250 -0.112*** -0.0160 0.229**
(0.0719) (0.0342) (0.0103) (0.145) (0.116)
Observations 66,992 7,680 9,736 8,574 10,348 2,911
Pseudo R2 0.279 0.323 0.387 0.411 0.208 0.415
Chi-squared test stat 49.58 13.16 33.58 19.99 16.90 13.71
Chi-squared p-value 4.92e-08 0.107 4.85e-05 0.0104 0.0311 0.0566
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the ward level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1. Regressions include district, installer and funder fixed effects. Number of observations
varies because some districts do not have any pumps of a particular technology and are therefore
excluded from the probit.
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Table A.18: Main specifications, technology and groundwater interac-
tions. Including groundwater variables and their interaction with pump technology
does not change the key estimated marginal effects, as given in Table 1.2.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Number of non-pump sources within 1.2km -0.241** -0.296*** -0.327*** -0.292*** -0.327***
(0.0963) (0.0986) (0.104) (0.105) (0.112)
Number of pumps, diff tech within 1.2km -0.0266 0.111 -0.0745 -0.174 -0.177
(0.145) (0.190) (0.203) (0.199) (0.251)
Number of pumps, same tech within 1.2km 1.48*** 1.08*** 1.08*** 1.22*** 1.20***
(0.232) (0.222) (0.221) (0.235) (0.247)
Observations 10,617 10,617 10,617 10,617 10,617
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the ward level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1. Marginal effects reported in percentage points. The control variables used in each
specification correspond to those used in the main specification (reported in Table 1.2).
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A.5.4 Do physical shocks specific to the type of hole a pump is installed
on explain the correlations?
Table A.19: Main specifications, hole type and technology interactions.
Adding the hole type to the centrality regressions shows that the positive correlation
seems to be entirely driven by pumps of the same technology installed on the same
type of hole, and there is evidence of a negative correlation between pump func-
tionality and the number of pumps of the same technology installed on a different
type of hole. There are two plausible explanations for this: that positive spillovers
are dependent on the hole type, or that there are shocks that are specific to the
hole type. However, if the second explanation was true, we would expect a positive
coefficient on the number of pumps of a different technology installed on the same
type of hole, but this coefficient is in fact negative (and insignificant). Together,
these results suggest that I should include the hole type in the measure of how
similar two sources are (i.e. include hole type in the definition of two pumps being
of the same technology), and therefore the possible strength of spillovers between
them.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Number of non-pump sources within 1.2km -0.184 -0.234** -0.289*** -0.265** -0.286***
(0.113) (0.104) (0.104) (0.106) (0.110)
Number of pumps, diff tech within 1.2km -0.413 0.999* 0.806 0.657 0.542
(0.460) (0.567) (0.599) (0.595) (0.610)
No. pumps, diff tech, same hole, 1.2km -0.0268 -1.03* -0.989 -0.911 -0.835
(0.466) (0.614) (0.626) (0.629) (0.628)
Number of pumps, same tech within 1.2km -0.796 -2.17 -3.86** -3.62** -3.77**
(1.76) (1.33) (1.52) (1.60) (1.62)
No. pumps, same tech, same hole, 1.2km 2.56 3.32** 4.97*** 4.86*** 4.96***
(1.77) (1.35) (1.54) (1.62) (1.64)
Observations 10,667 10,667 10,667 10,667 10,667
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the ward level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1. Marginal effects reported in percentage points. The control variables used in each
specification correspond to those used in the main specification (reported in Table 1.2).
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A.5.5 Does overlap of members of the water point committees explain
the correlations?
The main analysis uses individual water sources as the unit of analysis, and the
model uses each water point to define a ‘community’ that makes maintenance de-
cisions in a network game. I make this assumption because decisions about pump
maintenance are made by a water point committee appointed by the community for
each water source. A valid concern is that a single committee may manage more
than one water source, or that there may be overlap of members of the commit-
tees, which might explain the correlations in pump functionality. Indeed survey
responsents were split about whether they thought water point committees typi-
cally manage a single pump or multiple pumps (see Figure A.40).
Although the data does not contain information about all of the members of the
water point committee (WPC), water sources are typically named after the leader of
the WPC in the dataset. I use this information to test for evidence that overlapping
management explains the correlations using two specifications. Of the 10,667 water
pumps used in the main specifications, 1201 (11.3 percent) are listed as having the
same water point name as another water source in their village, but only 608 of these
(5.7 percent) have the same name as a pump of the same technology in their village.
I use this information to run two robustness tests. First, I estimate the main
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centrality specifications (from Table 1.2) but excluding all observations that share
the same water point name with another water point in their village. The results
are shown in Table A.20. Second, I estimate the main centrality specifications but
treating pumps with the same name and of the same technology as a single observa-
tion, averaging pump characteristics between them. The dependent variable will be
the proportion of pumps that are functional in these newly defined ‘communities’,
and so I use a linear regression, with the results given in Table A.21.
Table A.20: Main specifications, excluding observations with same name.
Excluding observations that have the same water point name and are in the same
village does not significantly change the main estimated marginal effects.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Number of non-pump sources within 1.2km -0.141 -0.229* -0.275** -0.260** -0.285**
(0.127) (0.121) (0.121) (0.124) (0.129)
Number of pumps, diff tech within 1.2km -0.550** -0.0259 -0.233 -0.297 -0.364
(0.252) (0.201) (0.194) (0.192) (0.247)
Number of pumps, same tech within 1.2km 1.84*** 1.20*** 0.979*** 1.10*** 1.05***
(0.332) (0.254) (0.229) (0.229) (0.243)
Observations 9,464 9,464 9,464 9,464 9,464
Pseudo R2 0.012 0.114 0.149 0.162 0.163
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the ward level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1. Marginal effects reported in percentage points. The control variables used in each
specification correspond to those used in the main specification (reported in Table 1.2).
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Table A.21: Main specifications, merging observations with same name.
Treating pumps in the same village with the same name and technology as a single
observation does not significantly change the main estimated marginal effects.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Number of non-pump sources within 1.2km -0.204* -0.221** -0.244** -0.224** -0.244**
(0.112) (0.0937) (0.0948) (0.0934) (0.0981)
Number of pumps, diff tech within 1.2km -0.474** 0.0369 -0.0829 -0.142 -0.179
(0.228) (0.164) (0.166) (0.160) (0.210)
Number of pumps, same tech within 1.2km 1.72*** 1.05*** 0.856*** 0.948*** 0.916***
(0.273) (0.203) (0.182) (0.182) (0.194)
Number of pumps with same name and tech -1.26 -0.691 -0.358 -0.591 -0.735
(1.03) (1.10) (1.13) (1.19) (1.20)
Observations 10,302 10,302 10,302 10,302 10,302
R2 0.015 0.138 0.175 0.190 0.191
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the ward level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1. Marginal effects reported in percentage points. The control variables used in each
specification correspond to those used in the main specification (reported in Table 1.2).
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A.5.6 Do technology-specific physical shocks, or shocks to the commu-
nity that affect maintenance of one technology more than an-
other, explain the observed correlations?
Table A.22: Main specifications, district and technology interactions.
Including interactions between district fixed effects and technology dummies does
not change the key marginal effects.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Number of non-pump sources within 1.2km -0.226** -0.247*** -0.289*** -0.268*** -0.271***
(0.0915) (0.0933) (0.0934) (0.0923) (0.0951)
Number of pumps, diff tech within 1.2km 0.185 0.149 0.0743 0.0294 0.0115
(0.173) (0.153) (0.141) (0.141) (0.186)
Number of pumps, same tech within 1.2km 1.13*** 0.861*** 0.853*** 0.947*** 0.903***
(0.192) (0.182) (0.189) (0.203) (0.212)
Observations 10,667 10,667 10,667 10,667 10,667
R2 0.157 0.188 0.218 0.232 0.233
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the ward level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1. Marginal effects reported in percentage points. The control variables used in each
specification correspond to those used in the main specification (reported in Table 1.2).
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A.5.7 Do year of installation and technology-specific fixed effects (and
their interaction) explain these correlations?
Table A.23: Main specifications, year and technology interactions. Includ-
ing dummies for the year of installation, technology dummies and their interactions
does not change the key marginal effects.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Number of non-pump sources within 1.2km -0.262** -0.226** -0.296*** -0.271*** -0.284***
(0.106) (0.0932) (0.0930) (0.0895) (0.0958)
Number of pumps, diff tech within 1.2km 0.0825 0.0455 0.0354 -0.0133 -0.142
(0.115) (0.157) (0.156) (0.152) (0.195)
Number of pumps, same tech within 1.2km 1.20*** 0.908*** 0.877*** 0.961*** 0.868***
(0.207) (0.193) (0.174) (0.172) (0.191)
Observations 10,667 10,667 10,667 10,667 10,667
R2 0.122 0.188 0.204 0.219 0.220
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the ward level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1. Marginal effects reported in percentage points. The control variables used in each
specification correspond to those used in the main specification (reported in Table 1.2).
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A.6 Derivation of likelihood
This section fills out the missing steps from section 1.6, to derive the expressions
for fξw(v¯w|w), σ2ξw , σ2w and ρw in terms of our structural parameters.
First note that we can use an orthogonal decomposition of ξw to give
ξw
σξw
= ρw
w
σw
+ω
such that ω ∼ N(0, 1−ρ2w). We can use this decomposition to rearrange the density
in terms of ω, and then standardize this as follows:
fξw(v¯w|w) = fξw(yw − β0 − β1
1
nw
nw∑
i=1
mi − β2 1
nw
nw∑
i=1
m¯−i −Xawβ︸ ︷︷ ︸
v¯w
|w) (A.6.1)
= f (ξw = v¯w|w) (A.6.2)
= f
(
ρw
σξw
σw
w + σξwω = v¯w
)
(A.6.3)
= f
(
ω =
v¯w − ρw σξwσw w
σξw
)
(A.6.4)
=
1
σξw
√
1− ρ2w
φ
(
v¯w − ρw σξwσw w
σξw
√
1− ρ2w
)
(A.6.5)
To derive σ2ξw , σ
2
w and ρw, recall that i = η1c + η2i + η3i and ξi = bη2i + η4i, where
η1c, η2i, η3i, η4i are independent normal random variables with variances σ
2
1, σ
2
2, σ
2
3, σ
2
4.
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Therefore, we get σ2ξw , σ
2
w and ρw in terms of our structural parameters:
w =
1
ncw
ncw∑
c=1
η1c +
1
nw
nw∑
i=1
(η2i + η3i) ⇒ σ2w =
σ21
ncw
+
σ22 + σ
2
3
nw
(A.6.6)
ξw =
1
nw
nw∑
i=1
(bη2i + η4i) ⇒ σ2ξw =
b2σ22 + σ
2
4
nw
(A.6.7)
σw,ξw =E
b( 1
nw
nw∑
i=1
η2i
)2 = bσ22
nw
⇒ ρw = bσ
2
2/nw
σwσξw
(A.6.8)
A.7 Simulations to test performance of estimation proce-
dure
This section shows the performance of the estimation procedure for simulated data.
Figure A.41 shows that the simulated likelihood function is well behaved, and at-
tains a maximum around the true parameter values. Figure A.42 shows the perfor-
mance of estimates of the δ parameters as we increase the number of observations
in the simulation (equivalent figures for other model parameters are available upon
request). To carry out this Monte Carlo exercise, I generated a dataset of 1000
clusters of size 8, with random characteristics of water sources (including location,
type and technology), then estimated the model on the first 100 clusters, then the
first 200 clusters and so on. This, and similar exercises, indicated that I need more
than 2400 observations with reasonable variation in the key model parameters for
the estimates to converge to the true parameters.
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Figure A.41: Shape of simulated likelihood function. The likelihood function
achieves a maximum very close to the true parameters in simulations, and is well
behaved.
Notes: Simulated data was constructed to closely match the sample used to estimate the model
(see section 1.6.1). There are 789 wards, each containing 2-7 clusters (randomly selected), with
each cluster containing 1-10 observations (randomly selected), giving a total of 19,399 observations.
42 percent of observations are pumps.
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Figure A.42: Performance of estimation procedure as we increase the
sample size (selected parameters). The estimated parameters are close to
the true parameters used to simulate the data when there are more than 300-
400 clusters (2400-3200 observations). The estimation procedure is not able to
separately identify δ0 and δ3 when there are fewer clusters.
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Appendix B: Chapter 2
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B.1 Proof of bias in linear model
[
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B.2 Simulation of linear model with continuous treatment
variable
We estimated the parameters of the model using both the reduced form and two-
step structural bias-correction procedure on a large number of simulated datasets.
We present estimates from ten simulated datasets which we think are representative
of our simulation results and help to demonstrate how the bias of the reduced form
estimates change as we vary the key parameters, κ, ϕ, φ, γ, θ. Simulation 1 can be
thought of as the ‘baseline’ simulation, with simulations 2-10 changing exactly one
key parameter from the baseline simulation. Simulations 2-4 vary φ, the effect of the
interaction between xi and Nix on outcomes, to see how the size of this parameter
affects the bias. Simulations 5 and 6 vary ϕ, simulation 7 varies κ, simulations 8
and 9 vary γ, and simulation 10 varies θ. All other parameters are identical across
the simulations, and the data is constructed in an identical way, including:
• the number of clusters, n, is 150;
• the number of individuals in each cluster, nk, is 50;
• the constant term, c0 is equal to zero;
• the output shock, i, is normally distributed with a standard deviation, σ, of
0.5; and
• the random shock to the direct effects of the treatment, ξi, is normally dis-
tributed with a standard deviation, σξ, of
√
3/2, and it is correlated within
clusters, and with i.
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